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The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine
Scott Aaronson∗
Abstract
In honor of Alan Turing’s hundredth birthday, I unwisely set out some thoughts about one of
Turing’s obsessions throughout his life, the question of physics and free will. I focus relatively
narrowly on a notion that I call “Knightian freedom”: a certain kind of in-principle physical un-
predictability that goes beyond probabilistic unpredictability. Other, more metaphysical aspects
of free will I regard as possibly outside the scope of science.
I examine a viewpoint, suggested independently by Carl Hoefer, Cristi Stoica, and even
Turing himself, that tries to find scope for “freedom” in the universe’s boundary conditions
rather than in the dynamical laws. Taking this viewpoint seriously leads to many interesting
conceptual problems. I investigate how far one can go toward solving those problems, and
along the way, encounter (among other things) the No-Cloning Theorem, the measurement
problem, decoherence, chaos, the arrow of time, the holographic principle, Newcomb’s paradox,
Boltzmann brains, algorithmic information theory, and the Common Prior Assumption. I also
compare the viewpoint explored here to the more radical speculations of Roger Penrose.
The result of all this is an unusual perspective on time, quantum mechanics, and causation,
of which I myself remain skeptical, but which has several appealing features. Among other
things, it suggests interesting empirical questions in neuroscience, physics, and cosmology; and
takes a millennia-old philosophical debate into some underexplored territory.
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Postcard from Alan M. Turing to Robin Gandy, March 1954 (reprinted in Hodges [43])
It reads, in part:
Messages from the Unseen World
The Universe is the interior of the Light Cone of the Creation
Science is a Differential Equation. Religion is a Boundary Condition
“Arthur Stanley” refers to Arthur Stanley Eddington, whose books were a major early influence
on Turing.
3
1 Introduction
When I was a teenager, Alan Turing was at the top of my pantheon of scientific heroes, above even
Darwin, Ramanujan, Einstein, and Feynman. Some of the reasons were obvious: the founding of
computer science, the proof of the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the breaking of the
Nazi Enigma code, the unapologetic nerdiness and the near-martyrdom for human rights. But
beyond the facts of his biography, I idolized Turing as an “u¨ber-reductionist”: the scientist who
had gone further than anyone before him to reveal the mechanistic nature of reality. Through his
discovery of computational universality, as well as the Turing Test criterion for intelligence, Turing
finally unmasked the pretensions of anyone who claimed there was anything more to mind, brain,
or the physical world than the unfolding of an immense computation. After Turing, it seemed to
me, one could assert with confidence that all our hopes, fears, sensations, and choices were just
evanescent patterns in some sort of cellular automaton: that is, a huge array of bits, different in
detail but not in essence from Conway’s famous Game of Life,1 getting updated in time by simple,
local, mechanistic rules.
So it’s striking that Turing’s own views about these issues, as revealed in his lectures as well
as private correspondence, were much more complicated than my early caricature. As a teenager,
Turing devoured the popular books of Sir Arthur Eddington, who was one of the first (though not,
of course, the last!) to speculate about the implications of the then-ongoing quantum revolution in
physics for ancient questions about mind and free will. Later, as a prize from his high school in
1932, Turing selected John von Neumann’s just-published Mathematische Grundlagen der Quan-
tenmechanik [65]: a treatise on quantum mechanics famous for its mathematical rigor, but also for
its perspective that the collapse of the wavefunction ultimately involves the experimenter’s mental
state. As detailed by Turing biographer Andrew Hodges [43], these early readings had a major
impact on Turing’s intellectual preoccupations throughout his life, and probably even influenced
his 1936 work on the theory of computing.
Turing also had a more personal reason for worrying about these “deep” questions. In 1930,
Christopher Morcom—Turing’s teenage best friend, scientific peer, and (probably) unrequited
love—died from tuberculosis, sending a grief-stricken Turing into long ruminations about the na-
ture of personal identity and consciousness. Let me quote from a remarkable disquisition, entitled
“Nature of Spirit,” that the 19-year-old Turing sent in 1932 to Christopher Morcom’s mother.
It used to be supposed in Science that if everything was known about the Universe
at any particular moment then we can predict what it will be through all the future.
This idea was really due to the great success of astronomical prediction. More modern
science however has come to the conclusion that when we are dealing with atoms and
electrons we are quite unable to know the exact state of them; our instruments being
made of atoms and electrons themselves. The conception then of being able to know
1Invented by the mathematician John Conway in 1970, the Game of Life involves a large two-dimensional array of
pixels, with each pixel either “live” or “dead.” At each (discrete) time step, the pixels get updated via a deterministic
rule: each live pixel “dies” if less than 2 or more than 3 of its 8 neighbors were alive, and each dead pixel “comes alive”
if exactly 3 of its 8 neighbors were alive. ‘Life’ is famous for the complicated, unpredictable patterns that typically
arise from a simple starting configuration and repeated application of the rules. Conway (see [53]) has expressed
certainty that, on a large enough Life board, living beings would arise, who would then start squabbling over territory
and writing learned PhD theses! Note that, with an exponentially-large Life board (and, say, a uniformly-random
initial configuration), Conway’s claim is vacuously true, in the sense that one could find essentially any regularity
one wanted just by chance. But one assumes that Conway meant something stronger.
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the exact state of the universe then really must break down on the small scale. This
means then that the theory which held that as eclipses etc. are predestined so were all
our actions breaks down too. We have a will which is able to determine the action of
the atoms probably in a small portion of the brain, or possibly all over it. The rest of
the body acts so as to amplify this. (Quoted in Hodges [43])
The rest of Turing’s letter discusses the prospects for the survival of the “spirit” after death, a
topic with obvious relevance to Turing at that time. In later years, Turing would eschew that sort
of mysticism. Yet even in a 1951 radio address defending the possibility of human-level artificial
intelligence, Turing still brought up Eddington, and the possible limits on prediction of human
brains imposed by the uncertainty principle:
If it is accepted that real brains, as found in animals, and in particular in men, are a sort
of machine it will follow that our digital computer suitably programmed, will behave
like a brain. [But the argument for this conclusion] involves several assumptions which
can quite reasonably be challenged. [It is] necessary that this machine should be of the
sort whose behaviour is in principle predictable by calculation. We certainly do not
know how any such calculation should be done, and it was even argued by Sir Arthur
Eddington that on account of the indeterminacy principle in quantum mechanics no
such prediction is even theoretically possible.2 (Reprinted in Shieber [80])
Finally, two years after his sentencing for “homosexual indecency,” and a few months before
his tragic death by self-poisoning, Turing wrote the striking aphorisms that I quoted earlier: “The
universe is the interior of the light-cone of the Creation. Science is a differential equation. Religion
is a boundary condition.”
The reason I’m writing this essay is that I think I now understand what Turing could have
meant by these remarks. Building on ideas of Hoefer [45], Stoica [85], and others, I’ll examine a
perspective—which I call the “freebit perspective,” for reasons to be explained later—that locates
a nontrivial sort of freedom in the universe’s boundary conditions, even while embracing the me-
chanical nature of the time-evolution laws. We’ll find that a central question, for this perspective,
is how well complicated biological systems like human brains can actually be predicted: not by
hypothetical Laplace demons, but by prediction devices compatible with the laws of physics. It’s
in the discussion of this predictability question (and only there) that quantum mechanics enters
the story.
Of course, the idea that quantum mechanics might have something to do with free will is not
new; neither are the problems with that idea or the controversy surrounding it. While I chose
Turing’s postcard for the opening text of this essay, I also could have chosen a striking claim by
Niels Bohr, from a 1932 lecture about the implications of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle:
[W]e should doubtless kill an animal if we tried to carry the investigation of its organs
so far that we could tell the part played by the single atoms in vital functions. In
2As Hodges (personal communication) points out, it’s interesting to contrast these remarks with a view Turing
had expressed just a year earlier, in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” [89]: “It is true that a discrete-state
machine must be different from a continuous machine. But if we adhere to the conditions of the imitation game,
the interrogator will not be able to take any advantage of this difference.” Note that there’s no actual contradiction
between this statement and the one about the uncertainty principle, especially if we distinguish (as I will) between
simulating a particular brain and simulating some brain-like entity able to pass the Turing test. However, I’m not
aware of any place where Turing explicitly makes that distinction.
every experiment on living organisms there must remain some uncertainty as regards
the physical conditions to which they are subjected, and the idea suggests itself that
the minimal freedom we must allow the organism will be just large enough to permit
it, so to say, to hide its ultimate secrets from us. (Reprinted in [17])
Or this, from the physicist Arthur Compton:
A set of known physical conditions is not adequate to specify precisely what a forth-
coming event will be. These conditions, insofar as they can be known, define instead
a range of possible events from among which some particular event will occur. When
one exercises freedom, by his act of choice he is himself adding a factor not supplied by
the physical conditions and is thus himself determining what will occur. That he does
so is known only to the person himself. From the outside one can see in his act only
the working of physical law. [24]
I want to know:
Were Bohr and Compton right or weren’t they? Does quantum mechanics (specifically,
say, the No-Cloning Theorem or the uncertainty principle) put interesting limits on an
external agent’s ability to scan, copy, and predict human brains and other complicated
biological systems, or doesn’t it?
Of course, one needs to spell out carefully what one means by “interesting limits,” an “external
agent,” the “ability to scan, copy, and predict,” and so forth.3 But once that’s done, I regard the
above as an unsolved scientific question, and a big one. Many people seem to think the answer
is obvious (though they disagree on what it is!), or else they reject the question as meaningless,
unanswerable, or irrelevant. In this essay I’ll argue strongly for a different perspective: that we
can easily imagine worlds consistent with quantum mechanics (and all other known physics and
biology) where the answer to the question is yes, and other such worlds where the answer is no.
And we don’t yet know which kind we live in. The most we can say is that, like P versus NP or
nature of quantum gravity, the question is well beyond our current ability to answer.
Furthermore, the two kinds of world lead, not merely to different philosophical stances, but
to different visions of the remote future. Will our descendants all choose to upload themselves
into a digital hive-mind, after a “technological singularity” that makes such things possible? Will
they then multiply themselves into trillions of perfect computer-simulated replicas, living in various
simulated worlds of their own invention, inside of which there might be further simulated worlds
with still more replicated minds? What will it be like to exist in so many manifestations: will each
copy have its own awareness, or will they comprise a single awareness that experiences trillions of
times more than we do? Supposing all this to be possible, is there any reason why our descendants
might want to hold back on it?
Now, if it turned out that Bohr and Compton were wrong—that human brains were as prob-
abilistically predictable by external agents as ordinary digital computers equipped with random-
number generators—then the freebit picture that I explore in this essay would be falsified, to
whatever extent it says anything interesting. It should go without saying that I see the freebit
picture’s vulnerability to future empirical findings as a feature rather than a bug.
3My own attempt to do so is in Appendix 12.
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In summary, I’ll make no claim to show here that the freebit picture is true. I’ll confine myself
to two weaker claims:
(1) That the picture is sensible (or rather, not obviously much crazier than the alternatives):
many considerations one might think would immediately make a hash of this picture, fail to
do so for interesting reasons.
(2) That the picture is falsifiable: there are open empirical questions that need to turn out one
way rather than another, for this picture to stand even a chance of working.
I ask others to take this essay as I do: as an exercise in what physicists call model-building.
I want to see how far I can get in thinking about time, causation, predictability, and quantum
mechanics in a certain unusual but apparently-consistent way. “Resolving” the millennia-old free
will debate isn’t even on the table! The most I can hope for, if I’m lucky, is to construct a model
whose strengths and weaknesses help to move the debate slightly forward.
1.1 “Free Will” Versus “Freedom”
There’s one terminological issue that experience has shown I need to dispense with before anything
else. In this essay, I’ll sharply distinguish between “free will” and another concept that I’ll call
“freedom,” and will mostly concentrate on the latter.
By “free will,” I’ll mean a metaphysical attribute that I hold to be largely outside the scope of
science—and which I can’t even define clearly, except to say that, if there’s an otherwise-undefinable
thing that people have tried to get at for centuries with the phrase “free will,” then free will is that
thing! More seriously, as many philosophers have pointed out, “free will” seems to combine two
distinct ideas: first, that your choices are “free” from any kind of external constraint; and second,
that your choices are not arbitrary or capricious, but are “willed by you.” The second idea—that
of being “willed by you”—is the one I consider outside the scope of science, for the simple reason
that no matter what the empirical facts were, a skeptic could always deny that a given decision
was “really” yours, and hold the true decider to have been God, the universe, an impersonating
demon, etc. I see no way to formulate, in terms of observable concepts, what it would even mean
for such a skeptic to be right or wrong.
But crucially, the situation seems different if we set aside the “will” part of free will, and
consider only the “free” part. Throughout, I’ll use the term freedom, or Knightian freedom, to
mean a certain strong kind of physical unpredictability: a lack of determination, even probabilistic
determination, by knowable external factors. That is, a physical system will be “free” if and
only if it’s unpredictable in a sufficiently strong sense, and “freedom” will simply be that property
possessed by free systems. A system that’s not “free” will be called “mechanistic.”
Many issues arise when we try to make the above notions more precise. For one thing, we need a
definition of unpredictability that does not encompass the “merely probabilistic” unpredictability
of (say) a photon or a radioactive atom—since, as I’ll discuss in Section 3, I accept the often-
made point that that kind of unpredictability has nothing to do with what most people would call
“freedom,” and is fully compatible with a system’s being “mechanistic.” Instead, we’ll want what
economists call “Knightian” unpredictability, meaning unpredictability that we lack a reliable way
even to quantify using probability distributions. Ideally, our criteria for Knightian unpredictability
will be so stringent that they won’t encompass systems like the Earth’s weather—for which, despite
the presence of chaos, we arguably can give very well-calibrated probabilistic forecasts.
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A second issue is that unpredictability seems observer-relative: a system that’s unpredictable
to one observer might be perfectly predictable to another. This is the reason why, throughout this
essay, I’ll be interested less in particular methods of prediction than in the best predictions that
could ever be made, consistent both with the laws of physics and with the need not to destroy the
system being studied.
This brings us to a third issue: it’s not obvious what should count as “destroying” the system, or
which interventions a would-be predictor should or shouldn’t be allowed to perform. For example,
in order to ease the prediction of a human brain, should a predictor first be allowed to replace each
neuron by a “functionally-equivalent” microchip? How would we decide whether the microchip
was functionally equivalent to the neuron?
I’ll offer detailed thoughts about these issues in Appendix 12. For now, though, the point I
want to make is that, once we do address these issues, it seems to me that “freedom”—in the sense
of Knightian unpredictability by any external physical observer—is perfectly within the scope of
science. We’re no longer talking about ethics, metaphysics, or the use of language: only about
whether such-and-such a system is or isn’t physically predictable in the relevant way! A similar
point was recently made forcefully by the philosopher Mark Balaguer [9], in his interesting book
Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. (However, while I strongly agree with Balaguer’s basic
thesis, as discussed above I reject any connection between freedom and “merely probabilistic”
unpredictability, whereas Balaguer seems to accept such a connection.)
Surprisingly, my experience has been that many scientifically-minded people will happily accept
that humans plausibly are physically unpredictable in the relevant sense. Or at least, they’ll accept
my own position, that whether humans are or aren’t so predictable is an empirical question whose
answer is neither obvious nor known. Again and again, I’ve found, people will concede that
chaos, the No-Cloning Theorem, or some other phenomenon might make human brains physically
unpredictable—indeed, they’ll seem oddly indifferent to the question of whether they do or don’t!
But they’ll never fail to add: “even if so, who cares? we’re just talking about unpredictability!
that obviously has nothing to do with free will !”
For my part, I grant that free will can’t be identified with unpredictability, without doing vi-
olence to the usual meanings of those concepts. Indeed, it’s precisely because I grant this that I
write, throughout the essay, about “freedom” (or “Knightian freedom”) rather than “free will.” I
insist, however, that unpredictability has something to do with free will—in roughly the same sense
that verbal intelligence has something to do with consciousness, or optical physics has something
to do with subjectively-perceived colors. That is, some people might see unpredictability as a pale
empirical shadow of the “true” metaphysical quality, free will, that we really want to understand.
But the great lesson of the scientific revolution, going back to Galileo, is that understanding the
“empirical shadow” of something is vastly better than not understanding the thing at all! Further-
more, the former might already be an immense undertaking, as understanding human intelligence
and the physical universe turned out to be (even setting aside the “mysteries” of consciousness and
metaphysics). Indeed I submit that, for the past four centuries, “start with the shadow” has been
a spectacularly fruitful approach to unravelling the mysteries of the universe: one that’s succeeded
where greedy attempts to go behind the shadow have failed. If one likes, the goal of this essay
is to explore what happens when one applies a “start with the shadow” approach to the free-will
debate.
Personally, I’d go even further than claiming a vague connection between unpredictability and
free will. Just as displaying intelligent behavior (by passing the Turing Test or some other means)
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might be thought a necessary condition for consciousness if not a sufficient one, so I tend to see
Knightian unpredictability as a necessary condition for free will. In other words, if a system were
completely predictable (even probabilistically) by an outside entity—not merely in principle but in
practice—then I find it hard to understand why we’d still want to ascribe “free will” to the system.
Why not admit that we now fully understand what makes this system tick?
However, I’m aware that many people sharply reject the idea that unpredictability is a necessary
condition for free will. Even if a computer in another room perfectly predicted all of their actions,
days in advance, these people would still call their actions “free,” so long as “they themselves
chose” the actions that the computer also predicted for them. In Section 2.5, I’ll explore some
of the difficulties that this position leads to when carried to science-fiction conclusions. For
now, though, it’s not important to dispute the point. I’ll happily settle for the weaker claim
that unpredictability has something to do with free will, just as intelligence has something to do
with consciousness. More precisely: in both cases, even when people think they’re asking purely
philosophical questions about the latter concept, much of what they want to know often turns
out to hinge on “grubby empirical questions” about the former concept!4 So if the philosophical
questions seem too ethereally inaccessible, then we might as well focus for a while on the scientific
ones.
1.2 Note on the Title
The term “ghost in the machine” was introduced in 1949 by Gilbert Ryle [73]. His purpose was
to ridicule the notion of a “mind-substance”: a mysterious entity that exists outside of space and
ordinary physical causation; has no size, weight, or other material properties; is knowable by its
possessor with absolute certainty (while the minds of others are not so knowable); and somehow
receives signals from the brain and influences the brain’s activity, even though it’s nowhere to
be found in the brain. Meanwhile, a quantum Turing machine, defined by Deutsch [30] (see
also Bernstein and Vazirani [13]), is a Turing machine able to exploit the principle of quantum
superposition. As far as anyone knows today [2], our universe seems to be efficiently simulable
by—or even “isomorphic to”—a quantum Turing machine, which would take as input the universe’s
quantum initial state (say, at the Big Bang), then run the evolution equations forward.
1.3 Level
Most of this essay should be accessible to any educated reader. In a few sections, though, I assume
familiarity with basic concepts from quantum mechanics, or (less often) relativity, thermodynamics,
Bayesian probability, or theoretical computer science. When I do review concepts from those fields,
I usually focus only on the ones most relevant to whatever point I’m making. To do otherwise
would make the essay even more absurdly long than it already is! Readers seeking an accessible
introduction to some of the established theories invoked in this essay might enjoy my recent book
Quantum Computing Since Democritus [4].5
4A perfect example of this phenomenon is provided by the countless people who claim that even if a computer
program passed the Turing Test, it still wouldn’t be conscious—and then, without batting an eye, defend that claim
using arguments that presuppose that the program couldn’t pass the Turing Test after all! (“Sure, the program
might solve math problems, but it could never write love poetry,” etc. etc.) The temptation to hitch metaphysical
claims to empirical ones, without even realizing the chasm one is crossing, seems incredibly strong.
5For the general reader, other good background reading for this essay might include From Eternity to Here by
Sean Carroll [20], The Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch [31], The Emperor’s New Mind by Roger Penrose
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In the main text, I’ve tried to keep the discussion extremely informal. I’ve found that, with
a contentious subject like free will, mathematical rigor (or the pretense of it) can easily obfuscate
more than it clarifies. However, for interested readers, I did put some more technical material into
appendices: a suggested formalization of “Knightian freedom” in Appendix 12; some observations
about prediction, Kolmogorov complexity, and the universal prior in Appendix 13; and a suggested
formalization of the notion of “freebits” in Appendix 3.1.
2 FAQ
In discussing a millennia-old conundrum like free will, a central difficulty is that almost everyone
already knows what he or she thinks—even if the certainties that one person brings to the discussion
are completely at odds with someone else’s. One practical consequence is that, no matter how
I organize this essay, I’m bound to make a large fraction of readers impatient; some will accuse
me of dodging the real issues by dwelling on irrelevancies. So without further ado, I’ll now offer
a “Frequently Asked Questions” list. In the thirteen questions below, I’ll engage determinists,
compatibilists, and others who might have strong a priori reasons to be leery of my whole project.
I’ll try to clarify my areas of agreement and disagreement, and hopefully convince the skeptics to
read further. Then, after developing my own ideas in Sections 3 and 4, I’ll come back and address
still further objections in Section 5.
2.1 Narrow Scientism
For thousands of years, the free-will debate has encompassed moral, legal, phenomeno-
logical, and even theological questions. You seem to want to sweep all of that away,
and focus exclusively on what would some would consider a narrow scientific issue
having to do with physical predictability. Isn’t that presumptuous?
On the contrary, it seems presumptuous not to limit my scope! Since it’s far beyond my aims
and abilities to address all aspects of the free-will debate, as discussed in Section 1.1 I decided
to focus on one issue: the physical and technological questions surrounding how well human and
animal brains can ever be predicted, in principle, by external entities that also want to keep those
brains alive. I focus on this for several reasons: because it seems underexplored; because I might
have something to say about it; and because even if what I say is wrong, the predictability issue
has the appealing property that progress on it seems possible. Indeed, even if one granted—which
I don’t—that the predictability issue had nothing to do with the “true” mystery of free will, I’d
still care about the former at least as much as I cared about the latter!
However, in the interest of laying all my cards on the table, let me offer some brief remarks on
the moral, legal, phenomenological, and theological aspects of free will.
On the moral and legal aspects, my own view is summed up beautifully by the Ambrose Bierce
poem:
There’s no free will, says the philosopher
To hang is most unjust.
There’s no free will, assent the officers
[67], or Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem by Mark Balaguer [9]. Obviously, none of these authors necessarily
endorse everything I say (or vice versa)! What the books have in common is simply that they explain one or more
concepts invoked in this essay in much more detail than I do.
10
We hang because we must. [14]
For the foreseeable future, I can’t see that the legal or practical implications of the free-will
debate are nearly as great as many commentators have made them out to be, for the simple reason
that (as Bierce points out) any implications would apply “symmetrically,” to accused and accuser
alike.
But I would go further: I’ve found many discussions about free will and legal responsibility to
be downright patronizing. The subtext of such discussions usually seems to be:
We, the educated, upper-class people having this conversation, should accept that the
entire concept of “should” is quaint and misguided, when it comes to the uneducated,
lower-class sorts of people who commit crimes. Those poor dears’ upbringing, brain
chemistry, and so forth absolve them of any real responsibility for their crimes: the
notion that they had the “free will” to choose otherwise is just na¨ıve. My friends and
I are right because we accept that enlightened stance, while other educated people are
wrong because they fail to accept it. For us educated people, of course, the relevance
of the categories “right” and “wrong” requires no justification or argument.
Or conversely:
Whatever the truth, we educated people should maintain that all people are responsi-
ble for their choices—since otherwise, we’d have no basis to punish the criminals and
degenerates in our midst, and civilization would collapse. For us, of course, the mean-
ingfulness of the word “should” in the previous sentence is not merely a useful fiction,
but is clear as day.
On the phenomenological aspects of free will: if someone claimed to know, from introspection,
either that free will exists or that it doesn’t exist, then of course I could never refute that person
to his or her satisfaction. But precisely because one can’t decide between conflicting introspective
reports, in this essay I’ll be exclusively interested in what can be learned from scientific observation
and argument. Appeals to inner experience—including my own and the reader’s—will be out of
bounds. Likewise, while it might be impossible to avoid grazing the “mystery of consciousness” in
a discussion of human predictability, I’ll do my best to avoid addressing that mystery head-on.
On the theological aspects of free will: probably the most relevant thing to say is that, even if
there existed an omniscient God who knew all of our future choices, that fact wouldn’t concern us
in this essay, unless God’s knowledge could somehow be made manifest in the physical world, and
used to predict our choices. In that case, however, we’d no longer be talking about “theological”
aspects of free will, but simply again about scientific aspects.
2.2 Bait-and-Switch
Despite everything you said in Section 1.1, I’m still not convinced that we can learn
anything about free will from an analysis of unpredictability. Isn’t that a shameless
“bait-and-switch”?
Yes, but it’s a shameless bait-and-switch with a distinguished history! I claim that, whenever
it’s been possible to make definite progress on ancient philosophical problems, such progress has
almost always involved a similar “bait-and-switch.” In other words: one replaces an unanswerable
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philosophical riddle Q by a “merely” scientific or mathematical question Q′, which captures part
of what people have wanted to know when they’ve asked Q. Then, with luck, one solves Q′.
Of course, even if Q′ is solved, centuries later philosophers might still be debating the exact
relation between Q and Q′! And further exploration might lead to other scientific or mathematical
questions—Q′′, Q′′′, and so on—which capture aspects of Q that Q′ left untouched. But from my
perspective, this process of “breaking off” answerable parts of unanswerable riddles, then trying to
answer those parts, is the closest thing to philosophical progress that there is.
Successful examples of this breaking-off process fill intellectual history. The use of calculus
to treat infinite series, the link between mental activity and nerve impulses, natural selection,
set theory and first-order logic, special relativity, Go¨del’s theorem, game theory, information the-
ory, computability and complexity theory, the Bell inequality, the theory of common knowledge,
Bayesian causal networks—each of these advances addressed questions that could rightly have been
called “philosophical” before the advance was made. And after each advance, there was still plenty
for philosophers to debate about truth and provability and infinity, space and time and causality,
probability and information and life and mind. But crucially, it seems to me that the technical ad-
vances transformed the philosophical discussion as philosophical discussion itself rarely transforms
it! And therefore, if such advances don’t count as “philosophical progress,” then it’s not clear that
anything should.
Appropriately for this essay, perhaps the best precedent for my bait-and-switch is the Turing
Test. Turing began his famous 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” [89] with the
words:
I propose to consider the question, “Can machines think?”
But after a few pages of ground-clearing, he wrote:
The original question, “Can machines think?” I believe to be too meaningless to deserve
discussion.
So with legendary abruptness, Turing simply replaced the original question by a different one:
“Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game”—i.e., which
would successfully fool human interrogators in a teletype conversation into thinking they were
human? Though some writers would later accuse Turing of conflating intelligence with the “mere
simulation” of it, Turing was perfectly clear about what he was doing:
I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed
in relatively unambiguous words ... We cannot altogether abandon the original form of
the problem, for opinions will differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution and
we must at least listen to what has to be said in this connexion [sic].
The claim is not that the new question, about the imitation game, is identical to the original
question about machine intelligence. The claim, rather, is that the new question is a worthy
candidate for what we should have asked or meant to have asked, if our goal was to learn something
new rather than endlessly debating definitions. In math and science, the process of revising one’s
original question is often the core of a research project, with the actual answering of the revised
question being the relatively easy part!
A good replacement question Q′ should satisfy two properties:
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(a) Q′ should capture some aspect of the original question Q—so that an answer to Q′ would be
hard to ignore in any subsequent discussion of Q.
(b) Q′ should be precise enough that one can see what it would mean to make progress on Q′:
what experiments one would need to do, what theorems one would need to prove, etc.
The Turing Test, I think, captured people’s imaginations precisely because it succeeded so well
at (a) and (b). Let me put it this way: if a digital computer were built that aced the imitation
game, then it’s hard to see what more science could possibly say in support of machine intelligence
being possible. Conversely, if digital computers were proved unable to win the imitation game, then
it’s hard to see what more science could say in support of machine intelligence not being possible.
Either way, though, we’re no longer “slashing air,” trying to pin down the true meanings of words
like “machine” and “think”: we’ve hit the relatively-solid ground of a science and engineering
problem. Now if we want to go further we need to dig (that is, do research in cognitive science,
machine learning, etc). This digging might take centuries of backbreaking work; we have no idea
if we’ll ever reach the bottom. But at least it’s something humans know how to do and have done
before. Just as important, diggers (unlike air-slashers) tend to uncover countless treasures besides
the ones they were looking for.
By analogy, in this essay I advocate replacing the question of whether humans have free will,
by the question of how accurately their choices can be predicted, in principle, by external agents
compatible with the laws of physics. And while I don’t pretend that the “replacement” question is
identical to the original, I do claim the following: if humans turned out to be arbitrarily predictable
in the relevant sense, then it’s hard to see what more science could possibly say in support of “free
will being a chimera.” Conversely, if a fundamental reason were discovered why the appropriate
“prediction game” couldn’t be won, then it’s hard to see what more science could say in support of
“free will being real.”
Either way, I’ll try to sketch the research program that confronts us if we take the question
seriously: a program that spans neuroscience, chemistry, physics, and even cosmology. Not sur-
prisingly, much of this program consists of problems that scientists in the relevant fields are already
working on, or longstanding puzzles of which they’re well aware. But there are also questions—for
example, about the “past macroscopic determinants” of the quantum states occurring in nature—
which as far as I know haven’t been asked in the form they take here.
2.3 Compatibilism
Like many scientifically-minded people, I’m a compatibilist : someone who believes free
will can exist even in a mechanistic universe. For me, “free will is as real as baseball,”
as the physicist Sean Carroll memorably put it.6 That is, the human capacity to weigh
options and make a decision “exists” in the same sense as Sweden, caramel corn, anger,
or other complicated notions that might interest us, but that no one expects to play
a role in the fundamental laws of the universe. As for the fundamental laws, I believe
them to be completely mechanistic and impersonal: as far as they know or care, a
human brain is just one more evanescent pattern of computation, along with sunspots
and hurricanes. Do you dispute any of that? What, if anything, can a compatibilist
take from your essay?
6See blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2011/07/13/free-will-is-as-real-as-baseball/
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I have a lot of sympathy for compatibilism—certainly more than for an incurious mysticism
that doesn’t even try to reconcile itself with a scientific worldview. So I hope compatibilists will
find much of what I have say “compatible” with their own views!
Let me first clear up a terminological confusion. Compatibilism is often defined as the belief
that free will is compatible with determinism. But as far as I can see, the question of determinism
versus indeterminism has almost nothing to do with what compatibilists actually believe. After all,
most compatibilists happily accept quantum mechanics, with its strong indeterminist implications
(see Question 2.8), but regard it as having almost no bearing on their position. No doubt some
compatibilists find it important to stress that even if classical physics had been right, there still
would have been no difficulty for free will. But it seems to me that one can be a “compatibilist”
even while denying that point, or remaining agnostic about it. In this essay, I’ll simply define
“compatibilism” to be the belief that free will is compatible with a broadly mechanistic worldview—
that is, with a universe governed by impersonal mathematical laws of some kind. Whether it’s
important that those laws be probabilistic (or chaotic, or computationally universal, or whatever
else), I’ll regard as internal disputes within compatibilism.
I can now come to the question: is my perspective compatible with compatibilism? Alas, at
the risk of sounding lawyerly, I can’t answer without a further distinction! Let’s define strong
compatibilism to mean the belief that the statement “Alice has free will” is compatible with the
actual, physical existence of a machine that predicts all of Alice’s future choices—a machine whose
predictions Alice herself can read and verify after the fact. (Where by “predict,” we mean “in
roughly the same sense that quantum mechanics predicts the behavior of a radioactive atom”: that
is, by giving arbitrarily-accurate probabilities, in cases where deterministic prediction is physically
impossible.) By contrast, let’s define weak compatibilism to mean the belief that “Alice has free
will” is compatible with Alice living in a mechanistic, law-governed universe—but not necessarily
with her living in a universe where the prediction machine can be built.
Then my perspective is compatible with weak compatibilism, but incompatible with strong
compatibilism. My perspective embraces the mechanical nature of the universe’s time-evolution
laws, and in that sense is proudly “compatibilist.” On the other hand, I care whether our choices can
actually be mechanically predicted—not by hypothetical Laplace demons but by physical machines.
I’m troubled if they are, and I take seriously the possibility that they aren’t (e.g., because of chaotic
amplification of unknowable details of the initial conditions).
2.4 Quantum Flapdoodle
The usual motivation for mentioning quantum mechanics and mind in the same breath
has been satirized as “quantum mechanics is mysterious, the mind is also mysterious,
ergo they must be related somehow”! Aren’t you worried that, merely by writing an
essay that seems to take such a connection seriously, you’ll fan the flames of pseudo-
science? That any subtleties and caveats in your position will quickly get lost?
Yes! Even though I can only take responsibility for what I write, not for what various Internet
commentators, etc. might mistakenly think I wrote, it would be distressing to see this essay twisted
to support credulous doctrines that I abhor. So for the record, let me state the following:
(a) I don’t think quantum mechanics, or anything else, lets us “bend the universe to our will,”
except through interacting with our external environments in the ordinary causal ways. Nor
do I think that quantum mechanics says “everything is holistically connected to everything
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else” (whatever that means). Proponents of these ideas usually invoke the phenomenon
of quantum entanglement between particles, which can persist no matter how far apart the
particles are. But contrary to a widespread misunderstanding encouraged by generations of
“quantum mystics,” it’s an elementary fact that entanglement does not allow instantaneous
communication. More precisely, quantum mechanics is “local” in the following sense: if Alice
and Bob share a pair of entangled particles, that nothing that Alice does to her particle
only can affect the probability of any outcome of any measurement that Bob performs on
his particle only.7 Because of the famous Bell inequality, it’s crucial that we don’t interpret
the concept of “locality” to mean more than that! But quantum mechanics’ revision to our
concept of locality is so subtle that neither scientists, mystics, nor anyone else anticipated it
beforehand.
(b) I don’t think quantum mechanics has vindicated Eastern religious teachings, any more than
(say) Big Bang cosmology has vindicated the Genesis account of creation. In both cases, while
there are interesting parallels, I find it dishonest to seek out only the points of convergence
while ignoring the many inconvenient parts that don’t fit! Personally, I’d say that the
quantum picture of the world—as a complex unit vector |ψ〉 evolving linearly in a Hilbert
space—is not a close match to any pre-20th-century conception of reality.
(c) I don’t think quantum mechanics has overthrown Enlightenment ideals of science and ra-
tionality. Quantum mechanics does overthrow the “na¨ıve realist” vision of particles with
unambiguous trajectories through space, and it does raise profound conceptual problems that
will concern us later on. On the other hand, the point is still to describe a physical world
external to our minds by positing a “state” for that world, giving precise mathematical rules
for the evolution of the state, and testing the results against observation. Compared to
classical physics, the reliance on mathematics has only increased; while the Enlightenment
ideal of describing Nature as we find it to be, rather than as intuition says it “must” be, is
emphatically upheld.
(d) I don’t think the human brain is a quantum computer in any interesting sense. As I explain
in [4], at least three considerations lead me to this opinion. First, it would be nearly
miraculous if complicated entangled states—which today, can generally survive for at most a
few seconds in near-absolute-zero laboratory conditions—could last for any appreciable time
in the hot, wet environment of the brain. (Many researchers have made some version of that
argument, but see Tegmark [88] for perhaps the most detailed version.) Second, the sorts of
tasks quantum computers are known to be good at (for example, factoring large integers and
simulating quantum systems) seem like a terrible fit to the sorts of tasks that humans seem
be good at, or that could have plausibly had survival value on the African savannah! Third,
and most importantly, I don’t see anything that the brain being a quantum computer would
plausibly help to explain. For example, why would a conscious quantum computer be any less
mysterious than a conscious classical computer? My conclusion is that, if quantum effects
play any role in the brain, then such effects are almost certainly short-lived and microscopic.8
At the “macro” level of most interest to neuroscience, the evidence is overwhelming that
7Assuming, of course, that we don’t condition on Alice’s knowledge—something that could change Bob’s proba-
bilities even in the case of mere classical correlation between the particles.
8This is not to say, of course, that the brain’s activity might not amplify such effects to the macroscopic, classical
scale—a possibility that will certainly concern us later on.
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the brain’s computation and information storage are classical. (See Section 6 for further
discussion of these issues in the context of Roger Penrose’s views.)
(e) I don’t think consciousness is in any sense necessary to bring about the “reduction of the
wavefunction” in quantum measurement. And I say that, despite freely confessing to unease
with all existing accounts of quantum measurement! My position is that, to whatever ex-
tent the reduction of the wavefunction is a real process at all (as opposed to an artifact of
observers’ limited perspectives, as in the Many-Worlds Interpretation), it must be a process
that can occur even in interstellar space, with no conscious observers anywhere around. For
otherwise, we’re forced to the absurd conclusion that the universe’s quantum state evolved
linearly via the Schro¨dinger equation for billions of years, until the first observers arose (who:
humans? monkeys? aliens?) and looked around them—at which instant the state suddenly
and violently collapsed!
If one likes, whatever I do say about quantum mechanics and mind in this essay will be said
in the teeth of the above points. In other words, I’ll regard points (a)-(e) as sufficiently well-
established to serve as useful constraints, which a new proposal ought to satisfy as a prerequisite
to being taken seriously.
2.5 Brain-Uploading: Who Cares?
Suppose it were possible to “upload” a human brain to a computer, and thereafter
predict the brain unlimited accuracy. Who cares? Why should anyone even worry
that that would create a problem for free will or personal identity?
For me, the problem comes from the observation that it seems impossible to give any operational
difference between a perfect predictor of your actions, and a second copy or instantiation of yourself.
If there are two entities, both of which respond to every situation exactly as “you” would, then
by what right can we declare that only one such entity is the “real” you, and the other is just a
predictor, simulation, or model? But having multiple copies of you in the same universe seems to
open a Pandora’s box of science-fiction paradoxes. Furthermore, these paradoxes aren’t “merely
metaphysical”: they concern how you should do science knowing there might be clones of yourself,
and which predictions and decisions you should make.
Since this point is important, let me give some examples. Planning a dangerous mountain-
climbing trip? Before you go, make a backup of yourself—or two or three—so that if tragedy
should strike, you can restore from backup and then continue life as if you’d never left. Want
to visit Mars? Don’t bother with the perilous months-long journey through space; just use a
brain-scanning machine to “fax yourself” there as pure information, whereupon another machine
on Mars will construct a new body for you, functionally identical to the original.
Admittedly, some awkward questions arise. For example, after you’ve been faxed to Mars,
what should be done with the “original” copy of you left on Earth? Should it be destroyed with a
quick, painless gunshot to the head? Would you agree to be “faxed” to Mars, knowing that that’s
what would be done to the original? Alternatively, if the original were left alive, then what makes
you sure you would “wake up” as the copy on Mars? At best, wouldn’t you have 50/50 odds of
still finding yourself on Earth? Could that problem be “solved” by putting a thousand copies of
you on Mars, while leaving only one copy on Earth? Likewise, suppose you return unharmed from
your mountain-climbing trip, and decide that the backup copies you made before you left are now
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an expensive nuisance. If you destroy them, are you guilty of murder? Or is it more like suicide?
Or neither?
Here’s a “purer” example of such a puzzle, which I’ve adapted from the philosopher Nick
Bostrom [18]. Suppose an experimenter flips a fair coin while you lie anesthetized in a white,
windowless hospital room. If the coin lands heads, then she’ll create a thousand copies of you,
place them in a thousand identical rooms, and wake each one up. If the coin lands tails, then she’ll
wake you up without creating any copies. You wake up in a white, windowless room just like the
one you remember. Knowing the setup of the experiment, at what odds should you be willing to
bet that the coin landed heads? Should your odds just be 50/50, since the coin was fair? Or
should they be biased 1000:1 in favor of the coin having landed heads—since if it did land heads,
then there are a thousand of you confronting the same situation, compared to only one if the coin
landed tails?
Many people immediately respond that the odds should be 50/50: they consider it a metaphys-
ical absurdity to adjust the odds based on the number of copies of yourself in existence. (Are we
to imagine a “warehouse full of souls,” with the odds of any particular soul being taken out of the
warehouse proportional to the number of suitable bodies for it?) However, those who consider
50/50 the obvious answer should consider a slight variant of the puzzle. Suppose that, if the coin
lands tails, then as before the experimenter leaves a single copy of you in a white room. If the coin
lands heads, then the experimenter creates a thousand copies of you and places them in a thousand
windowless rooms. Now, though, 999 of the rooms are painted blue; only one of the rooms is white
like you remember.
You wake up from the anesthesia and find yourself in a white room. Now what posterior
probability should you assign to the coin having landed heads? If you answered 50/50 to the
first puzzle, then a simple application of Bayes’ rule implies that, in the second puzzle, you should
consider it overwhelmingly likely that the coin landed tails. For if the coin landed heads, then
presumably you had a 99.9% probability of being one of the 999 copies who woke up in a blue room.
So the fact that you woke up in a white room furnishes powerful evidence about the coin. Not
surprisingly, many people find this result just as metaphysically unacceptable as the 1000:1 answer
to the first puzzle! Yet as Bostrom points out, it seems mathematically inconsistent to insist on
50/50 as the answer to both puzzles.
Probably the most famous “paradox of brain-copying” was invented by Simon Newcomb, then
popularized by Robert Nozick [66] and Martin Gardner [39]. In Newcomb’s paradox, a superintel-
ligent “Predictor” presents you with two closed boxes, and offers you a choice between opening the
first box only or opening both boxes. Either way, you get to keep whatever you find in the box or
boxes that you open. The contents of the first box can vary—sometimes it contains $1,000,000,
sometimes nothing—but the second box always contains $1,000.
Just from what was already said, it seems that it must be preferable to open both boxes. For
whatever you would get by opening the first box only, you can get $1,000 more by opening the
second box as well. But here’s the catch: using a detailed brain model, the Predictor has already
foreseen your choice. If it predicted that you would open both boxes, then the Predictor left the
first box empty; while if it predicted that you would open the first box only, then the Predictor
put $1,000,000 in the first box. Furthermore, the Predictor has played this game hundreds of
times before, both with you and with other people, and its predictions have been right every time.
Everyone who opened the first box ended up with $1,000,000, while everyone who opened both
boxes ended up with only $1,000. Knowing all of this, what do you do?
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Some people dismiss the problem as contradictory—arguing that, if the assumed Predictor
exists, then you have no free will, so there’s no use fretting over how many boxes to open since
your choice is already predetermined anyway. Among those willing to play along, opinion has been
split for decades between “one-boxers” and “two-boxers.” Lately, though, the one-boxers seem to
have been gaining the upper hand—and reasonably so in my opinion, since by the assumptions of
the thought experiment, the one-boxers do always walk away richer!
As I see it, the real problem is to explain how one-boxing could possibly be rational, given
that, at the time you’re contemplating your decision, the million dollars are either in the first
box or not. Can a last-minute decision to open both boxes somehow “reach backwards in time,”
causing the million dollars that “would have been” in the first box to disappear? Do we need to
distinguish between your “actual” choices and your “dispositions,” and say that, while one-boxing
is admittedly irrational, making yourself into the sort of person who one-boxes is rational?
While I consider myself a one-boxer, the only justification for one-boxing that makes sense to
me goes as follows.9 In principle, you could base your decision of whether to one-box or two-box
on anything you like: for example, on whether the name of some obscure childhood friend had an
even or odd number of letters. However, this suggests that the problem of predicting whether
you will one-box or two-box is “you-complete.”10 In other words, if the Predictor can solve this
problem reliably, then it seems to me that it must possess a simulation of you so detailed as to
constitute another copy of you (as discussed previously).
But in that case, to whatever extent we want to think about Newcomb’s paradox in terms of
a freely-willed decision at all, we need to imagine two entities separated in space and time—the
“flesh-and-blood you,” and the simulated version being run by the Predictor—that are nevertheless
“tethered together” and share common interests. If we think this way, then we can easily explain
why one-boxing can be rational, even without backwards-in-time causation. Namely, as you
contemplate whether to open one box or two, who’s to say that you’re not “actually” the simulation?
If you are, then of course your decision can affect what the Predictor does in an ordinary, causal
way.
For me, the takeaway is this. If any of these technologies—brain-uploading, teleportation, the
Newcomb predictor, etc.—were actually realized, then all sorts of “woolly metaphysical questions”
about personal identity and free will would start to have practical consequences. Should you fax
yourself to Mars or not? Sitting in the hospital room, should you bet that the coin landed heads
or tails? Should you expect to “wake up” as one of your backup copies, or as a simulation being
run by the Newcomb Predictor? These questions all seem “empirical,” yet one can’t answer them
without taking an implicit stance on questions that many people would prefer to regard as outside
the scope of science.
Thus, the idea that we can “escape all that philosophical crazy-talk” by declaring that the
human mind is a computer program running on the hardware of the brain, and that’s all there
is to it, strikes me as ironically backwards. Yes, we can say that, and we might even be right.
But far from bypassing all philosophical perplexities, such a move lands in a swamp of them! For
now we need to give some account of how a rational agent ought to make decisions and scientific
predictions, in situations where it knows it’s only one of several exact copies of itself inhabiting the
9I came up with this justification around 2002, and set it out in a blog post in 2006: see
www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=30. Later, I learned that Radford Neal [64] had independently proposed simi-
lar ideas.
10In theoretical computer science, a problem belonging to a class C is called C-complete, if solving the problem
would suffice to solve any other problem in C.
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same universe.
Many will try to escape the problem, by saying that such an agent, being (by assumption) “just
a computer program,” simply does whatever its code determines it does given the relevant initial
conditions. For example, if a piece of code says to bet heads in a certain game, then all agents
running that code will bet heads; if the code says to bet tails, then the agents will bet tails. Either
way, an outside observer who knew the code could easily calculate the probability that the agents
will win or lose their bet. So what’s the philosophical problem?
For me, the problem with this response is simply that it gives up on science as something agents
can use to predict their future experiences. The agents wanted science to tell them, “given such-
and-such physical conditions, here’s what you should expect to see, and why.” Instead they’re
getting the worthless tautology, “if your internal code causes you to expect to see X, then you
expect to see X, while if your internal code causes you to expect to see Y , then you expect to
see Y .” But the same could be said about anything, with no scientific understanding needed! To
paraphrase Democritus,11 it seems like the ultimate victory of the mechanistic worldview is also its
defeat.
As far as I can see, the only hope for avoiding these difficulties is if—because of chaos, the
limits of quantum measurement, or whatever other obstruction—minds can’t be copied perfectly
from one physical substrate to another, as can programs on standard digital computers. So that’s
a possibility that this essay explores at some length. To clarify, we can’t use any philosophical
difficulties that would arise if minds were copyable, as evidence for the empirical claim that they’re
not copyable. The universe has never shown any particular tendency to cater to human philo-
sophical prejudices! But I’d say the difficulties provide more than enough reason to care about
the copyability question.
2.6 Determinism versus Predictability
I’m a determinist: I believe, not only that humans lack free will, but that everything
that happens is completely determined by prior causes. So why should an analysis of
“mere unpredictability” change my thinking at all? After all, I readily admit that,
despite being metaphysically determined, many future events are unpredictable in
practice. But for me, the fact that we can’t predict something is our problem, not
Nature’s!
There’s an observation that doesn’t get made often enough in free-will debates, but that seems
extremely pertinent here. Namely: if you stretch the notion of “determination” far enough, then
events become “determined” so trivially that the notion itself becomes vacuous.
For example, a religious person might maintain that all events are predetermined by God’s
Encyclopedia, which of course only God can read. Another, secular person might maintain that
by definition, “the present state of the universe” contains all the data needed to determine future
events, even if those future events (such as quantum measurement outcomes) aren’t actually pre-
dictable via present-day measurements. In other words: if, in a given conception of physics, the
present state does not fully determine all the future states, then such a person will simply add
“hidden variables” to the present state until it does so.
11In Democritus’s famous dialogue between the intellect and the senses, the intellect declares: “By convention there
is sweetness, by convention bitterness, by convention color, in reality only atoms and the void.” To which the senses
reply: “Foolish intellect! Do you seek to overthrow us, while it is from us that you take your evidence? Your victory
is your defeat.”
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Now, if our hidden-variable theorist isn’t careful, and piles on additional requirements like
spatial locality, then she’ll quickly find herself contradicting one or more of quantum mechanics’
no-hidden-variable theorems (such as the Bell [10], Kochen-Specker [51], or PBR [71] theorems).
But the bare assertion that “everything is determined by the current state” is no more disprovable
than the belief in God’s Encyclopedia.
To me, this immunity from any possible empirical discovery shows just how feeble a concept
“determinism” really is, unless it’s supplemented by further concepts like locality, simplicity, or (best
of all) actual predictability. A form of “determinism” that applies not merely to our universe, but
to any logically possible universe, is not a determinism that has “fangs,” or that could credibly
threaten any notion of free will worth talking about.
2.7 Predictability in the Eye of the Beholder
A system that’s predictable to one observer might be unpredictable to another. Given
that predictability is such a relative notion, how could it possibly play the fundamental
role you need it to?
This question was already briefly addressed in Section 1.1, but since it arises so frequently,
it might be worth answering again. In this essay, I call a physical system S “predictable” if
(roughly speaking) there’s any possible technology, consistent with the laws of physics, that would
allow an external observer to gain enough information about S, without destroying S, to calcu-
late well-calibrated probabilities (to any desired accuracy) for the outcomes of all possible future
measurements on S within some allowed set. Of course, this definition introduces many concepts
that require further clarification: for example, what do we mean by “destroying” S? What does it
mean for probabilities to be “well-calibrated”? Which measurements on S are “allowed”? What
can the external observer be assumed to know about S before encountering it? For that matter,
what exactly counts as an “external observer,” or a “physical system”? I set out my thoughts
about these questions, and even suggest a tentative formal definition of “Knightian freedom” in
terms of other concepts, in Appendix 12.
For now, though, the main point is that, whenever I talk about whether a system “can” be
predicted, the word “can” has basically the same meaning as when physicists talk about whether
information “can” get from point A to point B. Just like in the latter case, we don’t care whether
the two points are literally connected by a phone line, so too in the former case, we don’t care
whether the requisite prediction machine has actually been built, or could plausibly be built in the
next millennium. Instead, we’re allowed to imagine arbitrarily-advanced technologies, so long as
our imaginations are constrained by the laws of physics.12
(Observe that, were our imaginations not constrained even by physics, we’d have to say that
anything whatsoever “can” happen, except outright logical contradictions. So in particular, we’d
reach the uninteresting conclusion that any system can be perfectly predicted—by God, for exam-
ple, or by magical demons. For more see Question 2.6.)
12By “the laws of physics,” I mean the currently-accepted laws—unless we’re explicitly tinkering with those laws
to see what happens. Of course, whenever known physics imposes an inconvenient limit (for example, no faster-
than-light communication), the convention in most science-fiction writing is simply to stipulate that physicists of the
future will discover some way around the limit (such as wormholes, tachyons, “hyperdrive,” etc). In this essay I take
a different approach, trying to be as conservative as I can about fundamental physics.
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2.8 Quantum Mechanics and Hidden Variables
Forget about free will or Knightian uncertainty: I deny even that probability plays
any fundamental role in physics. For me, like for Einstein, the much-touted “ran-
domness” of quantum mechanics merely shows that we humans haven’t yet discovered
the underlying deterministic rules. Can you prove that I’m wrong?
With minimal use of Occam’s Razor, yes, I can! In 1926, when Einstein wrote his famous
aphorism about God and dice, the question of whether quantum events were “truly” random or
merely pseudorandom could still be considered metaphysical. After all, common sense suggests we
can never say with confidence that anything is random: the most we can ever say is that we failed
to find a pattern in it.
But common sense is flawed here. A large body of work, starting with that of Bell in the 1960s
[10], has furnished evidence that quantum measurement outcomes can’t be governed by any hidden
pattern, but must be random in just the way quantum mechanics says they are. Crucially, this
evidence doesn’t circularly assume that quantum mechanics is the final theory of nature. Instead,
it assumes just a few general principles (such as spatial locality and “no cosmic conspiracies”),
together with the results of specific experiments that have already been done. Since these points
are often misunderstood, it might be worthwhile to spell them out in more detail.
Consider the Bell inequality, whose violation by entangled particles (in accord with quantum
mechanics) has been experimentally demonstrated more and more firmly since the 1980s [7]. From
a modern perspective, Bell simply showed that certain games, played by two cooperating but non-
communicating players Alice and Bob, can be won with greater probability if Alice and Bob share
entangled particles than if they merely share correlated classical information.13 Bell’s theorem
is usually presented as ruling out a class of theories called local hidden-variable theories. Those
theories sought to explain Alice and Bob’s measurement results in terms of ordinary statistical
correlations between two random variables X and Y , which are somehow associated with Alice’s
and Bob’s particles respectively, and which have the properties that nothing Alice does can affect
Y and that nothing Bob does can affect X. (One can imagine the particles flipping a coin at the
moment of their creation, whereupon one of them declares, “OK, if anyone asks, I’ll be spinning
up and you’ll be spinning down!”)
In popular treatments, Bell’s theorem is usually presented as demonstrating the reality of what
Einstein called “spooky action at a distance.”14 However, as many people have pointed out over the
13The standard example is the CHSH game [23]. Here Alice and Bob are given bits x and y respectively, which
are independent and uniformly random. Their goal is for Alice to output a bit a, and Bob a bit b, such that
a+ b (mod 2) = xy. Alice and Bob can agree on a strategy in advance, but can’t communicate after receiving x and
y. Classically, it’s easy to see that the best they can do is always to output a = b = 0, in which case they win the
game with probability 3/4. By contrast, if Alice and Bob own one qubit each of the entangled state 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉),
then there exists a strategy by which they can win with probability cos2 (pi/8) ≈ 0.85. That strategy has the following
form: Alice measures her qubit in a way that depends on x and outputs the result as a, while Bob measures his qubit
in a way that depends on y and outputs the result as b.
14The reason why many people (including me) cringe at that sort of talk is the no-communication theorem, which
explains why, despite Bell’s theorem, entanglement can’t be used to send actual messages faster than light. (Indeed,
if it could, then quantum mechanics would flat-out contradict special relativity.)
The situation is this: if one wanted to violate the Bell inequality using classical physics, then one would need faster-
than-light communication. But that doesn’t imply that quantum mechanics’ violation of the same inequality should
also be understood in terms of faster-than-light communication! We’re really dealing with an intermediate case
here—“more than classical locality, but less than classical nonlocality”—which I don’t think anyone even recognized
as a logical possibility until quantum mechanics forced it on them.
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years—see, for example, my 2002 critique [1] of Stephen Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science [93]—
one can also see Bell’s theorem in a different way: as using the assumption of no instantaneous
communication to address the even more basic issue of determinism. From this perspective, Bell’s
theorem says the following:
Unless Alice and Bob’s particles communicate faster than light, the results of all possi-
ble measurements that Alice and Bob could make on those particles cannot have been
determined prior to measurement—not even by some bizarre, as-yet-undiscovered un-
computable law—assuming the statistics of all the possible measurements agree with
the quantum predictions. Instead, the results must be “generated randomly on-the-fly”
in response to whichever measurement is made, just as quantum mechanics says they
are.
The above observation was popularized in 2006 by John Conway and Simon Kochen, who called
it the “Free Will Theorem” [25]. Conway and Kochen put the point as follows: if there’s no faster-
than-light communication, and Alice and Bob have the “free will” to choose how to measure their
respective particles, then the particles must have their own “free will” to choose how to respond to
the measurements.
Alas, Conway and Kochen’s use of the term “free will” has generated confusion. For the
record, what Conway and Kochen mean by “free will” has only the most tenuous connection to
what most people (including me, in this essay) mean by it! Their result might more accurately
be called the “freshly-generated randomness theorem.”15 For the indeterminism that’s relevant
here is “only” probabilistic: indeed, Alice and Bob could be replaced by simple dice-throwing or
quantum-state-measuring automata without affecting the theorem at all.16
Another recent development has made the conflict between quantummechanics and determinism
particularly vivid. It’s now known how to exploit Bell’s theorem to generate so-called “Einstein-
certified random bits” for use in cryptographic applications [70, 90], starting from a much smaller
number of “seed” bits that are known to be random.17 Here “Einstein-certified” means that, if
the bits pass certain statistical tests, then they must be close to uniformly-random, unless nature
resorted to “cosmic conspiracies” between separated physical devices to bias the bits.
Thus, if one wants to restore determinism while preserving the empirical success of quantum
mechanics, then one has to posit a conspiracy in which every elementary particle, measuring device,
and human brain potentially colludes. Furthermore, this conspiracy needs to be so diabolical as to
leave essentially no trace of its existence! For example, in order to explain why we can’t exploit the
conspiracy to send faster-than-light signals, one has to imagine that the conspiracy prevents our
own brains (or the quantum-mechanical random number generators in our computers, etc.) from
making the choices that would cause those signals to be sent. To my mind, this is no better than
the creationists’ God, who planted fossils in the ground to confound the paleontologists.
I should say that at least one prominent physicist, Gerard ’t Hooft, actually advocates such a
cosmic conspiracy [46] (under the name “superdeterminism”); he speculates that a yet-undiscovered
15Or the “Free Whim Theorem,” as Conway likes to suggest when people point out the irrelevance of human free
will to the theorem.
16This point was recently brought out by Fritz, in his paper “Bell’s theorem without free will” [37]. Fritz replaces
the so-called “free will assumption” of the Bell inequality—that is, the assumption that Alice and Bob get to choose
which measurements to perform—by an assumption about the independence of separated physical devices.
17The protocol of Vazirani and Vidick [90] needs only O (log n) seed bits to generate n Einstein-certified output
bits.
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replacement for quantum mechanics will reveal its workings.18 For me, though, the crux is that
once we start positing conspiracies between distant regions of spacetime, or between the particles
we measure and our own instruments or brains, determinism becomes consistent with any possible
scientific discovery, and therefore retreats into vacuousness. As the extreme case, as pointed out
in Question 2.6, someone could always declare that everything that happens was “determined” by
God’s unknowable book listing everything that will ever happen! That sort of determinism can
never be falsified, but has zero predictive or explanatory power.
In summary, I think it’s fair to say that physical indeterminism is now a settled fact to roughly
the same extent as evolution, heliocentrism, or any other discovery in science. So if that fact is
considered relevant to the free-will debate, then all sides might as well just accept it and move on!
(Of course, we haven’t yet touched the question of whether physical indeterminism is relevant to
the free-will debate.)
2.9 The Consequence Argument
How does your perspective respond to Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument?
Some background for non-philosophers: the Consequence Argument [48] is an attempt to for-
malize most people’s intuition for why free will is incompatible with determinism. The argument
consists of the following steps:
(i) If determinism is true, then our choices today are determined by whatever the state of the
universe was (say) 100 million years ago, when dinosaurs roamed the earth.
(ii) The state of the universe 100 million years ago is clearly outside our ability to alter.
(iii) Therefore, if determinism is true, then our choices today are outside our ability to alter.
(iv) Therefore, if determinism is true, then we don’t have free will.
(A side note: as discussed in Question 2.3, the traditional obsession with “determinism” here
seems unfortunate to me. What people really mean to ask, I think, is whether free will is compatible
with any mechanistic account of the universe, regardless of whether the account happens to be
deterministic or probabilistic. On the other hand, one could easily rephrase the Consequence
Argument to allow for this, with the state of the universe 100 million years ago now fully determining
the probabilities of our choices today, if not the choices themselves. And I don’t think that
substitution would make any essential difference to what follows.)
One can classify beliefs about free will according to how they respond to the Consequence Ar-
gument. If you accept the argument as well as its starting premise of determinism (or mechanism),
and hence also the conclusion of no free will, then you’re a hard determinist (or mechanist). If
you accept the argument, but reject the conclusion by denying the starting premise of determinism
18Some people might argue that Bohmian mechanics [16], the interpretation of quantum mechanics that originally
inspired Bell’s theorem, is also “superdeterministic.” But Bohmian mechanics is empirically equivalent to standard
quantum mechanics—from which fact it follows immediately that the “determinism” of Bohm’s theory is a formal
construct that, whatever else one thinks about it, has no actual consequences for prediction. To put it differently: at
least in its standard version, Bohmian mechanics buys its “determinism” via the mathematical device of pushing all
the randomness back to the beginning of time. It then accepts the nonlocality that such a tactic inevitably entails
because of Bell’s theorem.
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or mechanism, then you’re a metaphysical libertarian. If you reject the argument by denying that
steps (iii) or (iv) follow from the previous steps, then you’re a compatibilist.
What about the perspective I explore here? It denies step (ii)—or rather, it denies the usual
notion of “the state of the universe 100 million years ago,” insisting on a distinction between
“macrofacts” and “microfacts” about that state. It agrees that the past macrofacts—such as
whether a dinosaur kicked a particular stone—have an objective reality that is outside our ability
to alter. But it denies that we can always speak in straightforward causal terms about the past
microfacts, such as the quantum state |ψ〉 of some particular photon impinging on the dinosaur’s
tail.
As such, my perspective can be seen as an example of a little-known view that Fischer [35]
calls multiple-pasts compatibilism. As I’d put it, multiple-pasts compatibilism agrees that the past
microfacts about the world determine its future, and it also agrees that the past macrofacts are
outside our ability to alter. However, it maintains that there might be many possible settings
of the past microfacts—the polarizations of individual photons, etc.—that all coexist in the same
“past-ensemble.” By definition, such microfacts can’t possibly have made it into the history books,
and a multiple-pasts compatibilist would deny that they’re necessarily “outside our ability to al-
ter.” Instead, our choices today might play a role in selecting one past from a giant ensemble of
macroscopically-identical but microscopically-different pasts.
While I take the simple idea above as a starting point, there are two main ways in which I try
to go further than it. First, I insist that whether we can make the needed distinction between
“microfacts” and “macrofacts” is a scientific question—one that can only be addressed through
detailed investigation of the quantum decoherence process and other aspects of physics. Second,
I change the focus from unanswerable metaphysical conundrums about what “determines” what,
toward empirical questions about the actual predictability of our choices (or at least the probabilities
of those choices) given the past macrofacts. I argue that, by making progress on the predictability
question, we can learn something about whether multiple-pasts compatibilism is a viable response
to the Consequence Argument, even if we can never know for certain whether it’s the right response.
2.10 Paradoxes of Prediction
You say you’re worried about the consequences for rational decision-making, Bayesian
inference, and so forth if our choices were all mechanically predictable. Why isn’t
it reassurance enough that, logically, predictions of an agent’s behavior can never be
known ahead of time to the agent itself? For if they were known ahead of time,
then in real life—as opposed to Greek tragedies, or stories like Philip K. Dick’s Mi-
nority Report [32]—the agent could simply defy the prediction by doing something
else! Likewise, why isn’t enough that, because of the Time Hierarchy Theorem from
computational complexity, predicting an agent’s choices might require as much com-
putational power as the agent itself expends in making those choices?
The obvious problem with such computational or self-referential arguments is that they can’t
possibly prevent one agent, say Alice, from predicting the behavior of a different agent, say Bob.
And in order to do that, Alice doesn’t need unlimited computational power: she only needs a
bit more computational power than Bob has.19 Furthermore, Bob’s free will actually seems more
19This is analogous to how, in computational complexity theory, there exists a program that that uses (say) n2.0001
time steps, and that simulates any n2-step program provided to it as input. The time hierarchy theorem, which is
close to tight, only rules out the simulation of n2-step programs using significantly less than n2 time steps.
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threatened by Alice predicting his actions than by Bob predicting his own actions, supposing the
latter were possible! This explains why I won’t be concerned in this essay with computational
obstacles to prediction, but only with obstacles that arise from Alice’s physical inability to gather
the requisite information about Bob.
Admittedly, as MacKay [59], Lloyd [57], and others have stressed, if Alice wants to predict
Bob’s choices, then she needs to be careful not to tell Bob her predictions before they come true!
And that does indeed make predictions of Bob’s actions an unusual sort of “knowledge”: knowledge
that can be falsified by the very fact of Bob’s learning it.
But unlike some authors, I don’t make much of these observations. For even if Alice can’t
tell Bob what he’s going to do, it’s easy enough for her to demonstrate to him afterwards that she
knew. For example, Alice could put her prediction into a sealed envelope, and let Bob open the
envelope only after the prediction came true. Or she could send Bob a cryptographic commitment
to her prediction, withholding the decryption key until afterward. If Alice could do these things
reliably, then it seems likely that Bob’s self-conception would change just as radically as if he knew
the predictions in advance.
2.11 Singulatarianism
How could it possibly make a difference to anyone’s life whether his or her neural
computations were buffeted around by microscopic events subject to Knightian un-
certainty? Suppose that only “ordinary” quantum randomness and classical chaos
turned out to be involved: how on earth could that matter, outside the narrow con-
fines of free-will debates? Is the variety of free will that apparently interests you—one
based on the physical unpredictability of our choices—really a variety “worth want-
ing,” in Daniel Dennett’s famous phrase [27]?
As a first remark, if there’s anything in this debate that all sides can agree on, hopefully they
can agree that the truth (whatever it is) doesn’t care what we want, consider “worth wanting,” or
think is necessary or sufficient to make our lives meaningful!
But to lay my cards on the table, my interest in the issues discussed in this essay was sparked,
in part, by considering arguments of the so-called Singulatarians. These are people who look at
current technological trends—including advances in neuroscience, nanotechnology, and AI, as well
as the dramatic increases in computing power—and foresee a “technological singularity” perhaps
50-200 years in our future (not surprisingly, the projected timescales vary). By this, they mean not
a mathematical singularity, but a rapid “phase transition,” perhaps analogous to the appearance
of the first life on earth, the appearance of humanity, or the invention of agriculture or of writing.
In Singulatarians’ view, the next such change will happen around the time when humans manage
to build artificial intelligences that are smarter than the smartest humans. It stands to reason,
the Singulatarians say, that such AIs will realize they can best further their goals (whatever those
might be) by building AIs even smarter than themselves—and then the super-AIs will build yet
smarter AIs, and so on, presumably until the fundamental physical limits on intelligence (whatever
they are) are reached.
Following the lead of science-fiction movies, of course one might wonder about the role of
humans in the resulting world. Will the AIs wipe us out, treating us as callously as humans have
treated each other and most animal species? Will the AIs keep us around as pets, or as revered (if
rather dimwitted) creators and ancestors? Will humans be invited to upload their brains to the
post-singularity computer cloud—with each human, perhaps, living for billions of years in his or
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her own simulated paradise? Or will the humans simply merge their consciousnesses into the AI
hive-mind, losing their individual identities but becoming part of something unimaginably greater?
Hoping to find out, many Singulatarians have signed up to have their brains cryogenically
frozen upon their (biological) deaths, so that some future intelligence (before or after the singu-
larity) might be able to use the information therein to revive them.20 One leading Singulatarian,
Eliezer Yudkowsky, has written at length about the irrationality of people who don’t sign up for
cryonics: how they value social conformity and “not being perceived as weird” over a non-negligible
probability of living for billions of years.21
With some notable exceptions, academics in neuroscience and other relevant fields have tended
to dismiss Singulatarians as nerds with hyperactive imaginations: people who have no idea how
great the difficulties are in modeling the human brain or building a general-purpose AI. Certainly,
one could argue that the Singulatarians’ timescales might be wildly off. And even if one accepts
their timescales, one could argue that (almost by definition) the unknowns in their scenario are so
great as to negate any practical consequences for the humans alive now. For example, suppose
we conclude—as many Singulatarians have—that the greatest problem facing humanity today is
how to ensure that, when superhuman AIs are finally built, those AIs will be “friendly” to human
concerns. The difficulty is: given our current ignorance about AI, how on earth should we act
on that conclusion? Indeed, how could we have any confidence that whatever steps we did take
wouldn’t backfire, and increase the probability of an unfriendly AI?
Yet on questions of principle—that is, of what the laws of physics could ultimately allow—I
think the uncomfortable truth is that it’s the Singulatarians who are the scientific conservatives,
while those who reject their vision as fantasy are scientific radicals. For at some level, all the
Singulatarians are doing is taking conventional thinking about physics and the brain to its logical
conclusion. If the brain is a “meat computer,” then given the right technology, why shouldn’t we
be able to copy its program from one physical substrate to another? And why couldn’t we then
run multiple copies of the program in parallel, leading to all the philosophical perplexities discussed
in Section 2.5?
Maybe the conclusion is that we should all become Singulatarians! But given the stakes,
it seems worth exploring the possibility that there are scientific reasons why human minds can’t
be casually treated as copyable computer programs: not just practical difficulties, or the sorts of
question-begging appeals to human specialness that are child’s-play for Singulatarians to demolish.
If one likes, the origin of this essay was my own refusal to accept the lazy cop-out position, which
answers the question of whether the Singulatarians’ ideas are true by repeating that their ideas are
crazy and weird. If uploading our minds to digital computers is indeed a fantasy, then I demand
to know what it is about the physical universe that makes it a fantasy.
2.12 The Libet Experiments
Haven’t neuroscience experiments already proved that our choices aren’t nearly as
unpredictable as we imagine? Seconds before a subject is conscious of making a de-
cision, EEG recordings can already detect the neural buildup to that decision. Given
that empirical fact, isn’t any attempt to ground freedom in unpredictability doomed
from the start?
20The largest cryonics organization is Alcor, www.alcor.org.
21See, for example, lesswrong.com/lw/mb/lonely dissent/
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It’s important to understand what experiments have and haven’t shown, since the details tend
to get lost in popularization. The celebrated experiments by Libet (see [55]) from the 1970s used
EEGs to detect a “readiness potential” building up in a subject’s brain up to a second and a
half before the subject made the “freely-willed decision” to flick her finger. The implications of
this finding for free will were avidly discussed—especially since the subject might not have been
conscious of any intention to flick her finger until (say) half a second before the act. So, did the
prior appearance of the readiness potential prove that what we perceive as “conscious intentions”
are just window-dressing, which our brains add after the fact?
However, as Libet acknowledged, an important gap in the experiment was that it had inadequate
“control.” That is, how often did the readiness potential form, without the subject flicking her
finger (which might indicate a decision that was “vetoed at the last instant”)? Because of this
gap, it was unclear to what extent the signal Libet found could actually be used for prediction.
More recent experiments—see especially Soon et al. [82]—have tried to close this gap, by using
fMRI scans to predict which of two buttons a person would press. Soon et al. [82] report that they
were able to do so four or more seconds in advance, with success probability significantly better
than chance (around 60%). The question is, how much should we read into these findings?
My own view is that the quantitative aspects are crucial when discussing these experiments.
For compare a (hypothetical) ability to predict human decisions a full minute in advance, to an
ability to predict the same decisions 0.1 seconds in advance, in terms of the intuitive “threat” to
free will. The two cases seem utterly different! A minute seems like clearly enough time for a
deliberate choice, while 0.1 seconds seems like clearly not enough time; on the latter scale, we are
only talking about physiological reflexes. (For intermediate scales like 1 second, intuition—or at
least my intuition—is more conflicted.)
Similarly, compare a hypothetical ability to predict human decisions with 99% accuracy, against
an ability to predict them with 51% accuracy. I expect that only the former, and not the latter,
would strike anyone as threatening or even uncanny. For it’s obvious that human decisions are
somewhat predictable: if they weren’t, there would be nothing for advertisers, salespeople, seducers,
or demagogues to exploit! Indeed, with zero predictability, we couldn’t even talk about personality
or character as having any stability over time. So better-than-chance predictability is just too
low a bar for clearing it to have any relevance to the free-will debate. One wants to know: how
much better than chance? Is the accuracy better than what my grandmother, or an experienced
cold-reader, could achieve?
Even within the limited domain of button-pressing, years ago I wrote a program that invited the
user to press the ‘G’ or ‘H’ keys in any sequence—‘GGGHGHHHHGHG’—and that tried to predict
which key the user would press next. The program used only the crudest pattern-matching—“in
the past, was the subsequence GGGH more likely to be followed by G or H?” Yet humans are so
poor at generating “random” digits that the program regularly achieved prediction accuracies of
around 70%—no fMRI scans needed!22
In summary, I believe neuroscience might someday advance to the point where it completely
rewrites the terms of the free-will debate, by showing that the human brain is “physically predictable
22Soon et al. [82] (see the Supplementary Material, p. 14-15) argue that, by introducing a long delay between trials
and other means, they were able to rule out the possibility that their prediction accuracy was due purely to “carryover”
between successive trials. They also found that the probability of a run of N successive presses of the same button
decreased exponentially with N , as would be expected if the choices were independently random. However, it would
be interesting for future research to compare fMRI-based prediction “head-to-head” against prediction using carefully
designed machine learning algorithms that see only the sequence of previous button presses.
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by outside observers” in the same sense as a digital computer. But it seems nowhere close to that
point today. Brain-imaging experiments have succeeded in demonstrating predictability with
better-than-chance accuracy, in limited contexts and over short durations. Such experiments are
deeply valuable and worth trying to push as far as possible. On the other hand, the mere fact of
limited predictability is something that humans knew millennia before brain-imaging technologies
became available.
2.13 Mind and Morality
Notwithstanding your protests that you won’t address the “mystery of consciousness,”
your entire project seems geared toward the old, disreputable quest to find some sort
of dividing line between “real, conscious, biological” humans and digital computer
programs, even supposing that the latter could perfectly emulate the former. Many
thinkers have sought such a line before, but most scientifically-minded people regard
the results as dubious. For Roger Penrose, the dividing line involves neural struc-
tures called microtubules harnessing exotic quantum-gravitational effects (see Section
6). For the philosopher John Searle [78], the line involves the brain’s unique “biolog-
ical causal powers”: powers whose existence Searle loudly asserts but never actually
explains. For you, the line seems to involve hypothesized limits on predictability
imposed by the No-Cloning Theorem. But regardless of where the line gets drawn,
let’s discuss where the rubber meets the road. Suppose that in the far future, there
are trillions of emulated brains (or “ems”) running on digital computers. In such
a world, would you consider it acceptable to “murder” an em (say, by deleting its
file), simply because it lacked the “Knightian unpredictability” that biological brains
might or might not derive from amplified quantum fluctuations? If so, then isn’t
that a cruel, arbitrary, “meatist” double standard—one that violates the most basic
principles of your supposed hero, Alan Turing?
For me, this moral objection to my project is possibly the most pressing objection of all. Will
I be the one to shoot a humanoid robot pleading for its life, simply because the robot lacks the
supposedly-crucial “freebits,” or “Knightian unpredictability,” or whatever else the magical stuff is
supposed to be that separates humans from machines?
Thus, perhaps my most important reason to take the freebit picture seriously is that it does
suggest a reply to the objection: one that strikes me as both intellectually consistent and moral.
I simply need to adopt the following ethical stance: I’m against any irreversible destruction of
knowledge, thoughts, perspectives, adaptations, or ideas, except possibly by their owner. Such
destruction is worse the more valuable the thing destroyed, the longer it took to create, and the
harder it is to replace. From this basic revulsion to irreplaceable loss, hatred of murder, genocide,
the hunting of endangered species to extinction, and even (say) the burning of the Library of
Alexandria can all be derived as consequences.
Now, what about the case of “deleting” an emulated human brain from a computer memory?
The same revulsion applies in full force—if the copy deleted is the last copy in existence. If, however,
there are other extant copies, then the deleted copy can always be “restored from backup,” so
deleting it seems at worst like property damage. For biological brains, by contrast, whether such
backup copies can be physically created is of course exactly what’s at issue, and the freebit picture
conjectures a negative answer.
These considerations suggest that the moral status of ems really could be different than that
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of organic humans, but for straightforward practical reasons that have nothing to do with “meat
chauvinism,” or with question-begging philosophical appeals to human specialness. The crucial
point is that even a program that passed the Turing Test would revert to looking “crude and
automaton-like,” if you could read, trace, and copy its code. And whether the code could be read
and copied might depend strongly on the machine’s physical substrate. Destroying something
that’s both as complex as a human being and one-of-a-kind could be regarded as an especially
heinous crime.
I see it as the great advantage of this reply that it makes no direct reference to the first-person
experience of anyone, neither biological humans nor ems. On this account, we don’t need to
answer probably-unanswerable questions about whether or not ems would be conscious, in order
to constructed a workable moral code that applies to them. Deleting the last copy of an em in
existence should be prosecuted as murder, not because doing so snuffs out some inner light of
consciousness (who is anyone else to know?), but rather because it deprives the rest of society of a
unique, irreplaceable store of knowledge and experiences, precisely as murdering a human would.
3 Knightian Uncertainty and Physics
Having spent almost half the essay answering a priori objections to the investigation I want to
undertake, I’m finally ready to start the investigation itself! In this section, I’ll set out and defend
two propositions, both of which are central to what follows.
The first proposition is that probabilistic uncertainty (like that of quantum-mechanical measure-
ment outcomes) can’t possibly, by itself, provide the sort of “indeterminism” that could be relevant
to the free-will debate. In other words, if we see a conflict between free will and the deterministic
predictability of human choices, then we should see the same conflict between free will and prob-
abilistic predictability, assuming the probabilistic predictions are as accurate as those of quantum
mechanics. Conversely, if we hold free will to be compatible with “quantum-like predictability,”
then we might as well hold free will to be compatible with deterministic predictability also. In
my perspective, for a form of uncertainty to be relevant to free will, a necessary condition is that
it be what the economists call Knightian uncertainty. Knightian uncertainty simply refers to un-
certainty that we lack a clear, agreed-upon way to quantify—like our uncertainty about existence
of extraterrestrial life, as opposed to our uncertainty about the outcome of a coin toss.
The second proposition is that, in current physics, there appears to be only one source of
Knightian uncertainty that could possibly be both fundamental and relevant to human choices.
That source is uncertainty about the microscopic, quantum-mechanical details of the universe’s
initial conditions (or the initial conditions of our local region of the universe). In classical physics,
there’s no known fundamental principle that prevents a predictor from learning the relevant initial
conditions to whatever precision it likes, without disturbing the system to be predicted. But in
quantum mechanics there is such a principle, namely the uncertainty principle (or from a more
“modern” standpoint, the No-Cloning Theorem). It’s crucial to understand that this source of
uncertainty is separate from the randomness of quantum measurement outcomes: the latter is
much more often invoked in free-will speculations, but in my opinion it shouldn’t be. If we know a
system’s quantum state ρ, then quantum mechanics lets us calculate the probability of any outcome
of any measurement that might later be made on the system. But if we don’t know the state ρ,
then ρ itself can be thought of as subject to Knightian uncertainty.
In the next two subsections, I’ll expand on and justify the above claims.
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3.1 Knightian Uncertainty
A well-known argument maintains that the very concept of free will is logically incoherent. The
argument goes like this:
Any event is either determined by earlier events (like the return of Halley’s comet), or
else not determined by earlier events (like the decay of a radioactive atom). If the event
is determined, then clearly it isn’t “free.” But if the event is undetermined, it isn’t
“free” either: it’s merely arbitrary, capricious, and random. Therefore no event can be
“free.”
As I’m far from the first to point out, the above argument has a gap, contained in the vague
phrase “arbitrary, capricious, and random.” An event can be “arbitrary,” in the sense of being
undetermined by previous events, without being random in the narrower technical sense of being
generated by some known or knowable probabilistic process. The distinction between arbitrary
and random is not just word-splitting: it plays a huge practical role in computer science, economics,
and other fields. To illustrate, consider the following two events:
E1 = Three weeks from today, the least significant digit of the Dow Jones average will
be even
E2 = Humans will make contact with an extraterrestrial civilization within the next
500 years
For both events, we are ignorant about whether they will occur, but we are ignorant in com-
pletely different ways. For E1, we can quantify our ignorance by a probability distribution, in such
a way that almost any reasonable person would agree with our quantification. For E2, we can’t.
For another example, consider a computer program, which has a bug that only appears when a
call to the random number generator returns the result 3456. That’s not necessarily a big deal—
since with high probability, the program would need to be run thousands of times before the bug
reared its head. Indeed, today many problems are solved using randomized algorithms (such as
Monte-Carlo simulation), which do have a small but nonzero probability of failure.23 On the other
hand, if the program has a bug that only occurs when the user inputs 3456, that’s a much more
serious problem. For how can the programmer know, in advance, whether 3456 is an input (maybe
even the only input) that the user cares about? So a programmer must treat the two types of
uncertainty differently: she can’t just toss them both into a bin labeled “arbitrary, capricious, and
random.” And indeed, the difference between the two types of uncertainty shows up constantly in
theoretical computer science and information theory.24
In economics, the “second type” of uncertainty—the type that can’t be objectively quantified
using probabilities—is called Knightian uncertainty, after Frank Knight, who wrote about it ex-
tensively in the 1920s [49]. Knightian uncertainty has been invoked to explain phenomena from
risk-aversion in behavioral economics to the 2008 financial crisis (and was popularized by Taleb
[87] under the name “black swans”). An agent in a state of Knightian uncertainty might describe
its beliefs using a convex set of probability distributions, rather than a single distribution.25 For
23The probability of failure can be made arbitrarily small by the simple expedient of running the algorithm over
and over and taking a majority vote.
24For example, it shows up in the clear distinctions made between random and adversarial noise, between proba-
bilistic and nondeterministic Turing machines, and between average-case and worst-case analysis of algorithms.
25In Appendix 14, I briefly explain why I think convex sets provide the “right” representation of Knightian uncer-
tainty, though this point doesn’t much matter for the rest of the essay.
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example, it might say that a homeowner will default on a mortgage with some probability between
0.1 and 0.3, but within that interval, be unwilling to quantify its uncertainty further. The notion
of probability intervals leads naturally to various generalizations of probability theory, of which the
best-known is the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief [79].
What does any of this have to do with the free-will debate? As I said in Section 1.1, from my
personal perspective Knightian uncertainty seems like a precondition for free will as I understand
the latter. In other words, I agree with the free-will-is-incoherent camp when it says that a
random event can’t be considered “free” in any meaningful sense. Several writers, such as Kane
[36], Balaguer [9], Satinover [75], and Koch [50], have speculated that the randomness inherent in
quantum-mechanical wavefunction collapse, were it relevant to brain function, could provide all the
scope for free will that’s needed. But I think those writers are mistaken on this point.
For me, the bottom line is simply that it seems like a sorry and pathetic “free will” that’s
ruled by ironclad, externally-knowable statistical laws, and that retains only a “ceremonial” role,
analogous to spinning a roulette wheel or shuffling a deck of cards. Should we say that a radioactive
nucleus has “free will,” just because (according to quantum mechanics) we can’t predict exactly
when it will decay, but can only calculate a precise probability distribution over the decay times?
That seems perverse—especially since given many nuclei, we can predict almost perfectly what
fraction will have decayed by such-and-such a time. Or imagine an artificially-intelligent robot
that used nuclear decays as a source of random numbers. Does anyone seriously maintain that,
if we swapped out the actual decaying nuclei for a “mere” pseudorandom computer simulation of
such nuclei (leaving all other components unchanged), the robot would suddenly be robbed of its
free will? While I’m leery of “arguments from obviousness” in this subject, it really does seem to
me that if we say the robot has free will in the first case then we should also say so in the second.
And thus, I think that the free-will-is-incoherent camp would be right, if all uncertainty were
probabilistic. But I consider it far from obvious that all uncertainty is (usefully regarded as)
probabilistic. Some uncertainty strikes me as Knightian, in the sense that rational people might
never even reach agreement about how to assign the probabilities. And while Knightian uncertainty
might or might not be relevant to predicting human choices, I definitely (for reasons I’ll discuss
later) don’t think that current knowledge of physics or neuroscience lets us exclude the possibility.
At this point, though, we’d better hear from those who reject the entire concept of Knightian
uncertainty. Some thinkers—I’ll call them Bayesian fundamentalists—hold that Bayesian proba-
bility theory provides the only sensible way to represent uncertainty. On that view, “Knightian
uncertainty” is just a fancy name for someone’s failure to carry a probability analysis far enough.
In support of their position, Bayesian fundamentalists often invoke the so-called Dutch book
arguments (see for example Savage [76]), which say that any rational agent satisfying a few axioms
must behave as if its beliefs were organized using probability theory. Intuitively, even if you claim
not to have any opinion whatsoever about (say) the probability of life being discovered on Mars,
I can still “elicit” a probabilistic prediction from you, by observing which bets about the question
you will or won’t accept.
However, a central assumption on which the Dutch book arguments rely—basically, that a
rational agent shouldn’t mind taking at least one side of any bet—has struck many commentators
as dubious. And if we drop that assumption, then the path is open to Knightian uncertainty
(involving, for example, convex sets of probability distributions).
Even if we accept the standard derivations of probability theory, the bigger problem is that
Bayesian agents can have different “priors.” If one strips away the philosophy, Bayes’ rule is just
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an elementary mathematical fact about how one should update one’s prior beliefs in light of new
evidence. So one can’t use Bayesianism to justify a belief in the existence of objective probabilities
underlying all events, unless one is also prepared to defend the existence of an “objective prior.”
In economics, the idea that all rational agents can be assumed to start with the same prior is called
the Common Prior Assumption, or CPA. Assuming the CPA leads to some wildly counterintuitive
consequences, most famously Aumann’s agreement theorem [8]. That theorem says that two
rational agents with common priors (but differing information) can never “agree to disagree”: as
soon as their opinions on any subject become common knowledge, their opinions must be equal.
The CPA has long been controversial; see Morris [63] for a summary of arguments for and
against. To my mind, though, the real question is: what could possibly have led anyone to take the
CPA seriously in the first place?
Setting aside methodological arguments in economics26 (which don’t concern us here), I’m aware
of two substantive arguments in favor of the CPA. The first argument is that, if two rational agents
(call them Alice and Bob) have different priors, then Alice will realize that if she had been born Bob,
she would have had Bob’s prior, and Bob will realize that if he had been born Alice, he would have
had Alice’s. But if Alice and Bob are indeed rational, then why should they assign any weight to
personal accidents of their birth, which are clearly irrelevant to the objective state of the universe?
(See Cowen and Hanson [26] for a detailed discussion of this argument.)
The simplest reply is that, even if Alice and Bob accepted this reasoning, they would still
generally end up with different priors, unless they furthermore shared the same reference class:
that is, the set of all agents who they imagine they “could have been” if they weren’t themselves.
For example, if Alice includes all humans in her reference class, while Bob includes only those
humans capable of understanding Bayesian reasoning such as he and Alice are engaging in now,
then their beliefs will differ. But requiring agreement on the reference class makes the argument
circular—presupposing, as it does, a “God’s-eye perspective” transcending the individual agents,
the very thing whose existence or relevance was in question. Section 8 will go into more detail
about “indexical” puzzles (that is, puzzles concerning the probability of your own existence, the
likelihood of having been born at one time rather than another, etc). But I hope this discussion
already makes clear how much debatable metaphysics lurks in the assumption that a single Bayesian
prior governs (or should govern) every probability judgment of every rational being.
The second argument for the CPA is more ambitious: it seeks to tell us what the true prior
is, not merely that it exists. According to this argument, any sufficiently intelligent being ought
to use what’s called the universal prior from algorithmic information theory. This is basically a
distribution that assigns a probability proportional to 2−n to every possible universe describable by
an n-bit computer program. In Appendix 13, I’ll examine this notion further, explain why some
people [47, 77] have advanced it as a candidate for the “true” prior, but also explain why, despite its
mathematical interest, I don’t think it can fulfill that role. (Briefly, a predictor using the universal
prior can be thought of as a superintelligent entity that figures out the right probabilities almost as
fast as is information-theoretically possible. But that’s conceptually very different from an entity
that already knows the probabilities.)
26E.g., that even if the CPA is wrong, we should assume it because economic theorizing would be too unconstrained
without it, or because many interesting theorems need it as a hypothesis.
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3.2 Quantum Mechanics and the No-Cloning Theorem
While defending the meaningfulness of Knightian uncertainty, the last section left an obvious ques-
tion unanswered: where, in a law-governed universe, could we possibly find Knightian uncertainty?
Granted, in almost any part of science, it’s easy to find systems that are “effectively” subject to
Knightian uncertainty, in that we don’t yet have models for the systems that capture all the impor-
tant components and their probabilistic interactions. The earth’s climate, a country’s economy, a
forest ecosystem, the early universe, a high-temperature superconductor, or even a flatworm or a
cell are examples. Even if our probabilistic models of many of these systems are improving over
time, none of them come anywhere close to (say) the quantum-mechanical model of the hydrogen
atom: a model that answers essentially everything one could think to ask within its domain, modulo
an unavoidable (but precisely-quantifiable) random element.
However, in all of these cases (the earth’s climate, the flatworm, etc.), the question arises: what
grounds could we ever have to think that Knightian uncertainty was inherent to the system, rather
than an artifact of our own ignorance? Of course, one could have asked the same question about
probabilistic uncertainty, before the discovery of quantum mechanics and its no-hidden-variable
theorems (see Section 2.8). But the fact remains that today, we don’t have any physical theory
that demands Knightian uncertainty in anything like the way that quantum mechanics demands
probabilistic uncertainty. And as I said in Section 3.1, I insist that the “merely probabilistic”
aspect of quantum mechanics can’t do the work that many free-will advocates have wanted it to
do for a century.
On the other hand, no matter how much we’ve learned about the dynamics of the physical
world, there remains one enormous source of Knightian uncertainty that’s been “hiding in plain
sight,” and that receives surprisingly little attention in the free-will debate. This is our ignorance
of the relevant initial conditions. By this I mean both the initial conditions of the entire universe
or multiverse (say, at the Big Bang), and the “indexical conditions,” which characterize the part
of the universe or multiverse in which we happen to reside. To make a prediction, of course one
needs initial conditions as well as dynamical laws: indeed, outside of idealized toy problems, the
initial conditions are typically the “larger” part of the input. Yet leaving aside recent cosmological
speculations (and “genericity” assumptions, like those of thermodynamics), the specification of
initial conditions is normally not even considered the task of physics. So, if there are no laws that
fix the initial conditions, or even a distribution over possible initial conditions—if there aren’t even
especially promising candidates for such laws—then why isn’t this just what free-will advocates
have been looking for?
It will be answered immediately that there’s an excellent reason why not. Namely, whatever
else we do or don’t know about the universe’s initial state (e.g., at the Big Bang), clearly nothing
about it was determined by any of our choices! (This is the assumption made explicit in step (ii)
of van Inwagen’s “Consequence Argument” from Section 2.9.)
The above answer might strike the reader as conclusive. Yet if our interest is in actual, physical
predictability—rather than in the metaphysical concept of “determination”—then notice that it’s
no longer conclusive at all. For we still need to ask: how much can we learn about the initial state
by making measurements? This, of course, is where quantum mechanics might become relevant.
It’s actually easiest for our purposes to forget the famous uncertainty principle, and talk instead
about the No-Cloning Theorem. The latter is simply the statement that there’s no physical pro-
cedure, consistent with quantum mechanics, that takes as input a system in an arbitrary quantum
33
state |ψ〉,27 and outputs two systems both in the state |ψ〉.28 Intuitively, it’s not hard to see why:
a measurement of (say) a qubit |ψ〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉 reveals only a single, probabilistic bit of informa-
tion about the continuous parameters α and β; the rest of the information vanishes forever. The
proof of the No-Cloning Theorem (in its simplest version) is as easy as observing that the “cloning
map,”
(α |0〉+ β |1〉) |0〉 −→ (α |0〉+ β |1〉) (α |0〉+ β |1〉)
= α2 |0〉 |0〉+ αβ |0〉 |1〉+ αβ |1〉 |0〉+ β2 |1〉 |1〉 ,
acts nonlinearly on the amplitudes, but in quantum mechanics, unitary evolution must be linear.
Yet despite its mathematical triviality, the No-Cloning Theorem has the deep consequence that
quantum states have a certain “privacy”: unlike classical states, they can’t be copied promiscuously
around the universe. One way to gain intuition for the No-Cloning Theorem is to consider some
striking cryptographic protocols that rely on it. In quantum key distribution [11]—something that’s
already (to a small extent) been commercialized and deployed—a sender, Alice, transmits a secret
key to a receiver, Bob, by encoding the key in a collection of qubits. The crucial point is that if
an eavesdropper, Eve, tries to learn the key by measuring the qubits, then the very fact that she
measured the qubits will be detectable by Alice and Bob—so Alice and Bob can simply keep trying
until the channel is safe. Quantum money, proposed decades ago by Wiesner [91] and developed
further in recent years [3, 5, 34], would exploit the No-Cloning Theorem even more directly, to
create cash that can’t be counterfeited according to the laws of physics, but that can nevertheless
be verified as genuine.29 A closely related proposal, quantum software copy-protection (see [3, 5]),
would exploit the No-Cloning Theorem in a still more dramatic way: to create quantum states |ψf 〉
that can be used to evaluate some function f , but that can’t feasibly be used to create more states
with which f can be evaluated. Research on quantum copy-protection has shown that, at least in
a few special cases (and maybe more broadly), it’s possible to create a physical object that
(a) interacts with the outside world in an interesting and nontrivial way, yet
(b) effectively hides from the outside world the information needed to predict how the object will
behave in future interactions.
When put that way, the possible relevance of the No-Cloning Theorem to free-will discussions
seems obvious! And indeed, a few bloggers and others30 have previously speculated about a
connection. Interestingly, their motivation for doing so has usually been to defend compatibilism
(see Section 2.3). In other words, they’ve invoked the No-Cloning Theorem to explain why, despite
the mechanistic nature of physical law, human decisions will nevertheless remain unpredictable in
27Here we assume for simplicity that we’re talking about pure states, not mixed states.
28The word “arbitrary” is needed because, if we knew how |ψ〉 was prepared, then of course we could simply run the
preparation procedure a second time. The No-Cloning Theorem implies that, if we don’t already know a preparation
procedure for |ψ〉, then we can’t learn one just by measuring |ψ〉. (And conversely, the inability to learn a preparation
procedure implies the No-Cloning Theorem. If we could copy |ψ〉 perfectly, then we could keep repeating to make as
many copies as we wanted, then use quantum state tomography on the copies to learn the amplitudes to arbitrary
accuracy.)
29Unfortunately, unlike quantum key distribution, quantum money is not yet practical, because of the difficulty of
protecting quantum states against decoherence for long periods of time.
30See, for example, www.daylightatheism.org/2006/04/on-free-will-iii.html
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practice. In a discussion of this issue, one commenter31 opined that, while the No-Cloning Theorem
does put limits on physical predictability, human brains will also remain unpredictable for countless
more prosaic reasons that have nothing to do with quantum mechanics. Thus, he said, invoking the
No-Cloning Theorem in free-will discussions is “like hiring the world’s most high-powered lawyer
to get you out of a parking ticket.”
Personally, though, I think the world’s most high-powered lawyer might ultimately be needed
here! For the example of the Singulatarians (see Section 2.11) shows why, in these discussions,
it doesn’t suffice to offer “merely practical” reasons why copying a brain state is hard. Every
practical problem can easily be countered by a speculative technological answer—one that assumes
a future filled with brain-scanning nanorobots and the like. If we want a proposed obstacle to
copying to survive unlimited technological imagination, then the obstacle had better be grounded
in the laws of physics.
So as I see it, the real question is: once we disallow quantum mechanics, does there remain any
classical source of “fundamental unclonability” in physical law? Some might suggest, for example,
the impossibility of keeping a system perfectly isolated from its environment during the cloning
process, or the impossibility of measuring continuous particle positions to infinite precision. But
either of these would require very nontrivial arguments (and if one wanted to invoke continuity, one
would also have to address the apparent breakdown of continuity at the Planck scale). There are
also formal analogues of the No-Cloning Theorem in various classical settings, but none of them
seem able to do the work required here.32 As far as current physics can say, if copying a bounded
physical system is fundamentally impossible, then the reason for the impossibility seems ultimately
traceable to quantum mechanics.
Let me end this section by discussing quantum teleportation, since nothing more suggestively
illustrates the “philosophical work” that the No-Cloning Theorem can potentially do. Recall, from
Section 2.5, the “paradox” raised by teleportation machines. Namely, after a perfect copy of you
has been reconstituted on Mars from the information in radio signals, what should be done with
the “original” copy of you back on Earth? Should it be euthanized?
Like other such paradoxes, this one need not trouble us if (because of the No-Cloning Theorem,
or whatever other reason) we drop the assumption that such copying is possible—at least with
great enough fidelity for the copy on Mars to be a “second instantiation of you.” However, what
makes the situation more interesting is that there is a famous protocol, discovered by Bennett et al.
[12], for “teleporting” an arbitrary quantum state |ψ〉 by sending classical information only. (This
protocol also requires quantum entanglement, in the form of Bell pairs |00〉+|11〉√
2
, shared between
the sender and receiver in advance, and one Bell pair gets “used up” for every qubit teleported.)
Now, a crucial feature of the teleportation protocol is that, in order to determine which classical
bits to send, the sender needs to perform a measurement on her quantum state |ψ〉 (together with her
half of the Bell pair) that destroys |ψ〉. In other words, in quantum teleportation, the destruction of
31Sadly, I no longer have the reference.
32For example, No-Cloning holds for classical probability distributions: there’s no procedure that takes an input
bit b that equals 1 with unknown probability p, and produces two output bits that are both 1 with probability p
independently. But this observation lacks the import of the quantum No-Cloning Theorem, because regardless of
what one wanted to do with the bit b, one might as well have measured it immediately, thereby “collapsing” it to a
deterministic bit—which can of course be copied.
Also, seeking to clarify foundational issues in quantum mechanics, Spekkens [83] constructed an “epistemic toy
theory” that’s purely classical, but where an analogue of the No-Cloning Theorem holds. However, the toy theory
involves “magic boxes” that we have no reason to think can be physically realized.
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the original copy is not an extra decision that one needs to make; rather, it happens as an inevitable
byproduct of the protocol itself! Indeed this must be so, since otherwise quantum teleportation
could be used to violate the No-Cloning Theorem.
3.3 The Freebit Picture
At this point one might interject: theoretical arguments about the No-Cloning Theorem are well
and good, but even if accepted, they still don’t provide any concrete picture of how Knightian
uncertainty could be relevant to human decision-making.
So let me sketch a possible picture (the only one I can think of, consistent with current physics),
which I call the “freebit picture.” At the Big Bang, the universe had some particular quantum
state |Ψ〉. If known, |Ψ〉 would of course determine the universe’s future history, modulo the
probabilities arising from quantum measurement. However, because |Ψ〉 is the state of the whole
universe (including us), we might refuse to take a “God’s-eye view” of |Ψ〉, and insist on thinking
about |Ψ〉 differently than about an ordinary state that we prepare for ourselves in the lab. In
particular, we might regard at least some (not all) of the qubits that constitute |Ψ〉 as what I’ll
call freebits. A freebit is simply a qubit for which the most complete physical description possible
involves Knightian uncertainty. While the details aren’t so important, I give a brief mathematical
account of freebits in Appendix 14. For now, suffice it to say that a freestate is a convex set of
quantum mixed states, and a freebit is a 2-level quantum system in a freestate.
Thus, by the freebit picture, I mean the picture of the world according to which
(i) due to Knightian uncertainty about the universe’s initial quantum state |Ψ〉, at least some of
the qubits found in nature are regarded as freebits, and
(ii) the presence of these freebits makes predicting certain future events—possibly including some
human decisions—physically impossible, even probabilistically and even with arbitrarily-
advanced future technology.
Section 3.4 will say more about the “biological” aspects of the freebit picture: that is, the
actual chains of causation that could in principle connect freebits to (say) a neuron firing or not
firing. In the rest of this section, I’ll discuss some physical and conceptual questions about freebits
themselves.
Firstly, why is it important that freebits be qubits, rather than classical bits subject to Knightian
uncertainty? The answer is that only for qubits can we appeal to the No-Cloning Theorem. Even
if the value of a classical bit b can’t determined by measurements on the entire rest of the universe,
a superintelligent predictor could always learn b by non-invasively measuring b itself. But the same
is not true for a qubit.
Secondly, isn’t Knightian uncertainty in the eye of the beholder? That is, why couldn’t one
observer regard a given qubit as a “freebit,” while a different observer, with more information,
described the same qubit by ordinary quantum mixed state ρ? The answer is that our criterion for
what counts a freebit is extremely stringent. Given a 2-level quantum system S, if a superintelli-
gent demon could reliably learn the reduced density matrix ρ of S, via arbitrary measurements on
anything in the universe (including S itself), then S is not a freebit. Thus, to qualify as a freebit,
S must be a “freely moving part” of the universe’s quantum state |Ψ〉: it must not be possible (even
in principle) to trace S’s causal history back to any physical process that generated S according to
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a known probabilistic ensemble. Instead, our Knightian uncertainty about S must (so to speak)
go “all the way back,” and be traceable to uncertainty about the initial state of the universe.
To illustrate the point: suppose we detect a beam of photons with varying polarizations. For
the most part, the polarizations look uniformly random (i.e., like qubits in the maximally mixed
state). But there is a slight bias toward the vertical axis, and the bias is slowly changing over
time, in a way not fully accounted for by our model of the photons. So far, we can’t rule out the
possibility that freebits might be involved. However, suppose we later learn that the photons are
coming from a laser in another room, and that the polarization bias is due to drift in the laser that
can be characterized and mostly corrected. Then the scope for freebits is correspondingly reduced.
Someone might interject: “but why was there drift in the laser? Couldn’t freebits have been
responsible for the drift itself?” The difficulty is that, even if so, we still couldn’t use those freebits
to argue for Knightian uncertainty in the laser’s output. For between the output photons, and
whatever freebits might have caused the laser to be configured as it was, there stands a classical,
macroscopic intermediary: the laser itself. If a demon had wanted to predict the polarization drift
in the output photons, the demon could simply have traced the photons back to the laser, then non-
invasively measured the laser’s classical degrees of freedom—cutting off the causal chain there and
ignoring any further antecedents. In general, given some quantum measurement outcome Q that
we’re trying to predict, if there exists a classical observable C that could have been non-invasively
measured long before Q, and that if measured, would have let the demon probabilistically predict
Q to arbitrary accuracy (in the same sense that radioactive decay is probabilistically predictable),
then I’ll call C a past macroscopic determinant (PMD) for Q.
In the freebit picture, we’re exclusively interested in the quantum states—if there are any!—that
can’t be grounded in PMDs, but can only be traced all the way back to the early universe, with
no macroscopic intermediary along the way that “screen off” the early universe’s causal effects.
The reason is simple: because such states, if they exist, are the only ones that our superintelligent
demon, able to measure all the macroscopic observables in the universe, would still have Knightian
uncertainty about. In other words, such states are the only possible freebits.
Of course this immediately raises a question:
(*) In the actual universe, are there any quantum states that can’t be
grounded in PMDs?
A central contention of this essay is that pure thought doesn’t suffice to answer question (*):
here we’ve reached the limits of where conceptual analysis can take us. There are possible universes
consistent with the rules of quantum mechanics where the requisite states exist, and other such
universes where they don’t exist, and deciding which kind of universe we inhabit seems to require
scientific knowledge that we don’t have.
Some people, while agreeing that logic and quantum mechanics don’t suffice to settle question
(*), would nevertheless say we can settle it using simple facts about astronomy. At least near the
surface of the earth, they’d ask, what quantum states could there possibly be that didn’t originate
in PMDs? Most of the photons impinging on the earth come from the sun, whose physics is
exceedingly well-understood. Of the subatomic particles that could conceivably “tip the scales” of
(say) a human neural event, causing it to turn out one way rather than another, others might have
causal pathways that lead back to other astronomical bodies (such as supernovae), the earth’s core,
etc. But it seems hard to imagine how any of the latter possibilities wouldn’t serve as PMDs: that
is, how they wouldn’t effectively “screen off” any Knightian uncertainty from the early universe.
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To show that the above argument is inconclusive, one need only mention the cosmic microwave
background (CMB) radiation. CMB photons pervade the universe, famously accounting for a few
percent of the static in old-fashioned TV sets. Furthermore, many CMB photons are believed to
reach the earth having maintained quantum coherence ever since being emitted at the so-called
time of last scattering, roughly 380, 000 years after the Big Bang. Finally, unlike (say) neutrinos
or dark matter, CMB photons readily interact with matter. In short, we’re continually bathed
with at least one type of radiation that seems to satisfy most of the freebit picture’s requirements!
On the other hand, no sooner is the CMB suggested for this role than we encounter two serious
objections. The first is that the time of last scattering, when the CMB photons were emitted, is
separated from the Big Bang itself by 380, 000 years. So if we wanted to postulate CMB photons
as freebit carriers, then we’d also need a story about why the hot early universe should not be
considered a PMD, and about how a qubit might have “made it intact” from the Big Bang—or at
any rate, from as far back as current physical theory can take us—to the time of last scattering.
The second objection asks us to imagine someone shielded from the CMB: for example, someone in
a deep underground mine. Would such a person be “bereft of Knightian freedom,” at least while
he or she remained in the mine?
Because of these objections, I find that, while the CMB might be one piece of a causal chain
conveying a qubit to us from the early universe (without getting screened off by a PMD), it can’t
possibly provide the full story. It seems to me that convincingly answering question (*) would
require something like a census of the possible causal chains from the early universe to ourselves
that are allowed by particle physics and cosmology. I don’t know whether the requisite census is
beyond present-day science, but it’s certainly beyond me! Note that, if it could be shown that all
qubits today can be traced back to PMDs, and that the answer to (*) is negative, then the freebit
picture would be falsified.
3.4 Amplification and the Brain
We haven’t yet touched on an obvious question: once freebits have made their way into (say) a
brain, by whatever means, how could they then tip the scales of a decision? But it’s not hard to
suggest plausible answers to this question, without having to assume anything particularly exotic
about either physics or neurobiology. Instead, one can appeal to the well-known phenomenon of
chaos (i.e., sensitive dependence on initial conditions) in dynamical systems.
The idea that chaos in brain activity might somehow underlie free will is an old one. However,
that idea has traditionally been rejected, on the sensible ground that a classical chaotic system is still
perfectly deterministic! Our inability to measure the initial conditions to unlimited precision, and
our consequent inability to predict very far into the future, seem at best like practical limitations.
Thus, a revised idea has held that the role of chaos for free will might be to take quantum
fluctuations—which, as we know, are not deterministic (see Section 2.8)—and amplify those fluc-
tuations to macroscopic scale. However, this revised idea has also been rejected, on the (again
sensible) ground that, even if true, it would only make the brain a probabilistic dynamical system,
which still seems “mechanistic” in any meaningful sense.
The freebit picture makes a further revision: namely, it postulates that chaotic dynamics in
the brain can have the effect of amplifying freebits (i.e., microscopic Knightian uncertainty) to
macroscopic scale. If nothing else, this overcomes the elementary objections above. Yes, the
resulting picture might still be wrong, but not for some simple a priori reason—and to me, that
represents progress!
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It’s long been recognized that neural processes relevant to cognition can be sensitive to micro-
scopic fluctuations. An important example is the opening and closing of a neuron’s sodium-ion
channels, which normally determines whether and for how long a neuron fires. This process is
modeled probabilistically (in particular, as a Markov chain) by the standard Hodgkin-Huxley equa-
tions [44] of neuroscience. Of course, one then has to ask: is the apparent randomness in the
behavior of the sodium-ion channels ultimately traceable back to quantum mechanics (and if so, by
what causal routes)? Or does the “randomness” merely reflect our ignorance of relevant classical
details?
Balaguer [9] put the above question to various neuroscientists, and was told that either that
the answer is unknown or that it’s outside neuroscience’s scope. For example, he quotes Sebastian
Seung as saying: “The question of whether [synaptic transmission and spike firing] are ‘truly
random’ processes in the brain isn’t really a neuroscience question. It’s more of a physics question,
having to do with statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics.” He also quotes Christof Koch
as saying: “At this point, we do not know to what extent the random, i.e. stochastic, neuronal
processes we observe are due to quantum fluctuations (a` la Heisenberg) that are magnified by
chemical and biological mechanisms or to what extent they just depend on classical physics (i.e.
thermodynamics) and statistical fluctuations in the underlying molecules.”
In his paper “A scientific perspective on human choice” [81], the neuroscientist Haim Sompolin-
sky offers a detailed review of what’s known about the brain’s sensitivity to microscopic fluctuations.
Though skeptical about any role for such fluctuations in cognition, he writes:
In sum, given the present state of our understanding of brain processes and given the
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the brain is truly an indeterministic system; that because of quantum indeterminism,
there are certain circumstances where choices produced by brain processes are not fully
determined by the antecedent brain process and the forces acting on it. If this is so,
then the first prerequisite [i.e., indeterminism] of “metaphysical free will” ... may be
consistent with the scientific understanding of the brain.33
To make the issue concrete: suppose that, with godlike knowledge of the quantum state |Ψ〉
of the entire universe, you wanted to change a particular decision made by a particular human
being—and do so without changing anything else, except insofar as the other changes flowed from
the changed decision itself. Then the question that interests us is: what sorts of changes to |Ψ〉
would or wouldn’t suffice to achieve your aim? For example, would it suffice to change the energy
of a single photon impinging on the subject’s brain? Such a photon might get absorbed by an
electron, thereby slightly altering the trajectories of a few molecules near one sodium-ion channel
in one neuron, thereby initiating a chain of events that ultimately causes the ion channel to open,
which causes the neuron to fire, which causes other neurons to fire, etc. If that sort of causal
chain is plausible—which, of course, is an empirical question—then at least as far as neuroscience
is concerned, the freebit picture would seem to have the raw material that it needs.
Some people might shrug at this, and regard our story of “the photon that broke the camel’s
back” as so self-evidently plausible that the question isn’t even scientifically interesting! So it’s
33However, Sompolinsky then goes on to reject “metaphysical free will” as incompatible with a scientific worldview:
if, he says, there were laws relevant to brain function beyond the known laws of physics and chemistry, then those
laws would themselves be incorporated into science, leaving us back where we started. I would agree if it weren’t
for the logical possibility of “Knightian laws,” which explained to us why we couldn’t even predict the probability
distributions for certain events.
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important to understand that there are two details of the story that matter enormously, if we
want the freebit picture to be viable. The first detail concerns the amount of time needed for a
microscopic change in a quantum state to produce a macroscopic change in brain activity. Are
we talking seconds? hours? days?34 The second detail concerns localization. We’d like our
change to the state of a single photon to be “surgical” in its effects: it should change a person’s
neural firing patterns enough to alter that person’s actions, but any other macroscopic effects of the
changed photon state should be mediated through the change to the brain state. The reason for
this requirement is simply that, if it fails, then a superintelligent predictor might “non-invasively”
learn about the photon by measuring its other macroscopic effects, and ignoring its effects on the
brain state.
To summarize our questions:
What are the causal pathways by which a microscopic fluctuation can get chaotically
amplified, in human or other animal brains? What are the characteristic timescales
for those pathways? What “side effects” do the pathways produce, separate from their
effects on cognition?35
In Section 9, I’ll use these questions—and the freebit picture’s dependence on their answers—to
argue that the picture makes falsifiable predictions. For now, I’ll simply say that these questions
strike me as wide open to investigation, and not only in principle. That is, I can easily imagine
that in (say) fifty years, neuroscience, molecular biology, and physics will be able to say more
about these questions than they can today. And crucially, the questions strike me as scientifically
interesting regardless of one’s philosophical predilections. Indeed, one could reject the freebit
picture completely, and still see progress on these questions as a “rising tide that lifts all boats” in
the scientific understanding of free will. The freebit picture seems unusual only in forcing us to
address these questions.
3.5 Against Homunculi
A final clarification is in order about the freebit picture. One might worry that freebits are playing
the role of a homunculus: the “secret core” of a person; a smaller person inside who directs the
brain like a manager, puppeteer, or pilot; Ryle’s ghost in the machine. But in philosophy and
cognitive science, the notion of a homunculus has been rightly laughed off the stage. Like the
theory that a clock can only work if there’s a smaller clock inside, the homunculus theory blithely
offers a black box where a mechanism is needed, and it leads to an obvious infinite regress: who’s
in charge of the homunculus?
Furthermore, if this were really the claim at issue, one would want to know: why do humans
(and other animals) have such complicated brains in the first place? Why shouldn’t our skulls be
empty, save for tiny “freebit antennae” for picking up signals from the Big Bang?
But whatever other problems the freebit picture has, I think it’s innocent of the charge of
homunculism. On the freebit picture—as, I’d argue, on any sane understanding of the world—the
physical activity of the brain retains its starring role in cognition. To whatever extent your “true
34Or one could ask: if we model the brain as a chaotic dynamical system, what’s the Lyapunov exponent?
35Another obvious question is whether brains differ in any interesting way from other complicated dynamical
systems like lava lamps or the Earth’s atmosphere, in terms of their response to microscopic fluctuations. This
question will be taken up in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
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self” has any definite location in spacetime, that location is in your brain. To whatever extent your
behavior is predictable, that predictability ultimately derives from the predictability of your brain.
And to whatever extent your choices have an author, you are their author, not some homunculus
secretly calling the shots.
But if this is so, one might ask, then what role could possibly be left for freebits, besides the
banal role of an unwanted noise source, randomly jostling neural firing patterns this way and
that? Perhaps the freebit picture’s central counterintuitive claim is that freebits can play a more
robust role than that of glorified random-number generator, without usurping the brain’s causal
supremacy. Or more generally: an organized, complex system can include a source of “pure
Knightian unpredictability,” which foils probabilistic forecasts made by outside observers, yet need
not play any role in explaining the system’s organization or complexity. While I confess that this
claim is strange, I fail to see any logical difficulty with it, nor do I see any way to escape it if the
freebit picture is accepted.
To summarize, on the freebit picture, freebits are simply part of the explanation for how a
brain can reach decisions that are not probabilistically predictable by outside observers, and that
are therefore “free” in the sense that interests us. As such, on this picture freebits are just one
ingredient among many in the physical substrate of the mind. I’d no more consider them the “true
essence” of a person than the myelin coating that speeds transmission between neurons.
4 Freedom from the Inside Out
The discussion in Section 3.5 might remind us about the importance of stepping back. Setting
aside any other concerns, isn’t it anti-scientific insanity to imagine that our choices today could
correlate nontrivially with the universe’s microstate at the Big Bang? Why shouldn’t this idea just
be thrown out immediately?
In this section, I’ll discuss an unusual perspective on time, causation, and boundary conditions:
one that, if adopted, makes the idea of such a correlation seem not particularly crazy at all. The
interesting point is that, despite its strangeness, this perspective seems perfectly compatible with
everything we know about the laws of physics. The perspective is not new; it was previously
suggested by Carl Hoefer [45] and independently by Cristi Stoica [85, 86]. (As Hoefer discusses,
centuries before either of them, Kant appears to have made related observations in his Critique of
Practical Reason, while trying to reconcile moral responsibility with free will! However, Kant’s
way of putting things strikes me as obscure and open to other interpretations.) Adopting Hoefer’s
terminology, I’ll call the perspective “Freedom from the Inside Out,” or FIO for short.
The FIO perspective starts from the familiar fact that the known equations of physics are
time-reversible: any valid solution to the equations is still a valid solution if we replace t by −t.36
Hence, there seems to be no particular reason to imagine time as “flowing” from past to future.
Instead, we might as well adopt what philosophers call the “Block Universe” picture, where the
whole 4-dimensional spacetime manifold is laid out at once as a frozen block.37 Time is simply
one more coordinate parameterizing that manifold, along with the spatial coordinates x, y, z. The
equations do treat the t coordinate differently from the other three, but not in any way that seems
36One also needs to interchange left with right and particles with antiparticles, but that doesn’t affect the substance
of the argument.
37Of course, if the physical laws were probabilistic, then we’d have a probability distribution over possible blocks.
This doesn’t change anything in the ensuing discussion.
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to justify the intuitive notion of t “flowing” in a particular direction, any more than the x, y, z
coordinates “flow” in a particular direction. Of course, with the discovery of special relativity,
we learned that the choice of t coordinate is no more unique than the choice of x, y, z coordinates;
indeed, an event in a faraway galaxy that you judge as years in the future, might well be judged
as years in the past by someone walking past you on the street. To many philosophers, this seems
to make the argument for a Block-Universe picture even stronger than it had been in Newtonian
physics.38
The Block-Universe picture is sometimes described as “leaving no room for free will”—but that
misses the much more important point, that the picture also leaves no room for causation! If we
adopt this mentality consistently, then it’s every bit as meaningless to say that “Jack and Jill went
up the hill because of the prior microstate of the universe,” as it is to say that “Jack and Jill went
up the hill because they wanted to.” Indeed, we might as well say that Jack and Jill went up the hill
because of the future microstate of the universe! Or rather, the concept of “because” plays no role
in this picture: there are the differential equations of physics, and the actual history of spacetime
is one particular solution to those equations, and that’s that.
Now, the idea of “Freedom from the Inside Out” is simply to embrace the Block-Universe picture
of physics, then turn it on its head. We say: if this frozen spacetime block has no “intrinsic” causal
arrows anyway, then why not annotate it with causal arrows ourselves, in whichever ways seem most
compelling and consistent to us? And at least a priori, who’s to say that some of the causal arrows
we draw can’t point “backwards” in time—for example, from human mental states and decisions
to “earlier” microstates consistent with them? Thus, we might decide that yesterday your brain
absorbed photons in certain quantum states because today you were going to eat tuna casserole,
and running the differential equations backward from the tuna casserole produced the photons. In
strict Block-Universe terms, this seems absolutely no worse than saying that you ate tuna casserole
today because of the state of the universe yesterday.
I’ll let Hoefer explain further:
The idea of freedom from the inside out is this: we are perfectly justified in viewing our
own actions not as determined by the past, nor as determined by the future, but rather
as simply determined (to the extent that this word sensibly applies) by ourselves, by
our own wills. In other words, they need not be viewed as caused or explained by the
physical states of other, vast regions of the block universe. Instead, we can view our
own actions, qua physical events, as primary explainers, determining—in a very partial
way—physical events outside ourselves to the past and future of our actions, in the
block. We adopt the perspective that the determination or explanation that matters
is from the inside (of the block universe, where we live) outward, rather than from the
outside (e.g. the state of things on a time slice 1 billion years ago) in. And we adopt the
perspective of downward causation, thinking of our choices and intentions as primary
explainers of our physical actions, rather than letting microstates of the world usurp this
role. We are free to adopt these perspectives because, quite simply, physics—including
[a] postulated, perfected deterministic physics—is perfectly compatible with them. [45,
p. 207-208, emphases in original]
38As Einstein himself famously wrote to Michele Besso’s family in 1955: “Now Besso has departed from this strange
world a little ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction
between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.”
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Some readers will immediately object as follows:
Yes, “causality” in the Block Universe might indeed be a subtle, emergent concept.
But doesn’t the FIO picture take that observation to a ludicrous extreme, by turning
causality into a free-for-all? For example, why couldn’t an FIO believer declare that
the dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago because if they hadn’t, today I might
not have decided to go bowling?
The reply to this objection is interesting. To explain it, we first need to ask: if the notion
of “causality” appears nowhere in fundamental physics, then why does it look like past events
constantly cause future ones, and never the reverse? Since the late 19th century, physicists have
had a profound answer to that question, or at least a reduction of the question to a different
question.
The answer goes something like this: causality is an “emergent phenomenon,” associated with
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Though no one really knows why, the universe was in a vastly
“improbable,” low-entropy state at the Big Bang—which means, for well-understood statistical
reasons, that the further in time we move away from the Big Bang, the greater the entropy we’ll
find. Now, the creation of reliable memories and records is essentially always associated with
an increase in entropy (some would argue by definition). And in order for us, as observers, to
speak sensibly about “A causing B,” we must be able to create records of A happening and then
B happening. But by the above, this will essentially never be possible unless A is closer in time
than B to the Big Bang.
We’re now ready to see how the FIO picture evades the unacceptable conclusion of a causal
free-for-all. It does so by agreeing with the usual account of causality based on entropy increase,
in all situations where the usual account is relevant. While Hoefer [45] and Stoica [85, 86] are
not explicit about this point, I would say that on the FIO picture, it can only make sense to draw
causal arrows “backwards in time,” in those rare situations where entropy is not increasing with
time.
What are those situations? To a first approximation, they’re the situations where physical
systems are allowed to evolve reversibly, free from contact with their external environments. In
practice, such perfectly-isolated systems will almost always be microscopic, and the reversible
equation relevant to them will just be the Schro¨dinger equation. One example of such a system
would be a photon of cosmic background radiation, which was emitted in the early universe and
has been propagating undisturbed ever since. But these are precisely the sorts of systems that I’d
consider candidates for “freebits”! As far as I can see, if we want the FIO picture not to lead to
absurdity, then we can entertain the possibility of backwards-in-time causal arrows only for these
systems. For this is where the “normal” way of drawing causal arrows breaks down, and we have
nothing else to guide us.
4.1 The Harmonization Problem
There’s another potential problem with the FIO perspective—Hoefer [45] calls it the “Harmoniza-
tion Problem”—that is so glaring that it needs to be dealt with immediately. The problem is this:
once we let certain causal arrows point backward in time, say from events today to the microstate
at the Big Bang, we’ve set up what a computer scientist would recognize as a giant constraint
satisfaction problem. Finding a “solution” to the differential equations of physics is no longer just
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a matter of starting from the initial conditions and evolving them forward in time. Instead, we
can now also have constraints involving later times—for example, that a person makes a particular
choice—from which we’re supposed to propagate backward. But if this is so, then why should a
globally-consistent solution even exist, in general? In particular, what happens if there are cycles
in the network of causal arrows? In such a case, we could easily face the classic grandfather para-
dox of time travel to the past: for example, if an event A causes another event B in its future, but
B also causes not (A) in its past—which in turn causes not (B), which in turn causes A. Further-
more, even if globally-consistent solutions do exist, one is tempted to ask what “algorithm” Nature
uses to build a solution up. Should we imagine that Nature starts at the initial conditions and
propagates them forward, but then “backtracks” if a contradiction is found, adjusting the initial
conditions slightly in an attempt to avoid the contradiction? What if it gets into an infinite loop
this way?
With hindsight, we can see the discussion from Section 2.5 about brain-uploading, teleporta-
tion, Newcomb’s Paradox, and so on as highlighting the same concerns about the consistency of
spacetime—indeed, as using speculative future technologies to make those concerns more vivid.
Suppose, for example, that your brain has been scanned, and a complete physical description of
it (sufficient to predict all your future actions) has been stored on a computer on Pluto. And
suppose you then make a decision. Then from an FIO perspective, the question is: can we take
your decision to explain, not only the state of your brain at the moment of your choice, and not
only various microstates in your past lightcone39 (insofar as they need to be compatible with your
choice), but also what’s stored in the computer memory billions of kilometers away? Should we say
that you and the computer now make your decisions in synchrony, whatever violence that might
seem to do to the locality of spacetime? Or should we say that the very act of copying your brain
state removed your freedom where previously you had it, or proved that you were never free in the
first place?
Fortunately, it turns out that in the freebit picture, none of these problems arise. The freebit
picture might be rejected for other reasons, but it can’t be charged with logical inconsistency or
with leading to closed timelike curves. The basic observation is simply that we have to distinguish
between what I’ll call macrofacts and microfacts. A macrofact is a fact about a “decohered,
classical, macroscopic” property of a physical system S at a particular time. More precisely, a
macrofact is a fact F that could, in principle, be learned by an external measuring device without
disturbing the system S in any significant way. Note that, for F to count as a macrofact, it’s
not necessary that anyone has ever known F or will ever know F : only that F could have been
known, if a suitable measuring device had been around at the right place and the right time. So
for example, there is a macrofact about whether or not a Stegosaurus kicked a particular rock 150
million years ago, even if no human will ever see the rock, and even if the relevant information can
no longer be reconstructed, even in principle, from the quantum state of the entire solar system.
There are also macrofacts constantly being created in the interiors of stars and in interstellar space.
By contrast, a microfact is a fact about an undecohered quantum state ρ: a fact that couldn’t
have been learned, even in principle, without the potential for altering ρ (if the measurement were
performed in the “wrong” basis). For example, the polarization of some particular photon of the
cosmic microwave background radiation is a microfact. A microfact might or might not concern a
freebit, but the quantum state of a freebit is always a microfact.
39Given a spacetime point x, the past lightcone of x is the set of points from which x can receive a signal, and the
future lightcone of x is the set of points to which it can send one.
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Within the freebit picture, the solution to the “Harmonization Problem” is now simply to
impose the following two rules.
(1) Backwards-in-time causal arrows can point only to microfacts, never to macrofacts.
(2) No microfact can do “double duty”: if it is caused by a fact to its future, then it is not itself
the cause of anything, nor is it caused by anything else.
Together, these rules readily imply that no cycles can arise, and more generally, that the “causal-
ity graph” never produces a contradiction. For whenever they hold, the causality graph with be a
directed acyclic graph (a dag), with all arrows pointing forward in time, except for some “dangling”
arrows pointing backward in time that never lead anywhere else.
Rule (1) is basically imposed by fiat: it just says that, for all the events we actually observe,
we must seek their causes only to their past, never to their future. This rule might someday be
subject to change (for example, if closed timelike curves were discovered), but for now, it seems
like a pretty indispensable part of a scientific worldview. By contrast, rule (2) can be justified by
appealing to the No-Cloning Theorem. If a microfact f is directly caused by a macrofact F to its
future, then at some point a measurement must have occurred (or more generally, some decoherence
event that we can call a “measurement”), in order to amplify f to macroscopic scale and correlate
it with F . In the freebit picture, we think of the correlation with F as completely fixing f , which
explains why f can’t also be caused by anything other than F . But why can’t f , itself, cause
some macrofact F ′ (which, by rule (1), would need to be to f ’s future)? Here there are two cases:
F ′ = F or F ′ 6= F . If F ′ = F , then we’ve simply created a “harmless” 2-element cycle, where f
and F cause each other. It’s purely by convention that we disallow such cycles, and declare that
F causes f rather than the reverse. On the other hand, if F ′ 6= F , then we have two independent
measurements of f to f ’s future, violating the No-Cloning Theorem.40 Note that this argument
wouldn’t have worked if f had been a macrofact, since macroscopic information can be measured
many times independently.
Subtle questions arise when we ask about the possibility of microfacts causing other microfacts.
Rules (1) and (2) allow that sort of causation, as long as it takes place forward in time—or, if
backward in time, that it consists of a single “dangling” arrow only. If we wanted, without
causing any harm we could allow long chains (and even dags) of microfacts causing other microfacts
backward in time, possibly originating at some macrofact to their future. We would need to be
careful, though, that none of those microfacts ever caused any facts to their future, since that would
create the possibility of cycles. A simpler option is just to declare the entire concept of causality
irrelevant to the microworld. On that view, whenever a microfact f “causes” another microfact
f ′, unitarity makes it just as legitimate to say that f ′ causes f , or that neither causes the other.
Because of the reversibility of microscopic laws, the temporal order of f and f ′ is irrelevant: if
U |ψ〉 = |ϕ〉, then U † |ϕ〉 = |ψ〉. This view would regard causality as inextricably bound up with
the thermodynamic arrow of time, and therefore with irreversible processes, and therefore with
macrofacts.
40For the same reason, we also have the rule that a microfact cannot cause two macrofacts to its future via disjoint
causal pathways. The only reason this rule wasn’t mentioned earlier is that it plays no role in eliminating cycles.
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4.2 Microfacts and Macrofacts
An obvious objection to the distinction between microfacts and macrofacts is that it’s poorly-
defined. The position of a rock might be “obviously” a macrofact, and the polarization of a
photon “obviously” a microfact, but there is a continuous transition between the two. Exactly how
decohered and classical does a fact have to be, before it counts as a “macrofact” for our purposes?
This, of course, is reminiscent of the traditional objection to Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation
of quantum mechanics, and in particular, to its unexplained yet crucial distinction between the
“microworld” of quantum mechanics and the “macroworld” of classical observations.
Here, my response is basically to admit ignorance. The freebit picture is not particularly
sensitive to the precise way we distinguish between microfacts and macrofacts. But if the picture
is to make sense, it does require that there exist a consistent way to make this distinction. (Or at
least, it requires that there exist a consistent way to quantify the macro-ness of a fact f . The degree
of macro-ness of f might then correspond to the “effort of will” needed to affect f retrocausally,
with the effort becoming essentially infinite for ordinary macroscopic facts!)
One obvious way to enforce a macro/micro distinction would be via a dynamical collapse theory,
such as those of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [41] or Penrose [68]. In these theories, all quantum
states periodically undergo “spontaneous collapse” to some classical basis, at a rate that grows
with their mass or some other parameter, and in such a way that the probability of spontaneous
collapse is close to 0 for all quantum systems that have so far been studied, but close to 1 for
ordinary “classical” systems. Unfortunately, the known dynamical-collapse theories tend to suffer
from technical problems, such as small violations of conservation of energy, and of course there is
as yet no experimental evidence for them. More fundamentally, I personally cannot believe that
Nature would solve the problem of the “transition between microfacts and macrofacts” in such
a seemingly ad hoc way, a way that does so much violence to the clean rules of linear quantum
mechanics.
As I’ll discuss further in Section 5.5, my own hope is that a principled distinction between
microfacts and macrofacts could ultimately emerge from cosmology. In particular, I’m partial to
the idea that, in a deSitter cosmology like our own, a “macrofact” is simply any fact of which the
news is already propagating outward at the speed of light, so that the information can never, even
in principle, be gathered together again in order to “uncause” the fact. A microfact would then be
any fact for which this propagation hasn’t yet happened. The advantage of this distinction is that
it doesn’t involve the slightest change to the principles of quantum mechanics. The disadvantage
is that the distinction is “teleological”: the line between microfacts and macrofacts is defined by
what could happen arbitrarily far in the future. In particular, this distinction implies that if,
hypothetically, we could surround the solar system by a perfect reflecting boundary, then within
the solar system, there would no longer be any macrofacts! It also implies that there can be
no macrofacts in an anti -deSitter (adS) cosmology, which does have such a reflecting boundary.
Finally, it suggests that there can probably be few if any macrofacts inside the event horizon of
a black hole. For even if the information in the black hole interior eventually emerges, in coded
form, in the Hawking radiation, the Hawking evaporation process is so slow (∼ 1067 years for a
solar-mass black hole) that there would seem to be plenty of time for an observer outside the hole
to gather most of the radiation, and thereby prevent the information from spreading further.41
Because I can’t see a better alternative—and also, because I rather like the idea of cosmology
41To be more precise here, one would presumably need to know the detailed mapping between the qubits of Hawking
radiation and the degrees of freedom inside the hole, which in turn would require a quantum theory of gravity.
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playing a role in the foundations of quantum mechanics!—my current inclination is to bite the
bullet, and accept these and other implications of the macro/micro distinction I’ve suggested. But
there’s enormous scope here for better ideas (or, of course, new developments in physics) to change
my thinking.
5 Further Objections
In this section, I’ll present five objections to the freebit picture, together with my responses. Some
of these objections are obvious, and are generic to any analysis of “freedom” that puts significant
stock in the actual unpredictability of human choices. Others are less obvious, and are more
specific to the freebit picture.
5.1 The Advertiser Objection
The first objection is simply that human beings are depressingly predictable in practice: if they
weren’t, then they wouldn’t be so easily manipulable! So, does surveying the sorry history of
humankind—in which most people, most of the time, did exactly the boring, narrowly self-interested
things one might have expected them to do—furnish any evidence at all for the existence of freebits?
Response. I already addressed a related objection in Section 2.12, but this one seems so
important that it’s worth returning to it from a different angle.
It’s obvious that humans are at least partly predictable—and sometimes extremely predictable,
depending on what one is trying to predict. For example, it’s vanishingly unlikely that tomorrow,
the CEO of General Motors will show up to work naked, or that Noam Chomsky will announce
his support for American militarism. On the other hand, that doesn’t mean we know how to
program a computer to simulate these people, anticipating every major or minor decision they
make throughout their lives! It seems crucial to maintain the distinction between the partial
predictability that even the most vocal free-will advocate would concede, and the “physics-like”
predictability of a comet. To illustrate, imagine a machine that correctly predicted most decisions
of most people: what they’ll order for dinner, which movies they’ll select, which socks they’ll take
out of the drawer, and so on. (In a few domains, this goal is already being approximated by
recommendation systems, such as those of Amazon and Netflix.) But imagine that the machine
was regularly blindsided by the most interesting, consequential, life-altering decisions. In that case,
I suspect most people’s intuitions about their own “freedom” would be shaken slightly, but would
basically remain intact. By analogy, for most computer programs that arise in practice, it’s easy
to decide whether they halt, but that hardly decreases the importance of the general unsolvability
of the halting problem. Perhaps, as Kane [36] speculates, we truly exercise freedom only for a
relatively small number of “self-forming actions” (SFAs)—that is, actions that help to define who
we are—and the rest of the time are essentially “running on autopilot.” Perhaps these SFAs are
common in childhood and early adulthood, but become rare later in life, as we get set in our ways
and correspondingly more predictable.
Having said this, I concede that the intuition in favor of humans’ predictability is a powerful
one. Indeed, even supposing humans did have the capacity for Knightian freedom, one could
argue that that capacity can’t be particularly important, if almost all humans choose to “run on
autopilot” almost all of the time!
However, against the undeniable fact of humans so often being manipulable like lab rats, there’s
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a second undeniable fact, which should be placed on the other side of the intuitive ledger. This
second fact is the conspicuous failure of investors, pundits, intelligence analysts, and so on actually
to predict, with any reliability, what individuals or even entire populations will do. Again and
again the best forecasters are blindsided (though it must be admitted that after the fact, forecasters
typically excel at explaining the inevitability of whatever people decided to do!).
5.2 The Weather Objection
What’s special about the human brain? If we want to describe it as having “Knightian freedom,”
then why not countless other complicated dynamical systems, such as the Earth’s weather, or a
lava lamp?
Response. For systems like the weather or a lava lamp, I think a plausible answer can
actually be given. These systems are indeed unpredictable, but the unpredictability seems much
more probabilistic than Knightian in character. To put it another way, the famous “butterfly effect”
seems likely to be an artifact of deterministic models of those systems; one expects it to get washed
out as soon as we model the systems’ microscopic components probabilistically. To illustrate,
imagine that the positions and momenta of all the molecules in the Earth’s atmosphere had been
measured to roughly the maximum precision allowed by quantum mechanics; and that, on the
basis of those measurements, a supercomputer had predicted a 23% probability of a thunderstorm
in Shanghai at a specific date next year. Now suppose we changed the initial conditions by adding
a single butterfly. In classical, deterministic physics, that could certainly change whether the
storm happens, due to chaotic effects—but that isn’t the relevant question. The question is: how
much does adding the butterfly change the probability of the storm? The answer seems likely to be
“hardly at all.” After all, the original 23% was already obtained by averaging over a huge number
of possible histories. So unless the butterfly somehow changes the general features of the statistical
ensemble, its effects should be washed out by the unmeasured randomness in the millions of other
butterflies (and whatever else is in the atmosphere).
Yet with brains, the situation seems plausibly different. For brains seem “balanced on a
knife-edge” between order and chaos: were they as orderly as a pendulum, they couldn’t support
interesting behavior; were they as chaotic as the weather, they couldn’t support rationality. More
concretely, a brain is composed of neurons, each of which (in the crudest idealization) has a firing
rate dependent on whether or not the sum of signals from incoming neurons exceeds some threshold.
As such, one expects there to be many molecular-level changes one could make to a brain’s state
that don’t affect the overall firing pattern at all, but a few changes—for example, those that push
a critical neuron “just over the edge” to firing or not firing—that affect the overall firing pattern
drastically. So for a brain—unlike for the weather—a single freebit could plausibly influence
the probability of some macroscopic outcome, even if we model all of the system’s constituents
quantum-mechanically.
A closely-related difference between brains and the weather is that, while both are presumably
chaotic systems able to amplify tiny effects, only in the case of brains are the amplifications likely
to have “irreversible” consequences. Even if a butterfly flapping its wings can cause a thunder-
storm halfway around the world, a butterfly almost certainly won’t change the average frequency of
thunderstorms—at least, not without changing something other than the weather as an intermedi-
ary. To change the frequency of thunderstorms, one needs to change the trajectory of the earth’s
climate, something less associated with butterflies than with macroscopic “forcings” (for example,
increasing the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or hitting the earth with an asteroid).
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With brains, by contrast, it seems perfectly plausible that a single neuron’s firing or not firing could
affect the rest of a person’s life (for example, if it caused the person to make a very bad decision).
5.3 The Gerbil Objection
Even if it’s accepted that brains are very different from lava lamps or the weather considered purely
as dynamical systems, one could attempt a different reductio ad absurdum of the freebit picture,
by constructing a physical system that behaves almost exactly like a brain, yet whose Knightian
uncertainty is “decoupled” from its intelligence in what seems like an absurd way. Thus, consider
the following thought experiment: on one side of a room, we have a digital computer, whose internal
operations are completely deterministic. The computer is running an AI program that easily passes
the Turing test: many humans, let’s say, have maintained long Internet correspondences with the
AI on diverse subjects, and not one ever suspected its consciousness or humanity. On the other
side of the room, we have a gerbil in a box. The gerbil scurries in its box, in a way that we can
imagine to be subject to at least some Knightian uncertainty. Meanwhile, an array of motion
sensors regularly captures information about the gerbil’s movements and transmits it across the
room to the computer, which uses the information as a source of random bits for the AI. Being
extremely sophisticated, of course the AI doesn’t make all its decisions randomly. But if it can’t
decide between two roughly-equal alternatives, then it sometimes uses the gerbil movements to
break a tie, much as an indecisive human might flip a coin in a similar situation.
The problem should now be obvious. By assumption, we have a system that acts with human-
level intelligence (i.e., it passes the Turing test), and that’s also subject to Knightian uncertainty,
arising from amplified quantum fluctuations in a mammalian nervous system. So if we believe
that humans have a “capacity for freedom” because of those two qualities, then we seem obligated
to believe that the AI/gerbil hybrid has that capacity as well. Yet if we simply disconnect the
computer from the gerbil box, then the AI loses its “capacity for freedom”! For then the AI’s
responses, though they might still seem intelligent, could be “unmasked as mechanistic” by any-
one who possessed a copy of the AI’s program. Indeed, even if we replaced the gerbil box by
an “ordinary” quantum-mechanical random number generator, the AI’s responses would still be
probabilistically predictable; they would no longer involve Knightian uncertainty.
Thus, a believer in the freebit picture seems forced to an insane conclusion: that the gerbil,
though presumably oblivious to its role, is like a magic amulet that gives the AI a “capacity for
freedom” it wouldn’t have had otherwise. Indeed, the gerbil seems uncomfortably close to the
soul-giving potions of countless children’s stories (stories that always end with the main character
realizing that she already had a soul, even without the potion!). Yet, if we reject this sort of thinking
in the gerbil-box scenario, then why shouldn’t we also reject it for the human brain? With the
brain, it’s true, the “Knightian-indeterminism-providing gerbil” has been moved physically closer
to the locus of thought: now it scurries around in the synaptic junctions and neurons, rather than
in a box on the other side of the room. But why should proximity make a difference? Wherever we
put the gerbil, it just scurries around aimlessly! Maybe the scurrying is probabilistic, maybe it’s
“Knightian,” but either way, it clearly plays no more explanatory role in intelligent decision-making
than the writing on the Golem’s forehead.
In summary, it seems the only way to rescue the freebit picture is to paper over an immense
causal gap—between the brain’s “Knightian noise” and its cognitive information processing—with
superstition and magic.
Response. Of all the arguments directed specifically against the freebit picture, this one
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strikes me as the most serious, which is why I tried to present it in a way that would show its
intuitive force.
On reflection, however, there is at least one potentially-important difference between the
AI/gerbil system and the brain. In the AI/gerbil system, the “intelligence” and “Knightian
noise” components were cleanly separable from one another. That is, the computer could easily be
disconnected from the gerbil box, and reattached to a different gerbil box, or an ordinary random-
number generator, or nothing at all. And after this was done, there’s a clear sense in which the AI
would still be running “the exact same program”: only the “indeterminism-generating peripheral”
would have been swapped out. For this reason, it seems best to think of the gerbil as simply yet
another part of the AI’s external environment—along (for example) with all the questions sent to
the AI over the Internet, which could also be used as a source of Knightian indeterminism.
With the brain, by contrast, it’s not nearly so obvious that the “Knightian indeterminism
source” can be physically swapped out for a different one, without destroying or radically alter-
ing the brain’s cognitive functions as well. Yes, we can imagine futuristic nanorobots swarming
through a brain, recording all the “macroscopically measurable information” about the connections
between neurons and the strengths of synapses, then building a new brain that was “macroscopi-
cally identical” to the first, differing only in its patterns of microscopic noise. But how would we
know whether the robots had recorded enough information about the original brain? What if, in
addition to synaptic strengths, there was also cognitively-relevant information at a smaller scale?
Then we’d need more advanced nanorobots, able to distinguish even smaller features. Ultimately,
we could imagine robots able to record all “classical” or even “quasi-classical” features. But by
definition, the robots would then be measuring features that were somewhat quantum-mechanical,
and therefore inevitably changing those features.
Of course, this is hardly a conclusive argument, since maybe there’s a gap of many orders of
magnitude between (a) the smallest possible scale of cognitive relevance, and (b) the scale where
the No-Cloning Theorem becomes relevant. In that case, at least in principle, the nanorobots really
could complete their scan of the brain’s “cognitive layer” without risking the slightest damage to it;
only the (easily-replaced?) “Knightian indeterminism layer” would be altered by the nanorobots’
presence. Whether this is possible is an empirical question for neuroscience.
However, the discussion of brain-scanning raises a broader point: that, against the gerbil-box
scenario, we need to weigh some other, older thought experiments where many people’s intuitions go
the other way. Suppose the nanorobots do eventually complete their scan of all the “macroscopic,
cognitively-relevant” information in your brain, and suppose they then transfer the information to a
digital computer, which proceeds to run a macroscopic-scale simulation of your brain. Would that
simulation be you? If your “original” brain were destroyed in this process, or simply anesthetized,
would you expect to wake up as the digital version? (Arguably, this is not even a philosophical
question, just a straightforward empirical question asking you to predict a future observation!)
Now, suppose you believe there’s some conceivable digital doppelga¨nger that would not “be
you,” and you also believe that the difference between you and it resides somewhere in the physical
world. Then since (by assumption) the doppelga¨nger is functionally indistinguishable from you, it
would seem to follow that the difference between you and it must reside in “functionally-irrelevant”
degrees of freedom, such as microscopic ones. Either that, or else the boundary between the “func-
tional” and “non-functional” degrees of freedom is not even sharp enough for the doppelga¨ngers to
be created in the first place.
My conclusion is that either you can be uploaded, copied, simulated, backed up, and so forth,
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leading to all the puzzles of personal identity discussed in Section 2.5, or else you can’t bear the
same sort of “uninteresting” relationship to the “non-functional” degrees of freedom in your brain
that the AI bore to the gerbil box.
To be clear, nothing I’ve said even hints at any sufficient condition on a physical system, in
order for the system to have attributes such as free will or consciousness. That is, even if human
brains were subject to Knightian noise at the microscopic scale, and even if the sources of such
noise could not be cleanly separated from the cognitive functions, human beings might still fail
to be “truly” conscious or free—whatever those things mean!—for other reasons. At most, I’m
investigating plausible necessary conditions for Knightian freedom as defined in this essay (and
hence, in my personal perspective, for “free will” also).
5.4 The Initial-State Objection
The fourth objection holds that the notion of “freebits” from the early universe nontrivially in-
fluencing present-day events is not merely strange, but inconsistent with known physics. More
concretely, Stenger [84] has claimed that it follows from known physics that the initial state at the
Big Bang was essentially random, and can’t have encoded any “interesting” information.42 His
argument is basically that the temperature at the Big Bang was enormous; and in quantum field
theory (neglecting gravity), such extreme temperatures seem manifestly incompatible with any
nontrivial structure.
Response. Regardless of whether Stenger’s conclusion holds, today there are strong indi-
cations, from cosmology and quantum gravity, that something has to be wrong with the above
argument for a thermal initial state.
First, by this argument, the universe’s entropy should have been maximal at the Big Bang, but
the Second Law tells us that the entropy was minimal! Stenger [84] notices the obvious problem,
and tries to solve it by arguing that the entropy at the Big Bang really was maximal, given the
tiny size of the observable universe at that time. On that view, the reason why entropy can
increase as we move away from the Big Bang is simply that the universe is expanding, and with it
the dimension of the state space. But others, such as Carroll [20] and Penrose [69], have pointed
out severe problems with that answer. For one thing, if the dimension of the state space can
increase, then we give up on reversibility, a central feature of quantum mechanics. For another,
this answer has the unpalatable implication that the entropy should turn around and decrease in a
hypothetical Big Crunch. The alternative, which Carroll and Penrose favor, is to hold that despite
the enormous temperature at the Big Bang, the universe’s state then was every bit as “special”
and low-entropy as the Second Law demands, but its specialness must have resided in gravitational
degrees of freedom that we don’t yet fully understand.
The second indication that the “thermal Big Bang” picture is incomplete is that quantum field
theory has misled us in a similar way before. In 1975, Hawking [42] famously used quantum field
theory in curved spacetime to calculate the temperature of black holes, and to prove the existence
of the Hawking radiation by which black holes eventually lose their mass and disappear. However,
Hawking’s calculation seemed to imply that the radiation was thermal—so that in particular, it
couldn’t encode any nontrivial information about objects that fell into the black hole. This
led to the black-hole information-loss paradox, since quantum-mechanical reversibility forbids the
42Here Stenger’s concern was not free will or human predictability, but rather ruling out the possibility (discussed
by some theologians) that God could have arranged the Big Bang with foreknowledge about life on Earth.
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quantum states of the infalling objects simply to “disappear” in this way. Today, largely because of
the AdS/CFT correspondence (see [15]), there’s a near-consensus among experts that the quantum
states of infalling objects don’t disappear as Hawking’s calculation suggested. Instead, at least
from the perspective of someone outside the black hole, the infalling information should “stick
around” on or near the event horizon, in not-quite-understood quantum-gravitational degrees of
freedom, before finally emerging in garbled form in the Hawking radiation. And if quantum field
theory says otherwise, that’s because quantum field theory is only a limiting case of a quantum
theory of gravity.
The AdS/CFT correspondence is just one realization of the holographic principle, which has
emerged over the last two decades as a central feature of quantum theories of gravity. It’s now
known that many physical theories have both a D-dimensional “bulk” formulation and a (D − 1)-
dimensional “boundary” formulation. In general, these two formulations look completely different:
states that are smooth and regular in one formulation might look random and garbled in the
other; questions that are trivial to answer in one formulation might seem hopeless in the other.43
Nevertheless, there exists an isomorphism between states and observables, by which the boundary
formulation “holographically encodes” everything that happens in the bulk formulation. As a
classic example, if Alice jumps into a black hole, then she might perceive herself falling smoothly
toward the singularity. Meanwhile Bob, far from the black hole, might describe exactly the
same physical situation using a “dual description” in which Alice never makes it past the event
horizon, and instead her quantum information gets “pancaked” across the horizon in a horrendously
complicated way. In other words, not only is not absurd to suppose that a “disorganized mess
of entropy” on the boundary of a region could be “isomorphic” to a richly-structured state in the
region’s interior, but there are now detailed examples where that’s exactly what happens.44
The bottom line is that, when discussing extreme situations like the Big Bang, it’s not okay to
ignore quantum-gravitational degrees of freedom simply because we don’t yet know how to model
them. And including those degrees of freedom seems to lead straight back to the unsurprising
conclusion that no one knows what sorts of correlations might have been present in the universe’s
initial microstate.
5.5 The Wigner’s-Friend Objection
A final objection comes from the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics—or more
precisely, from taking seriously the possibility that a conscious observer could be measured in a
coherent superposition of states.
Let’s start with the following thought experiment, called Wigner’s friend (after Eugene Wigner,
who wrote about it in 1962 [92]). An intelligent agent A is placed in a coherent superposition of
two different mental states, like so:
|Φ〉 = |1〉 |A1〉+ |2〉 |A2〉√
2
.
43As the simplest example, the boundary formulation makes it obvious that the total entropy in a region should
be upper-bounded by its surface area, rather than its volume. In the bulk formulation, that property is strange and
unexpected.
44Admittedly, the known examples involve isomorphisms between two theories with different numbers of spatial
dimensions but both with a time dimension. There don’t seem to be any nontrivial examples where the boundary
theory lives on an initial spacelike or null hypersurface of the bulk theory. (One could, of course, produce a trivial
example, by simply defining the “boundary theory” to consist of the initial conditions of the bulk theory, with no
time evolution! By “nontrivial,” I mean something more interesting than that.)
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We imagine that these two states correspond to two different questions that the agent could be
asked: for example, |1〉 |A1〉 represents A being asked its favorite color, while |2〉 |A2〉 denotes A
being asked its favorite ice cream flavor. Then, crucially, a second agent B comes along and
measures |Φ〉 in the basis
{ |1〉 |A1〉+ |2〉 |A2〉√
2
,
|1〉 |A1〉 − |2〉 |A2〉√
2
}
, (1)
in order to verify that A really was in a superposition of two mental states, not just in one state
or the other.
Now, there are many puzzling questions one can ask about this scenario: most obviously, “what
is it like” for A to be manipulated in this way? If A perceives itself in a definite state—either
A1 or A2, but not both—then will B’s later measurement of A in the basis (1) appear to A as a
violation of the laws of physics?
However, let’s pass over this well-trodden ground, and ask a different question more specific
to the freebit picture. According to that picture, A’s “free decision” of how to answer whichever
question it was asked should be correlated with one or more freebits w. But if we write out the
combined state of the superposed A and the freebits,
|1〉 |A1〉+ |2〉 |A2〉√
2
⊗ |w〉 ,
then a problem becomes apparent. Namely, the same freebits w need to do “double duty,” corre-
lating with A’s decision in both the |1〉 branch and the |2〉 branch! In other words, even supposing
microscopic details of the environment could somehow “explain” what happens in one branch, how
could the same details explain both branches? As A1 contemplated its favorite color, would it
find itself oddly constrained by A2’s simultaneous contemplations of its favorite ice cream flavor,
or vice versa?
One might think we could solve this problem by stipulating that w is split into two collections
of freebits, |w〉 = |w1〉 ⊗ |w2〉, with |w1〉 corresponding to A1’s response and |w2〉 corresponding to
A2’s. But this solution quickly runs into an exponential explosion: if we considered a state like
1
2500
∑
x∈{0,1}1000
|x〉 |Ax〉 ,
we would find we needed 21000 freebits to allow each Ax to make a yes/no decision independently
of all the other Ax’s.
Another “obvious” way out would be if the freebits were entangled with A:
∣∣Φ′〉 = |1〉 |A1〉 |w1〉+ |2〉 |A2〉 |w2〉√
2
.
The problem is that there seems to be no way to produce such entanglement, without violating
quantum mechanics. If w is supposed to represent microscopic details of A’s environment, ul-
timately traceable to the early universe, then it would be extremely mysterious to find A and
w entangled. Indeed, in a Wigner’s-friend experiment, such entanglement would show up as a
fundamental decoherence source: something which was not traceable to any “leakage” of quantum
information from A, yet which somehow prevented B from observing quantum interference between
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the |1〉 |A1〉 and |2〉 |A2〉 branches, when B measured in the basis (1). If, on the other hand, B did
ultimately trace the entanglement between A and w to a “leakage” of information from A, then
w would have been revealed to have never contained freebits at all! For in that case, w would
“merely” be the result of unitary evolution coupling A to its environment—so it could presumably
be predicted by B, who could even verify its hypothesis by measuring the state |Φ′〉 in the basis{ |1〉 |A1〉 |w1〉+ |2〉 |A2〉 |w2〉√
2
,
|1〉 |A1〉 |w1〉 − |2〉 |A2〉 |w2〉√
2
}
.
Response. As in Section 4.2—where asking about the definition of “microfacts” and “macro-
facts” led to a closely-related issue—my response to this important objection is to bite the bullet.
That is, I accept the existence of a deep incompatibility between the freebit picture and the phys-
ical feasibility of the Wigner’s-friend experiment. To state it differently: if the freebit picture is
correct, and the Wigner’s-friend experiment can be carried out, then I think we’re forced to con-
clude that—at least for the duration of the experiment—the subject no longer has the “capacity for
Knightian freedom,” and is now a “mechanistic,” externally-characterized physical system similar
to a large quantum computer.
I realize that the position above sounds crazy, but it becomes less so once one starts thinking
about what would actually be involved in performing a Wigner’s-friend experiment on a human
subject. Because of the immense couplings between a biological brain and its external environ-
ment (see Tegmark [88] for example), the experiment is likely impossible with any entity we would
currently recognize as “human.” Instead, as a first step (!), one would presumably need to solve
the problem of brain-uploading : that is, transferring a human brain into a digital substrate. Only
then could one even attempt the second part, of transferring the now-digitized brain onto a quan-
tum computer, and preparing and measuring it in a superposition of mental states. I submit
that, while the resulting entity might be “freely-willed,” “conscious,” etc., it certainly wouldn’t be
uncontroversially so, nor can we form any intuition by reasoning by analogy with ourselves (even
if we were inclined to try).
Notice in particular that, if the agent A could be manipulated in superposition, then as a direct
byproduct of those manipulations, A would presumably undergo the same mental processes over
and over, forwards in time as well as backwards in time. For example, the “obvious” way for B to
measure A in the basis (1), would simply be for B to “uncompute” whatever unitary transformation
U had placed A in the superposed state |Φ〉 in the first place. Presumably, the process would then
be repeated many times, as B accumulated more statistical evidence for the quantum interference
pattern. So, during the uncomputation steps, would A “experience time running backwards”?
Would the inverse map U † feel different than U? Or would all the applications of U and U †
be “experienced simultaneously,” being functionally indistinguishable from one another? I hope
I’m not alone in feeling a sense of vertigo about these questions! To me, it’s at least a plausible
speculation that A doesn’t experience anything, and that the reasons why it doesn’t are related to
B’s very ability to manipulate A in these ways.
More broadly, the view I’ve taken here on superposed agents strikes me as almost a conse-
quence of the view I took earlier, on agents whose mental states can be perfectly measured, copied,
simulated, and predicted by other agents. For there’s a close connection between being able to
measure the exact state |S〉 of a physical system, and being able to detect quantum interference in
a superposition of the form
|ψ〉 = |S1〉+ |S2〉√
2
,
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consisting of two “slight variants” of |S〉. If we know |S〉, then among other things, we can load
a copy of |S〉 onto a quantum computer, and thereby prepare and measure a superposition like
|ψ〉—provided, of course, that one counts the quantum computer’s encodings as |S1〉 and |S2〉 as
“just as good as the real thing.” Conversely, the ability to detect interference between |S1〉 and |S2〉
presupposes that we know, and can control, all the degrees of freedom that make them different:
quantum mechanics tells us that, if any degrees of freedom are left unaccounted for, then we will
simply see a probabilistic mixture of |S1〉 and |S2〉, not a superposition.
But if this is so, one might ask, then what makes humans any different? According to the most
literal reading of quantum mechanics’ unitary evolution rule—which some call the Many-Worlds
Interpretation—don’t we all exist in superpositions of enormous numbers of branches, and isn’t
our inability to measure the interference between those branches merely a “practical” problem,
caused by rapid decoherence? Here I reiterate the speculation put forward in Section 4.2: that the
decoherence of a state |ψ〉 should be considered “fundamental” and “irreversible,” precisely when
|ψ〉 becomes entangled with degrees of freedom that are receding toward our deSitter horizon at
the speed of light, and that can no longer be collected together even in principle. That sort of
decoherence could be avoided, at least in principle, by a fault-tolerant quantum computer, as in
the Wigner’s-friend thought experiment above. But it plausibly can’t be avoided by any entity
that we would currently recognize as “human.”
One could also ask: if the freebit picture were accepted, what would be the implications for
the foundations of quantum mechanics? For example, would the Many-Worlds Interpretation then
have to be rejected? Interestingly, I think the answer is no. Since I haven’t suggested any change
to the formal rules of quantum mechanics, any interpretations that accept those rules—including
Many-Worlds, Bohmian mechanics, and various Bayesian/subjectivist interpretations—would in
some sense “remain on the table” (to whatever extent they were on the table before!). As far as
we’re concerned in this essay, if one wants to believe that different branches of the wavefunction,
in which one’s life followed a different course than what one observes, “really exist,” that’s fine;
if one wants to deny the reality of those branches, that’s fine as well. Indeed, if the freebit
picture were correct, then Nature would have conspired so that we had no hope, even in principle,
of distinguishing the various interpretations by experiment.
Admittedly, one might think it’s obvious that the interpretations can’t be distinguished by
experiment, with or without the freebit picture. Isn’t that why they’re called “interpretations”?
But as Deutsch [29] already pointed out in 1985, scenarios like Wigner’s friend seriously challenge
the idea that the interpretations are empirically equivalent. For example, if one could perform a
quantum interference experiment on one’s own mental state, then couldn’t one directly experience
what it was like for the different components of the wavefunction describing that state to evolve
unitarily?45 And wouldn’t that, essentially, vindicate a Many-Worlds-like perspective, while ruling
out the subjectivist views that refuse to countenance the reality of “parallel copies of oneself”? By
denying that the subject of a Wigner’s-friend experiment has the “capacity for Knightian freedom,”
the freebit picture suggests that maybe there’s nothing that it’s like to be such a subject—and
45A crucial caveat is that, after the interference experiment was over, one would retain no reliable memories or
publishable records about “what it was like”! For the very fact of such an experiment implies that one’s memories
are being created and destroyed at will. Without the destruction of memories, we can’t get interference. After the
experiment is finished, one might have something in one’s memory, but what it is could have been probabilistically
predicted even before the experiment began, and can in no way depend on “what it was like” in the middle. Still,
at least while the experiment was underway, maybe one would know which interpretation of quantum mechanics was
correct!
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hence, that debates about quantum interpretation can freely continue forever, with not even the
in-principle possibility of an empirical resolution.
6 Comparison to Penrose’s Views
Probably the most original thinker to have speculated about physics and mind in the last half-
century has been Roger Penrose. In his books, including The Emperor’s New Mind [67] and
Shadows of the Mind [68],46 Penrose has advanced three related ideas, all of them extremely con-
troversial:
(1) That arguments related to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem imply that the physical action of
the human brain cannot be algorithmic (i.e., that it must violate the Church-Turing Thesis).
(2) That there must be an “objective” physical process that collapses quantum states and pro-
duces the definite world we experience, and that the best place to look for such a process is
in the interface of quantum mechanics, general relativity, and cosmology (the “specialness”
of the universe’s initial state providing the only known source of time-asymmetry in physics,
not counting quantum measurement).
(3) That objective collapse events, possibly taking place in the cytoskeletons of the brain’s neurons
(and subsequently amplified by “conventional” brain activity), provide the best candidate for
the source of noncomputability demanded by (1).
An obvious question is how Penrose’s views relate to the ones discussed here. Some people might
see the freebit picture as “Penrose lite.” For it embraces Penrose’s core belief in a relationship
between the mysteries of mind and those of modern physics, and even follows Penrose in focusing
on certain aspects of physics, such as the “specialness” of the initial state. On the other hand, the
account here rejects almost all of Penrose’s further speculations: for example, about noncomputable
dynamics in quantum gravity and the special role of the cytoskeleton in exploiting those dynamics.47
Let me now elaborate on seven differences between my account and Penrose’s.
(1) I make no attempt to “explain consciousness.” Indeed, that very goal seems mis-
guided to me, at least if “consciousness” is meant in the phenomenal sense rather than the
neuroscientists’ more restricted senses.48 For as countless philosophers have pointed out over
46A later book, The Road to Reality [69], says little directly about mind, but is my favorite. I think it makes
Penrose’s strongest case for a gap in our understanding of quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and cosmology that
radical new ideas will be needed to fill.
47Along another axis, though, some people might see the freebit picture as more radical, in that it suggests the
impossibility of any non-tautological explanation for certain events and decisions, even an explanation invoking oracles
for Turing-uncomputable problems.
48Just like “free will,” the word “consciousness” has been the victim of ferocious verbal overloading, having been
claimed for everything from “that which disappears under anesthesia,” to “that which a subject can give verbal
reports about,” to “the brain’s executive control system”! Worse, “consciousness” has the property that, even if
one specifies exactly what one means by it, readers are nevertheless certain to judge anything one says against their
own preferred meanings. For this reason, just as I ultimately decided to talk about “freedom” (or “Knightian
freedom”) rather than “free will” in this essay, so I’d much rather use less fraught terms for executive control, verbal
reportability, and so on, and restrict the word “consciousness” to mean “the otherwise-undefinable thing that people
have tried to get at for centuries with the word ‘consciousness,’ supposing that thing exists.”
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the years (see McGinn [62] for example), all scientific explanations seem equally compatible
with a “zombie world,” which fulfills the right causal relations but where no one “really”
experiences anything. More concretely, even if Penrose were right that the human brain
had “super-Turing” computational powers—and I see no reason to think he is—I’ve never
understood how that would help with what Chalmers [22] calls the “hard problem” of con-
sciousness. For example, could a Turing machine equipped with an oracle for the halting
problem perceive the “redness of red” any better than a Turing machine without such an
oracle?
Given how much Penrose says about consciousness, I find it strange that he says almost
nothing about the related mystery of free will. My central claim, in this essay, is that
there exists an “empirical counterpart” of free will (what I call “Knightian freedom”), whose
investigation really does lead naturally to questions about physics and cosmology, in a way
that I don’t know to happen for any of the usual empirical counterparts of consciousness.
(2) I make no appeal to the Platonic perceptual abilities of human mathematicians.
Penrose’s arguments rely on human mathematicians’ supposed power to “see” the consistency
of (for example) the Peano axioms of arithmetic (rather than simply assuming or asserting
that consistency, as a computer program engaging in formal reasoning might do). As far as I
can tell, to whatever extent this “power” exists at all, it’s just a particularly abstruse type of
qualia or subjective experience, as empirically inaccessible as any other type. In other words,
instead of talking about the consistency of Peano arithmetic, I believe Penrose might as well
have fallen back on the standard arguments about how a robot could never “really” enjoy
fresh strawberries, but at most claim to enjoy them.
In both cases, the reply seems obvious: how do you know that the robot doesn’t really enjoy
the strawberries that it claims to enjoy, or see the consistency of arithmetic that it claims
to see? And how do you know other people do enjoy or see those things? In any case,
none of the arguments in this essay turn on these sorts of considerations. If any important
difference is to be claimed between a digital computer and a human brain, then I insist that
the difference correspond to something empirical: for example, that computer memories can
be reliably measured and copied without disturbing them, while brain states quite possibly
can’t. The difference must not rely, even implicitly, on a question-begging appeal to the
author’s or reader’s own subjective experience.
(3) I make no appeal to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem. Let me summarize Penrose’s
(and earlier, Lucas’s [58]) “Go¨delian argument for human specialness.” Consider any finitely
describable machineM for deciding the truth or falsehood of mathematical statements, which
never errs but which might sometimes output “I don’t know.” Then by using the code of M ,
it’s possible to construct a mathematical statement SM—one example is a formal encoding
of “M will never affirm this statement”—that we humans, “looking in from the outside,” can
clearly see is true, yet that M itself can’t affirm without getting trapped in a contradiction.
The difficulties with this argument have been explained at length elsewhere [4, 28, 72]; some
standard replies to it are given in a footnote.49
49Why is it permissible to assume that M never errs, if no human mathematician (or even, arguably, the entire
mathematical community) has ever achieved that standard of infallibility?
Even if M never did affirm SM , or never erred more generally, how could we ever know that? Indeed, much like
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Here, I’ll simply say that I think the Penrose-Lucas argument establishes some valid con-
clusion, but the conclusion is much weaker than what Penrose wants, and it can also be
established much more straightforwardly, without Go¨delian considerations. The valid con-
clusion is that, if you know the code of an AI, then regardless of how intelligent the AI seems
to be, you can “unmask” it as an automaton, blindly following instructions. To do so, how-
ever, you don’t need to trap the AI in a self-referential paradox: it’s enough to verify that the
AI’s responses are precisely the ones predicted (or probabilistically predicted) by the code
that you possess! Both with the Penrose-Lucas argument and with this simpler argument, it
seems to me that the real issue is not whether the AI follows a program, but rather, whether
it follows a program that’s knowable by other physical agents. That’s why this essay focusses
from the outset on the latter issue.
(4) I don’t suggest any barrier to a suitably-programmed digital computer passing
the Turing Test. Of course, if the freebit picture were correct, then there would be a barrier
to duplicating the mental state and predicting the responses of a specific human. Even here,
though, it’s possible that, through non-invasive measurements, one could learn enough to
create a digital “mockup” of a given person that would fool that person’s closest friends
and relatives, possibly for decades. (For this purpose, it might not matter if the mockup’s
responses eventually diverged badly from the original person’s!) And such a mockup would
certainly succeed at the “weaker” task of passing the Turing Test—i.e., of fooling interrogators
into thinking it was human, at least until its code was revealed. If these sorts of mockups
couldn’t be built, then it would have to be for reasons well beyond anything explored in this
essay.
(5) I don’t imagine anything particularly exotic about the biology of the brain. In
The Emperor’s New Mind [67], Penrose speculates that the brain might act as what today
we would call an adiabatic quantum computer: a device that generates highly-entangled
quantum states, and might be able to solve certain optimization problems faster than any
classical algorithm. (In this case, presumably, the entanglement would be between neurons.)
In Shadows [68], Penrose goes further, presenting a proposal of himself and Stuart Hameroff
that ascribes a central role to microtubules, a component of the neuronal cytoskeleton. In this
proposal, the microtubules would basically be “antennae” sensitive to yet-to-be-discovered
quantum-gravity effects. Since Penrose also conjectures that a quantum theory of gravity
would include Turing-uncomputable processes (see point 7 below), the microtubules would
therefore let human beings surpass the capabilities of Turing machines.
Unfortunately, subsequent research hasn’t been kind to these ideas. Calculations of decoher-
ence rates leave almost no room for the possibility of quantum coherence being maintained
in the hot, wet environment of the brain for anything like the timescales relevant to cogni-
tion, or for long-range entanglement between neurons (see Tegmark [88] for example). As
for microtubules, they are common structural elements in cells—not only in neurons—and
no clear evidence has emerged that they are particularly sensitive to the quantum nature of
with consciousness itself, even if one person had the mysterious Platonic ability to “see” M ’s soundness, how could
that person ever convince a skeptical third party?
Finally, if we believed that the human brain was itself finitely describable, then why couldn’t we construct a similar
mathematical statement (e.g., “Penrose will never affirm this statement”), which Penrose couldn’t affirm without
contradicting himself, even though a different human, or indeed an AI program, could easily affirm it?
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spacetime. And this is setting aside the question of the evolutionary pathways by which the
“quantum-gravitational antennae” could have arisen.
The freebit perspective requires none of this: at least from a biological perspective, its picture
of the human brain is simply that of conventional neuroscience. Namely, the human brain
is a massively-parallel, highly-connected classical computing organ, whose design was shaped
by millions of years of natural selection. Neurons perform a role vaguely analogous to that
of gates in an electronic circuit (though neurons are far more complicated in detail), while
synaptic strengths serve as a readable and writable memory. If we restrict to issues of
principle, then perhaps the most salient difference between the brain and today’s electronic
computers is that the brain is a “digital/analog hybrid.” This means, for example, that we
have no practical way to measure the brain’s exact “computational state” at a given time,
copy the state, or restore the brain to a previous state; and it is not even obvious whether
these things can be done in principle. It also means that the brain’s detailed activity might
be sensitive to microscopic fluctuations (for example, in the sodium-ion channels) that get
chaotically amplified; this amplification might even occur over timescales relevant to human
decision-making (say, 30 seconds). Of course, if those fluctuations were quantum-mechanical
in origin—and at a small enough scale, they would be—then they couldn’t be measured even
in principle without altering them.
From the standpoint of neuroscience, the last parts of the preceding paragraph are certainly
not established, but neither does there seem to be any good evidence against them. I regard
them as plausible guesses, and hope future work will confirm or falsify them. To the view
above, the freebit picture adds only a single further speculation—a speculation that, moreover,
I think does not even encroach on neuroscience’s “turf.” This is simply that, if we consider
the quantum states ρ relevant to the microscopic fluctuations, then those states are subject
to at least some Knightian uncertainty (i.e., they are “freestates” as defined in Appendix 14);
and furthermore, at least some of the Knightian uncertainty could ultimately be traced, if we
wished, back to our ignorance of the detailed microstate of the early universe. This might or
might not be true, but it seems to me that it’s not a question for neuroscience at all, but for
physics and cosmology (see Section 9). What the freebit picture “needs” from neuroscience,
then, is extremely modest—certainly compared to what Penrose’s picture needs!
(6) I don’t propose an “objective reduction” process that would modify quantum
mechanics. Penrose speculates that, when the components of a quantum state achieve
a large enough energy difference that they induce “appreciably different” configurations of
the spacetime metric (roughly, configurations that differ by one Planck length or more), new
quantum-gravitational laws beyond of unitary quantum mechanics should come into effect,
and cause an “objective reduction” of the quantum state. This hypothetical process would
underlie what we perceive as a measurement or collapse. Penrose has given arguments
that his reduction process, if it existed, would have escaped detection by current quantum
interference experiments, but could conceivably be detected or ruled out by experiments in
the foreseeable future [61]. Penrose’s is far from the only “objective reduction” model on the
table: for example, there’s a well-known earlier model due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber
(GRW) [41], but that one was purely “phenomenological,” rather than being tied to gravity
or some other known part of physics.
If an objective reduction process were ever discovered, then it would provide a ready-made
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distinction between microfacts and macrofacts (see Section 4.2), of exactly the sort the freebit
picture needs. Despite this, I’m profoundly skeptical that any of the existing objective
reduction models are close to the truth. The reasons for my skepticism are, first, that
the models seem too ugly and ad hoc (GRW’s more so than Penrose’s); and second, that
the AdS/CFT correspondence now provides evidence that quantum mechanics can emerge
unscathed even from the combination with gravity. That’s why, in Sections 4.2 and 5.5, I
speculated that the distinction between microfacts and macrofacts might ultimately be defined
in terms of deSitter space cosmology, with a macrofact being any fact “already irreversibly
headed toward the deSitter horizon.”
(7) I don’t propose that quantum gravity leads to Turing-uncomputable processes.
One of Penrose’s most striking claims is that the laws of physics should involve uncomputabil-
ity : that is, transitions between physical states that cannot in principle be simulated by a
Turing machine, even given unlimited time. Penrose arrives at this conclusion via his Go¨del
argument (see point 3); he then faces the formidable challenge of where to locate the nec-
essary uncomputability in anything plausibly related to physics. Note that this is separate
from the challenge (discussed in point 5) of how to make the human brain sensitive to the
uncomputable phenomena, supposing they exist! In Shadows [68], Penrose seems to admit
that this is a weak link in his argument. As evidence for uncomputability, the best he can
offer is a theorem of Markov that the 4-manifold homeomorphism problem is undecidable
(indeed, equivalent to the halting problem) [60], and a speculation of Geroch and Hartle
[40] that maybe that fact has something to do with quantum gravity, since some attempted
formulations of quantum gravity involve sums over 4-manifolds.
Personally, I see no theoretical or empirical reason to think that the laws of physics should
let us solve Turing-uncomputable problems—either with our brains, or with any other phys-
ical system. Indeed, I would go further: in [2], I summarized the evidence that the laws of
physics seem to “conspire” to prevent us from solving NP-complete problems (like the Travel-
ing Salesman Problem) in polynomial time. But the NP-complete problems, being solvable in
“merely” exponential time, are child’s play compared to Turing-uncomputable problems like
the halting problem! For this reason, I regard it as a serious drawback of Penrose’s proposals
that they demand uncomputability in the dynamical laws, and as an advantage of the freebit
picture that it suggests nothing of the kind. Admittedly, the freebit picture does require that
there be no complete, computationally-simple description of the initial conditions.50 But it
seems to me that nothing in established physics should have led us to expect that such a
description would exist anyway !51 The freebit picture is silent on whether detailed proper-
ties of the initial state can be actually be used to solve otherwise-intractable computational
problems, such as NP-complete problems, in a reliable way. But the picture certainly gives
no reason to think this is possible, and I see no evidence for its possibility from any other
source.
50More precisely, the initial state, when encoded in some natural way as a binary string, must have non-negligibly
large “sophistication”: see Appendix 13.
51By contrast, when it comes to dynamical behavior, we have centuries of experience discovering laws that can
indeed be simulated on a computer, given the initial conditions as input, and no experience discovering laws that
can’t be so simulated.
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7 “Application” to Boltzmann Brains
In this section, I’ll explain how the freebit perspective, if adopted, seems to resolve the notorious
“Boltzmann brain problem” of cosmology. No doubt some people will feel that the cure is even
worse than the disease! But even if one thinks that, the mere fact of a connection between freebits
and Boltzmann brains seems worth spelling out.
First, what is the Boltzmann brain problem? Suppose that—as now seems all but certain
[74]—our universe will not undergo a Big Crunch, but will simply continue to expand forever, its
entropy increasing according to the Second Law. Then eventually, after the last black holes have
decayed into Hawking radiation, the universe will reach the state known as thermal equilibrium:
basically an entropy-maximizing soup of low-energy photons, flying around in an otherwise cold
and empty vacuum. The difficulty is that, even in thermal equilibrium, there’s still a tiny but
nonzero probability that any given (finite) configuration will arise randomly: for example, via a
chance conglomeration of photons, which could give rise to other particles via virtual processes.
In general, we expect a configuration with total entropy S to arise at a particular time and place
with probability of order ∼ 1/ exp (S). But eternity being a long time, even such exponentially-
unlikely fluctuations should not only occur, but occur infinitely often, for the same reason why all
of Shakespeare’s plays presumably appear, in coded form, infinitely often in the decimal expansion
of pi.52
So in particular, we would eventually expect (say) beings physically identical to you, who’d
survive just long enough to have whatever mental experiences you’re now having, then disappear
back into the void. These hypothetical observers are known in the trade as Boltzmann brains (see
[33]), after Ludwig Boltzmann, who speculated about related matters in the late 19th century. So,
how do you know that you aren’t a Boltzmann brain?
But the problem is worse. Since in an eternal universe, you would have infinitely many
Boltzmann-brain doppelga¨ngers, any observer with your memories and experiences seems infinitely
more likely to be a Boltzmann brain, than to have arisen via the “normal” processes of Darwinian
evolution and so on starting from a Big Bang! Silly as it sounds, this has been a major problem
plaguing recent cosmological proposals, since they keep wanting to assign enormous probability
measure to Boltzmann brains (see [20]).
But now suppose you believed the freebit picture, and also believed that possessing Knightian
freedom is a necessary condition for counting as an observer. Then I claim that the Boltzmann
brain problem would immediately go away. The reason is that, in the freebit picture, Knightian
freedom implies a certain sort of correlation with the universe’s initial state at the Big Bang—so
that lack of complete knowledge of the initial state corresponds to lack of complete predictability
(even probabilistic predictability) of one’s actions by an outside observer. But a Boltzmann brain
wouldn’t have that sort of correlation with the initial state. By the time thermal equilibrium is
reached, the universe will (by definition) have “forgotten” all details of its initial state, and any
freebits will have long ago been “used up.” In other words, there’s no way to make a Boltzmann
brain think one thought rather than another by toggling freebits. So, on this account, Boltzmann
brains wouldn’t be “free,” even during their brief moments of existence. This, perhaps, invites the
further speculation that there’s nothing that it’s like to be a Boltzmann brain.
52This would follow from the conjecture, as yet unproved, that pi is a “base-10 normal number”: that is, that just
like for a random sequence, every possible sequence of k consecutive digits appears in pi’s decimal expansion with
asymptotic frequency 1/10k .
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7.1 What Happens When We Run Out of Freebits?
The above discussion of Boltzmann brains leads to a more general observation about the freebit
picture. Suppose that
(1) the freebit picture holds,
(2) the observable universe has a finite extent (as it does, assuming a positive cosmological
constant), and
(3) the holographic principle (see Section 5.4) holds.
Then the number of freebits accessible to any one observer must be finite—simply because the
number of bits of any kind is then upper-bounded by the observable universe’s finite holographic
entropy. (For details, see Bousso [19] or Lloyd [56], both of whom estimate the observable universe’s
information capacity as roughly ∼ 10122 bits.)
But the nature of freebits is that they get permanently “used up” whenever they are amplified
to macroscopic scale. So under the stated assumptions, we conclude that only a finite number of
“free decisions” can possibly be made, before the observable universe runs out of freebits! In my
view, this should not be too alarming. After all, even without the notion of freebits, the Second
Law of Thermodynamics (combined with the holographic principle and the positive cosmological
constant) already told us that the observable universe can witness at most ∼ 10122 “interesting
events,” of any kind, before it settles into thermal equilibrium. For more on the theme of freebits
as a finite resource, see Appendix 13.
8 Indexicality and Freebits
The Boltzmann brain problem is just one example of what philosophers call an indexical puzzle:
a puzzle involving the “first-person facts” of who, what, where, and when you are, which seems
to persist even after all the “third-person facts” about the physical world have been specified.
Indexical puzzles, and the lack of consensus on how to handle them, underlie many notorious
debates in science and philosophy—including the debates surrounding the anthropic principle and
“fine-tuning” of cosmological parameters, the multiverse and string theory landscape, the Doomsday
argument, and the Fermi paradox of where all the extraterrestrial civilizations are. I won’t even try
to summarize the vast literature on these problems (see Bostrom [18] for an engaging introduction).
Still, it might be helpful to go through a few examples, just to illustrate what we mean by indexical
puzzles.
• When doing Bayesian statistics, it’s common to use a reference class: roughly speaking, the set
of observers from which you consider yourself to have been “sampled.” For an uncontroversial
example, suppose you want to estimate the probability that you have some genetic disease, in
order to decide (say) whether it’s worth getting tested. In reality, you either have the disease
or you don’t. Yet it seems perfectly unobjectionable to estimate the probability that you
have the disease, by imagining that you were “chosen randomly” from among all people with
the same race, sex, and so forth, then looking up the relevant statistics. However, things
quickly become puzzling when we ask how large a reference class can be invoked. Can you
consider yourself to have been “sampled uniformly at random” from the set of all humans
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who ever lived or ever will live? If so, then why not also include early hominids, chimpanzees,
dolphins, extraterrestrials, or sentient artificial intelligences? Many would simply reply that
you’re not a dolphin or any of those other things, so there’s no point worrying about the
hypothetical possibility of having been one. The problem is that you’re also not some other
person of the same race and sex—you’re you—but for medical and actuarial purposes, we
clearly do reason as if you “could have been” someone different. So why can your reference
class include those other people but not dolphins?
• Suppose you’re an astronomer who’s trying to use Bayesian statistics to estimate the prob-
ability of one cosmological model versus another one, conditioned on the latest data about
the cosmic background radiation and so forth. Of course, as discussed in Section 3.1, any
such calculation requires a specification of prior probabilities. The question is: should your
prior include the assumption that, all else being equal, we’re twice as likely to find ourselves
in a universe that’s twice as large (and thus presumably has twice as many civilizations, in
expectation)? If so, then how do we escape the absurd-seeming conclusion that we’re certain
to live in an infinite universe, if such a universe is possible at all—since we expect there to be
infinitely many more observers in an infinite universe than in a finite one? Surely we can’t
deduce the size of the universe without leaving our armchairs, like a medieval scholastic?
The trouble is that, as Bostrom [18] points out, not adjusting the prior probabilities for the
expected number of observers leads to its own paradoxes. As a fanciful example, suppose
we’re trying to decide between two theories, which on physical grounds are equally likely.
Theory A predicts the universe will contain a single civilization of two-legged creatures, while
theory B predicts the universe will contain a single civilization of two-legged creatures, as well
as a trillion equally-advanced civilizations of nine-legged creatures. Observing ourselves to
be two-legged, can we conclude that theory A is overwhelmingly more likely—since if theory
B were correct, then we would almost certainly have been pondering the question on nine
legs? A straightforward application of Bayes’ rule seems to imply that the answer should be
yes—unless we perform the adjustment for the number of civilizations that led to the first
paradox!
• Pursuing thoughts like the above quickly leads to the notorious Doomsday argument. Ac-
cording to that argument, the likelihood that human civilization will kill itself off in the near
future is much larger than one would na¨ıvely think—where “na¨ıvely” means “before taking
indexical considerations into account.” The logic is simple: suppose human civilization will
continue for billions of years longer, colonizing the galaxy and so forth. In that case, our
own position near the very beginning of human history would seem absurdly improbable—the
more so when one takes into account that such a long-lived, spacefaring civilization would
probably have a much larger population than exists today (just as we have a much larger
population than existed hundreds of years ago). If we’re Bayesians, and willing to speak at
all about ourselves as drawn from an ensemble (as most people are, in the medical example),
that presumably means we should revise downward the probability that the “spacefaring”
scenario is correct, and revise upward the probability of scenarios that give us a more “aver-
age” position in human history. But because of exponential population growth, one expects
the latter to be heavily weighted toward scenarios where civilization kills itself off in the very
near future. Many commentators have tried to dismiss this argument as flat-out erroneous
(see Leslie [52] or Bostrom [18] for common objections to the argument and responses to
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them).53 However, while the “modern, Bayesian” version of the Doomsday argument might
indeed be wrong, it’s not wrong because of some trivial statistical oversight. Rather, the
argument might be wrong because it embodies an interestingly false way of thinking about
indexical uncertainty.
Perplexing though they might be, what do any of these indexical puzzles have to do with our
subject, free will? After all, presumably no one thinks that we have the “free will” to choose
where and when we’re born! Yet, while I’ve never seen this connection spelled out before, it seems
to me that indexical puzzles like those above do have some bearing on the free will debate. For
the indexical puzzles make it apparent that, even if we assume the laws of physics are completely
mechanistic, there remain large aspects of our experience that those laws fail to determine, even
probabilistically. Nothing in the laws picks out one particular chunk of suitably organized matter
from the immensity of time and space, and says, “here, this chunk is you; its experiences are
your experiences.” Nor does anything in the laws give us even a probability distribution over the
possible such chunks. Despite its obvious importance even for empirical questions, our uncertainty
about who we are and who we “could have been” (i.e., our reference class) bears all the marks
of Knightian uncertainty. Yet once we’ve admitted indexical uncertainty into our worldview, it
becomes less clear why we should reject the sort of uncertainty that the freebit picture needs! If
whether you find yourself born in 8th-century China, 21st-century California, or Planet Zorg is a
variable subject to Knightian uncertainty, then why not what you’ll have for dessert tonight?
More concretely, suppose that there are numerous planets nearly identical to Earth, down to
the same books being written, people with the same names and same DNA being born, etc. If
the universe is spatially infinite—which cosmologists consider a serious possibility54—then there’s
no need to imagine this scenario: for simple probabilistic reasons, it’s almost certainly true! Even
if the universe is spatially finite, the probability of such a “twin Earth” would approach 1 as the
number of stars, galaxies, and so on went to infinity. Naturally, we’d expect any two of these “twin
Earths” to be separated by exponentially large distances—so that, because of the dark energy
pushing the galaxies apart, we would not expect a given “Earth-twin” ever to be in communication
with any of its counterparts.
Assume for simplicity that there are at most two of these Earth-twins, call them A and B.
(That assumption will have no effect on our conclusions.) Let’s suppose that, because of (say) a
chaotically amplified quantum fluctuation, these two Earths are about to diverge significantly in
their histories for the first time. Let’s further suppose that you—or rather, beings on A and B
53Many people point out that cavemen could have made exactly the same argument, and would have been wrong.
This is true but irrelevant: the whole point of the Doomsday argument is that most people who make it will be right!
Another common way to escape the argument’s conclusion is to postulate the existence of large numbers of ex-
traterrestrial civilizations, which are there regardless of what humans do or don’t do. If the extraterrestrials are
included in our reference class, they can then “swamp” the effect of the number of future humans in the Bayesian
calculation.
54Astronomers can only see as far as light has reached since the Big Bang. If a positive spatial curvature was ever
detected on cosmological scales, it would strongly suggest that the universe “wraps around”—much like hypothetical
ancients might have deduced that the earth was round by measuring the curvature of a small patch. So far, though,
except for local perturbations, the universe appears perfectly flat to within the limits of measurement, suggesting that
it is either infinite or else extends far beyond our cosmological horizon. On the other hand, it is logically possible that
the universe could be topologically closed (and hence finite), despite having zero spatial curvature. Also, assuming
a positive cosmological constant, sufficiently far parts of the universe would be forever out of causal contact with
us—leading to philosophical debate about whether those parts should figure into scientific explanations, or even be
considered to “exist.”
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respectively who look, talk, and act like you—are the proximate cause of this divergence. On Earth
A, the quantum fluctuation triggers a chain of neural firing events in “your” brain that ultimately
causes “you” to take a job in a new city. On Earth B, a different quantum fluctuation triggers a
chain of neural firings that causes “you” to stay where you are.
We now ask: from the perspective of a superintelligence that knows everything above, what’s
the total probability p that “you” take the new job? Is it simply 1
2
, since the two actual histories
should be weighted equally? What if Earth B had a greater probability than Earth A of having
formed in the first place—or did under one cosmological theory but not another? And why do
we need to average over the two Earths at all? Maybe “youA” is the “real” you, and taking the
new job is a defining property of who you are, much as Shakespeare “wouldn’t be Shakespeare”
had he not written his plays. So maybe youB isn’t even part of your reference class: it’s just a
faraway doppelga¨nger you’ll never meet, who looks and acts like you (at least up to a certain point
in your life) but isn’t you. So maybe p = 1. Then again, maybe youB is the “real” you and p = 0.
Ultimately, not even a superintelligence could calculate p without knowing something about what
it means to be “you,” a topic about which the laws of physics are understandably silent.
Now, someone who accepted the freebit picture would say that the superintelligence’s inability
to calculate p is no accident. For whatever quantum fluctuation separated Earth A from Earth
B could perfectly well have been a freebit. In that case, before you made the decision, the right
representation of your physical state would have been a Knightian combination of youA and youB .
(See Appendix 14 for details of how these Knightian combinations fit in with the ordinary density
matrix formalism of quantum mechanics.) After you make the decision, the ambiguity is resolved
in favor of youA or youB . Of course, youA might then turn out to be a Knightian combination of
two further entities, youA1 and youA2 , and so on.
For me, the appeal of this view is that it “cancels two philosophical mysteries against each
other”: free will and indexical uncertainty. As I said in Section 1.1, free will seems to me to require
some source of Knightian uncertainty in the physical world. Meanwhile, indexical uncertainty
is a type of Knightian uncertainty that’s been considered troublesome and unwanted—though
attempts to replace it with probabilistic uncertainty have led to no end of apparent paradoxes,
from the Doomsday argument to Bostrom’s observer-counting paradoxes to the Boltzmann brain
problem. So it seems natural to try to fit the free-will peg into the indexical-uncertainty hole.
9 Is The Freebit Picture Falsifiable?
An obvious question about the freebit picture is whether it leads to any new, falsifiable predictions.
At one level, I was careful not to “commit” myself to such predictions in this essay! My goal was
to clarify some conceptual issues about the physical predictability of the brain. Whenever I ran
up against an unanswered scientific question—for example, about the role of amplified quantum
events in brain activity—I freely confessed my ignorance.
On the other hand, it’s natural to ask: are there empirical conditions that the universe has to
satisfy, in order for the freebit perspective to have even a chance of being related to “free will” as
most people understand the concept?
I submit that the answer to the above question is yes. To start with the most straightforward
predictions: first, it’s necessary that psychology will never become physics. If human beings could
be predicted as accurately as comets, then the freebit picture would be falsified. For in such a
world, it would have turned out that, whatever it is we called “free will” (or even “the illusion of
65
free will”) in ordinary life, that property was not associated with any fundamental unpredictability
of our choices.
It’s also necessary that a quantum-gravitational description of the early universe will not reveal
it to have a simply-describable pure or mixed state. Or at least, it’s necessary that indexical
uncertainty—that is, uncertainty about our own location in the universe or multiverse—will forever
prevent us from reducing arbitrary questions about our own future to well-posed mathematical
problems. (Such a math problem might ask, for example, for the probability distribution D that
results when the known evolution equations of physics are applied to the known initial state at the
Big Bang, marginalized to the vicinity of the earth, and conditioned on some relevant subset of
branches of the quantum-mechanical wavefunction in which we happen to find ourselves.)
However, the above “predictions” have an unsatisfying, “god-of-the-gaps” character: they’re
simply predictions that certain scientific problems will never be completely solved! Can’t we do
better, and give positive predictions? Perhaps surprisingly, I think we can.
The first prediction was already discussed in Section 3.4. In order for the freebit picture to
work, it’s necessary that quantum uncertainty—for example, in the opening and closing of sodium-
ion channels—can not only get chaotically amplified by brain activity, but can do so “surgically”
and on “reasonable” timescales. In other words, the elapsed time between (a) the amplification
of a quantum event and (b) the neural firings influenced by that amplification, must not be so
long that the idea of a connection between the two retreats into absurdity. (Ten seconds would
presumably be fine, whereas a year would presumably not be.) Closely related to that requirement,
the quantum event must not affect countless other classical features of the world, separately from
its effects on the brain activity. For if it did, then a prediction machine could in principle measure
those other classical features to forecast the brain activity, with no need for potentially-invasive
measurements on either the original quantum state or the brain itself.
It’s tempting to compare the empirical situation for the freebit picture to that for supersym-
metry in physics. Both of these frameworks are very hard to falsify—since no matter what energy
scale has been explored, or how far into the future neural events have been successfully predicted,
a diehard proponent could always hold out for the superparticles or freebits making their effects
known at the next higher energy, or the next longer timescale. Yet despite this property, super-
symmetry and freebits are both “falsifiable in degrees.” In other words, if the superparticles can
be chased up to a sufficiently high energy, then even if present, they would no longer do most of
the work they were originally invented to do. The same is true of freebits, if the time between
amplification and decision is long enough.
Moreover, there’s also a second empirical prediction of the freebit picture, one that doesn’t
involve the notion of a “reasonable timescale.” Recall, from Section 3.3, the concept of a past
macroscopic determinant (PMD): a set of “classical” facts (for example, the configuration of a
laser) to the causal past of a quantum state ρ that, if known, completely determine ρ. Now
consider an omniscient demon, who wants to influence your decision-making process by changing
the quantum state of a single photon impinging on your brain. Imagine that there are indeed
photons that would serve the demon for this purpose. However, now imagine that all such photons
can be “grounded” in PMDs. That is, imagine that the photons’ quantum states cannot be altered,
maintaining a spacetime history consistent with the laws of physics, without also altering classical
degrees of freedom in the photons’ causal past. In that case, the freebit picture would once again
fail. For if a prediction machine had simply had the foresight to measure the PMDs, then (by
assumption) it could also calculate the quantum states ρ, and therefore the probability of your
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Figure 1: Tracing the causal antecedents of a human decision backwards in time, stopping either
at past macroscopic determinants (PMDs) or at the initial boundary condition
reaching one decision rather than another. Indeed, not only could the machine probabilistically
predict your actions; it could even provide a complete quantum-mechanical account of where the
probabilities came from. Given such a machine, your choices would remain “unpredictable” only
in the sense that a radioactive atom is unpredictable, a sense that doesn’t interest us (see Section
3). The conclusion is that, for the freebit picture to work, it’s necessary that some of the relevant
quantum states can’t be grounded in PMDs, but only traced back to the early universe (see Figure
1).
10 Conclusions
At one level, all I did in this essay was to invoke what David Deutsch, in his book The Beginning
of Infinity [31], called the “momentous dichotomy”:
Either a given technology is possible, or else there must be some reason (say, of physics
or logic) why it isn’t possible.
Granted, the above statement is a near-tautology. But as Deutsch points out, the implications
of applying the tautology consistently can be enormous. One illustrative application, slightly less
contentious than free will, involves my own field of quantum computing. The idea there is to apply
the principles of quantum mechanics to build a new type of computer, one that could solve certain
problems (such as factoring integers) exponentially faster than we know how to solve them with
any existing computer. Quantum computing research is being avidly pursued around the world,
but there are also a few vocal skeptics of such research. Many (though not all) of the skeptics
appear to subscribe to the following three positions:
(a) A useful quantum computer is an almost self-evident absurdity: noise, decoherence, and so
forth must conspire to prevent such a machine from working, just as the laws of physics always
conspire to prevent perpetual-motion machines from working.
(b) No addition or revision is needed to quantum mechanics: the physical framework that un-
derlies quantum computing, and that describes the state of an isolated physical system as a
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vector in an exponentially-large Hilbert space (leading to an apparent exponential slowdown
when simulating quantum mechanics with a conventional computer).
(c) Reconciling (a) and (b) is not even a particularly interesting problem. At any rate, the
burden is on the quantum computing proponents to sort these matters out! Skeptics can be
satisfied that something must prevent quantum computers from working, and leave it at that.
What Deutsch’s dichotomy suggests is that such blase´ incuriosity, in the face of a glaring
conflict between ideas, is itself the absurd position. Such a position only pretends to be the
“conservative” one: secretly it is radical, in that it rejects the whole idea of science advancing by
identifying apparent conflicts and then trying to resolve them.
In this essay, I applied Deutsch’s momentous dichotomy to a different question:
Could there exist a machine, consistent with the laws of physics, that “non-invasively
cloned” all the information in a particular human brain that was relevant to behavior—
so that the human could emerge from the machine unharmed, but would thereafter be
fully probabilistically predictable given his or her future sense-inputs, in much the same
sense that a radioactive atom is probabilistically predictable?
My central thesis is simply that there is no “safe, conservative answer” to this question. Of
course, one can debate what exactly the question means, and how we would know whether the
supposed cloning machine had succeeded. (See Appendix 12 for my best attempt at formalizing
the requirements.) But I contend that philosophical analysis can only take us so far. The question
also has an “empirical core” that could turn out one way or another, depending on details of the
brain’s physical organization that are not yet known. In particular, does the brain possess what
one could call a clean digital abstraction layer : that is, a set of macroscopic degrees of freedom that
(1) encode everything relevant to memory and cognition,
(2) can be accurately modeled as performing a classical digital computation, and
(3) “notice” the microscopic, quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom at most as pure random-
number sources, generating noise according to prescribed probability distributions?
Or is such a clean separation between the macroscopic and microscopic levels unavailable—so
that any attempt to clone a brain would either miss much of the cognitively-relevant information,
or else violate the No-Cloning Theorem?
In my opinion, neither answer to the question should make us wholly comfortable: if it does,
then we haven’t sufficiently thought through the implications! Suppose, on the one hand, that the
brain-cloning device is possible. Then we immediately confront countless “paradoxes of personal
identity” like those discussed in Section 2.5. Would you feel comfortable being (painlessly) killed,
provided that a perfect clone of your brain’s digital abstraction layer remained? Would it matter if
the cloned data was moved to a new biological body, or was only “simulated” electronically? If the
latter, what would count as an acceptable simulation? Would it matter if the simulation was run
backwards in time, or in heavily-encrypted form, or in only one branch of a quantum computation?
Would you literally expect to “wake up” as your clone? What if two clones were created: would
you expect to wake up as each one with 50% probability? When applying Bayesian reasoning,
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should you, all other things equal, judge yourself twice as likely to wake up in a possible world with
twice as many clones of yourself? The point is that, in a world with the cloning device, these would
no longer be metaphysical conundrums, but in some sense, just straightforward empirical questions
about what you should expect to observe! Yet even people who agreed on every possible “third-
person” fact about the physical world and its contents, might answer such questions completely
differently.
To be clear: it seems legitimate to me, given current knowledge, to conjecture that there is
no principled obstruction to perfect brain-cloning, and indeed that this essay was misguided even
to speculate about such an obstruction. However, if one thinks that by taking the “pro-cloning”
route, one can sidestep the need for any “weird metaphysical commitments” of one’s own, then I’d
say one is mistaken.
So suppose, on the other hand, that the perfect brain-cloning device is not possible. Here,
exactly like in the case of quantum computing, no truly inquisitive person will ever be satisfied by
a bare assertion of the device’s impossibility, or by a listing of practical difficulties. Instead, such
a person will demand to know: what principle explains why perfect brain-cloning can’t succeed,
not even a million years from now? How do we reconcile its impossibility with everything we know
about the mechanistic nature of the brain? Indeed, how should we think about the laws of physics
in general, so that the impossibility of perfect brain-cloning would no longer seem surprising or
inexplicable?
As soon as we try to answer these questions, I’ve argued that we’re driven, more-or-less in-
evitably, to the view that the brain’s detailed evolution would have to be buffeted around by
chaotically-amplified “Knightian surprises,” which I called freebits. Before their amplification,
these freebits would need to live in quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom, since otherwise a
cloning machine could (in principle) non-invasively copy them. Furthermore, our ignorance about
the freebits would ultimately need to be traceable back to ignorance about the microstate of the
early universe—again because otherwise, cloning would become possible in principle, through vigi-
lant monitoring of the freebits’ sources.
Admittedly, all this sounds like a tall order! But, strange though it sounds, I don’t see that
any of it is ruled out by current scientific understanding—though conceivably it could be ruled out
in the future. In any case, setting aside one’s personal beliefs, it seems worthwhile to understand
that this is the picture one seems forced to, if one starts from the hypothesis that brain-cloning
(with all its metaphysical difficulties) should be fundamentally impossible, then tries to make that
hypothesis compatible with our knowledge of the laws of physics.
10.1 Reason and Mysticism
At this point, I imagine some readers might press me: but what do I really think? Do I actually
take seriously the notion of quantum-mechanical “freebits” from the early universe playing a role
in human decisions? The easiest response is that, in laying out my understanding of the various
alternatives—yes, brain states might be perfectly clonable, but if we want to avoid the philosophical
weirdness that such cloning would entail, then we’re led in such-and-such an interesting direction,
etc.—I already said what I really think. In pondering these riddles, I don’t have any sort of
special intuition, for which the actual arguments and counterarguments that I can articulate serve
as window-dressing. The arguments exhaust my intuition.
I’ll observe, however, that even uncontroversial facts can be made to sound incredible when some
of their consequences are spelled out; indeed, the spelling out of such consequences has always been
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a mainstay of popular science writing. To give some common examples: everything you can see
in the night sky was once compressed into a space smaller than an atom. The entire story of
your life, including the details of your death, is almost certainly encoded (in fact, infinitely many
times) somewhere in the decimal expansion of pi. If Alois Hitler and Klara Po¨lzl had moved an inch
differently while having intercourse, World War II would probably have been prevented. When you
lift a heavy bag of groceries, what you’re really feeling is the coupling of gravitons to a stress-energy
tensor generated mostly by the rapid movements of gluons. In each of these cases, the same point
could be made more prosaically, and many would prefer that it was. But when we state things
vividly, at least we can’t be accused of trying to hide the full implications of our abstract claims,
for fear of being laughed at were those implications understood.
Thus, suppose I’d merely argued, in this essay, that it’s possible that humans will never become
as predictable (even probabilistically predictable) as digital computers, because of chaotic amplifi-
cation of unknowable microscopic events, our ignorance of which can be traced as far backward in
time as one wishes. In that case, some people would likely agree and others would likely disagree,
with many averring (as I do) that the question remains open. Hardly anyone, I think, would
consider the speculation an absurdity or a gross affront to reason. But if exactly the same idea
is phrased in terms of a “quantum pixie-dust” left over from the Big Bang, which gets into our
brains and gives us the capacity for free will—well then, of course it sounds crazy! Yet the second
phrasing is nothing more than a dramatic rendering of the worldview that the first phrasing implies.
Perhaps some readers will accuse me of mysticism. To this, I can only reply that the view I
flirt with in this essay seems like “mysticism” of an unusually tame sort: one that embraces the
mechanistic and universal nature of the laws of physics, as they’ve played out for 13.7 billion years;
that can accept even the “collapse of the wavefunction” as an effect brought about by ordinary
unitary evolution; that’s consumed by doubts; that welcomes corrections and improvement; that
declines to plumb the cosmos for self-help tips or moral strictures about our sex lives; and that
sees science—not introspection, not ancient texts, not “science” redefined to mean something dif-
ferent, but just science in the ordinary sense—as our best hope for making progress on the ancient
questions of existence.
To any “mystical” readers, who want human beings to be as free as possible from the mechanistic
chains of cause and effect, I say: this picture represents the absolute maximum that I can see how
to offer you, if I confine myself to speculations that I can imagine making contact with our current
scientific understanding of the world. Perhaps it’s less than you want; on the other hand, it does
seem like more than the usual compatibilist account offers! To any “rationalist” readers, who cheer
when consciousness, free will, or similarly woolly notions get steamrolled by the advance of science,
I say: you can feel vindicated, if you like, that despite searching (almost literally) to the ends of
the universe, I wasn’t able to offer the “mystics” anything more than I was! And even what I do
offer might be ruled out by future discoveries.
Indeed, the freebit picture’s falsifiability is perhaps the single most important point about it.
Consider the following questions: On what timescales can microscopic fluctuations in biological
systems get amplified, and change the probabilities of macroscopic outcomes? What other side
effects do those fluctuations have? Is the brain interestingly different in its noise sensitivity than
the weather, or other complicated dynamical systems? Can the brain’s microscopic fluctuations be
fully understood probabilistically, or are they subject to Knightian uncertainty? That is, can the
fluctuations all be grounded in past macroscopic determinants, or are some ultimately cosmological
in origin? Can we have a complete theory of cosmological initial conditions? Few things would
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make me happier than if progress on these questions led to the discovery that the freebit picture
was wrong. For then at least we would have learned something.
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12 Appendix: Defining “Freedom”
In this appendix, I’ll use the notion of Knightian uncertainty (see Section 3) to offer a possible
mathematical formalization of “freedom” for use in free-will discussions. Two caveats are immedi-
ately in order. The first is that my formalization only tries to capture what I’ve called “Knightian
freedom”—a strong sort of in-principle physical unpredictability—and not “metaphysical free will.”
For as discussed in Section 1.1, I don’t see how any definition grounded in the physical universe
could possibly capture the latter, to either the believers’ or the deniers’ satisfaction. Also, as we’ll
see, formalizing “Knightian freedom” is already a formidable challenge!
The second caveat is that, by necessity, my definition will be in terms of more “basic” concepts,
which I’ll need to assume as unanalyzed primitives. Foremost among these is the concept of a
physical system: something that occupies space; exchanges information (and matter, energy, etc.)
with other physical systems; and crucially, retains an identity through time even as its internal state
changes. Examples of physical systems are black holes, the earth’s atmosphere, human bodies,
and digital computers. Without some concept like this, it seems to me that we can never specify
whose freedom we’re talking about, or even which physical events we’re trying to predict.
Yet as philosophers know well, the concept of “physical system” already has plenty of traps for
the unwary. As one illustration, should we say that a human body remains “the same physical
system” after its death? If so, then an extremely reliable method to predict a human subject
immediately suggests itself: namely, first shoot the subject; then predict that the subject will
continue to lay on the ground doing nothing!
Now, it might be objected that this “prediction method” shouldn’t count, since it changes the
subject’s state (to put it mildly), rather than just passively gathering information about the subject.
The trouble with that response is that putting the subject in an fMRI machine, interviewing her,
or even just having her sign a consent form or walking past her on the street also change her
state! If we don’t allow any interventions that change the subject’s state from what it “would
have been otherwise,” then prediction—at least with the science-fiction accuracy we’re imagining—
seems hopeless, but in an uninteresting way. So which interventions are allowed and which aren’t?
I see no alternative but to take the set of allowed interventions as another unanalyzed primitive.
When formulating the prediction task (and hence, in this essay, when defining Knightian freedom),
we simply declare that certain interventions—such as interviewing the subject, putting her in an
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fMRI machine, or perhaps even having nanorobots scan her brain state—are allowed; while other
interventions, such as killing her, are not allowed.
An important boundary case, much discussed by philosophers, is an intervention that would
destroy each neuron of the subject’s brain one by one, replacing the neurons by microchips claimed
to be functionally equivalent. Is that allowed? Note that such an operation could certainly
make it easier to predict the subject—since from that point forward, the predictor would only have
to worry about simulating the microchips, not the messy biological details of the original brain.
Here I’ll just observe that, if we like, we can disallow such drastic interventions, without thereby
taking any position on the conundrum of what such “siliconization” would do to the subject’s
conscious experience. Instead we can simply say that, while the subject might indeed be perfectly
predictable after the operation, that fact doesn’t settle the question at hand, which was about the
subject’s predictability before the operation. For a large part of what we wanted to know was to
what extent the messy biological details do matter, and we can’t answer that question by defining
it out of consideration.
But one might object: if the “messy biological details” need to be left in place when trying to
predict a brain, what doesn’t need to be left in place? After all, brains are not isolated physical
systems: they constantly receive inputs from the sense organs, from hormones in the bloodstream,
etc. So when modeling a brain, do we also need to model the entire environment in which that brain
is immersed—or at least, all aspects of the environment that might conceivably affect behavior?
If so, then prediction seems hopeless, but again, not for any “interesting” reasons: merely for the
boring reason that we can’t possibly measure all relevant aspects of the subject’s environment,
being embedded in the environment ourselves.
Fortunately, I think there’s a way around this difficulty, at the cost of one more unanalyzed
primitive. Given a physical system S, denote by I (S) the set of screenable inputs to S—by
which I mean, the inputs to S that we judge that any would-be predictor of S should also be
provided, in order to ensure a “fair contest.” For example, if S is a human brain, then I (S) would
probably include (finite-precision digital encodings of) the signals entering the brain through the
optic, auditory, and other sensory systems, the levels of various hormones in the blood, and other
measurable variables at the interface between the brain and its external environment. On the
other hand, I (S) probably wouldn’t include, for example, the exact quantum state of every photon
impinging on the brain. For arguably, we have no idea how to screen off all those microscopic
“inputs,” short of siliconization or some equally drastic intervention.
Next, call a system S input-monitorable if there exists an allowed intervention to S, the result
of which is that, after the intervention, all signals in I (S) get “carbon-copied” to the predictor’s
computer at the same time as they enter S. For example, using some future technology, a brain
might be input-monitored by installing microchips that scan all the electrical impulses in the
optic and auditory nerves, the chemical concentrations in the blood-brain barrier, etc., and that
faithfully transmit that information to a predictor in the next room via wireless link. Crucially,
and in contrast to siliconization, input-monitoring doesn’t strike me as raising any profound issues
of consciousness or selfhood. That is, it seems fairly clear that an input-monitored human would
still be “the same human,” just hooked up to some funny devices! Input-monitoring also differs
from siliconization in that it seems much closer to practical realization.
The definition of freedom that I’ll suggest will only make sense for input-monitorable physical
systems. If S is not input-monitorable, then I’ll simply hold that the problem of “predicting S’s
behavior” isn’t well-enough defined: S is so intertwined with its environment that one can’t say
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where predicting S ends and predicting its environment begins. One consequence is that, in this
framework, we can’t even pose the question of whether humans have Knightian freedom, unless
we agree (at least provisionally) that humans are input-monitorable. Fortunately, as already sug-
gested, I don’t see any major scientific obstacles to supposing that humans are input-monitorable,
and I even think input-monitoring could plausibly be achieved in 50 or 100 years.
Admittedly, in discussing whether humans are input-monitorable, a lot depends on our choice
of screenable inputs I (S). If I (S) is small, then input-monitoring S might be easy, but predicting
S after the monitoring is in place might be hard or impossible, simply because of the predictor’s
ignorance about crucial features of S’s environment. By contrast, if I (S) is large, then input-
monitoring S might be hard or impossible, but supposing S were input-monitored, predicting S
might be easy. Since our main interest is the inherent difficulty of prediction, our preference should
always be for the largest I (S) possible.
So, suppose S is input-monitorable, and suppose we’ve arranged things so that all the screenable
inputs to S—what S sees, what S hears, etc.—are transmitted in real-time to the predictor. We
then face the question: what aspects of S are we trying to predict, and what does it mean to predict
those aspects?
Our next primitive concept will be that of S’s observable behaviors. For the earth’s atmosphere,
observable behaviors might include snow and thunderstorms; for a human brain, they might include
the signals sent out by the motor cortex, or even just a high-level description of which words will be
spoken and which decisions taken. Fortunately, it seems to me that, for any sufficiently complex
system, the prediction problem is not terribly sensitive to which observable behaviors we focus
on, provided those behaviors belong to a large “universality class.” By analogy, in computability
theory, it doesn’t matter whether we ask whether a given computer program will ever halt, or
whether the program will ever return to its initial state, or whether it will ever print “YES” to
the console, or some other question about the program’s future behavior. For these problems are
all reducible to each other: if we had a reliable method to predict whether a program would halt,
then we could also predict whether the program would print “YES” to the console, by modifying
the program so that it prints “YES” if and only if it halts. In the same way, if we had a reliable
method to predict a subject’s hand movements in arbitrary situations, I claim that we could also
predict the subject’s speech. For “arbitrary situations” include those where we direct the subject
to translate everything she says into sign language! And thus, assuming we’ve built a “hand-
prediction algorithm” that works in those situations, we must also have built (or had the ability to
build) a speech-prediction algorithm as well.
So suppose we fix some set B of observable behaviors of S. What should count as predicting the
behaviors? From the outset, we should admit that S’s behavior might be inherently probabilistic—
as, for example, if it depended on amplified quantum events taking place inside S. So we should
be satisfied if we can predict S in “merely” the same sense that physicists can predict a radioactive
atom: namely, by giving a probability distribution over S’s possible future behaviors.
Here difficulties arise, which are well-known in the fields of finance and weather forecasting.
How exactly do we test predictions that take the form of probability distributions, if the predictions
apply to events that might not be repeatable? Also, what’s to prevent someone from declaring
success on the basis of absurdly conservative “predictions”: for example, “50/50” for every yes/no
question? Briefly, I’d say that if the predictor’s forecasts take the form of probability distributions,
then to whatever extent those forecasts are unimpressive (“50/50”), the burden is on the predictor
to convince skeptics that the forecasts nevertheless encoded everything that could be predicted
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about S via allowed interventions. That is, the predictor needs to rule out the hypothesis that the
probabilities merely reflected ignorance about unmeasured but measurable variables. In my view,
this would ultimately require the predictor to give a causal account of S’s behavior, which showed
explicitly how the observed outcome depended on quantum events—the only sort of events that we
know to be probabilistic on physical grounds (see Section 2.8).
But it’s not enough to let the predictions be probabilistic; we need to scale back our ambitions
still further. For even with a system S as simple as a radioactive atom, there’s no hope of
calculating the exact probability that (say) S will decay within a certain time interval—if only
because of the error bars in the physical constants that enter into that probability. But intuitively,
this lack of precision doesn’t make the atom any less “mechanistic.” Instead, it seems to me that
we should call a probabilistic system S “mechanistic” if—and only if—the differences between our
predicted probabilities for S’s behavior and the “true” probabilities can be made as small as desired
by repeated experiments.
Yet we are still not done. For what does the predictor P already know about S, before P ’s
data-gathering process even starts? If P were initialized with a “magical copy” of S, then of
course predicting S would be trivial.55 On the other hand, it also seems unreasonable not to tell
P anything about S: for example, if P could accurately predict S, but only if given the hint that
S is a human being, that would still be rather impressive, and intuitively incompatible with S’s
“freedom.” So, as our final primitive concept, we assume a reference class C of possible physical
systems; P is then told only that S ∈ C and needs to succeed under that assumption. For example,
C might be “the class of all members of the species Homo sapiens,” or even the class of all systems
macroscopically identifiable as some particular Homo sapien.56
This, finally, leads to my attempted definition of freedom. Before offering it, let me stress
that nothing in the essay depends much on the details of the definition—and indeed, I’m more than
willing to tinker with those details. So then what’s the point of giving a definition? One reason
is to convince skeptics that the concept of “Knightian freedom” can be made precise, once one
has a suitable framework with which to discuss these issues. A second reason is to illustrate just
how much little-examined complexity lurks in the commonsense notion of a physical system’s being
“predictable”—and to show how non-obvious the questions of freedom and predictability actually
become, once we start to unravel that complexity.
Let S be any input-monitorable physical system drawn from the reference class C.
Suppose that, as the result of allowed interventions, S is input-monitored by another
physical system P = P (C) (the “predictor”), starting at some time57 0. Given times
0 ≤ t < u ≤ ∞, let It,u encode all the information in the screenable inputs that S
receives between times t and u, with It,∞ denoting the information received from time
t onwards. Likewise, let Bt,u encode all the information in S’s observable behaviors
between times t and u. (While this is not essential, we can assume that It,u and Bt,u
both consist of finite sequences of bits whenever u <∞.)
55I thank Ronald de Wolf for this observation.
56We could also formulate a stronger notion of a “universal predictor,” which has to work for any physical system
S (or equivalently, whose reference class C is the set of all physical systems). My own guess is that, if there exists
a predictor for “sufficiently complex” systems like human brains, then there also exists a universal predictor. But I
won’t attempt to argue for that here.
57Here we don’t presuppose that time is absolute or continuous. Indeed, all we need is that S passes through a
discrete series of “instants,” which can be ordered by increasing values of t.
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Let D (Bt,u|It,u) be the “true” probability distribution58 over Bt,u conditional on the
inputs It,u, where “true” means the distribution that would be predicted by a godlike
intelligence who knew the exact physical state of S and its external environment at time
t. We assume that D (Bt,u|It,u) satisfies the “causal property”: that D (Bt,v|It,u) =
D (Bt,v|It,v) depends only on It,v for all v < u.
Suppose that, from time 0 to t, the predictor P has been monitoring the screen-
able inputs I0,t and observable behaviors B0,t, and more generally, interacting with S
however it wants via allowed interventions (for example, submitting questions to S by
manipulating I0,t, and observing the responses in B0,t). Then, at time t, we ask P to
output a description of a function f , which maps the future inputs It,∞ to a distribu-
tion E (Bt,∞|It,∞) satisfying the causal property. Here E (Bt,∞|It,∞) represents P ’s best
estimate for the distribution D (Bt,∞|It,∞). Note that the description of f might be
difficult to “unpack” computationally—for example, it might consist of a complicated
algorithm that outputs a description of E (Bt,u|It,u) given as input u ∈ (t,∞) and It,u.
All we require is that the description be information-theoretically complete, in the sense
that one could extract E (Bt,u|It,u) from it given enough computation time.
Given ε, δ > 0, we call P a (t, ε, δ)-predictor for the reference class C if the following
holds. For all S ∈ C, with probability at least 1 − δ over any “random” inputs in It,u
(controlled neither by S nor by P ), we have
‖E (Bt,∞|It,∞)−D (Bt,∞|It,∞)‖ < ε
for the actual future inputs It,∞ (not necessarily for every possible It,∞). Here ‖·‖
denotes the variation distance.59
We call C mechanistic if for all ε, δ > 0, there exists a t = tε,δ and a P = Pε,δ such
that P is a (t, ε, δ)-predictor for C. We call C free if C is not mechanistic.
Two important sanity checks are the following:
(a) According to the above definition, classes C of physical systems like thermostats, digital
computers, and radioactive nuclei are indeed mechanistic (given reasonable sets of screenable
inputs, allowed interventions, and observable behaviors). For example, suppose that C is the
set of all possible configurations of a particular digital computer; the allowed interventions
include reading the entire contents of the disk drives and memory and “eavesdropping” on
all the input ports (all of which is known to be technologically doable without destroying the
computer); and the observable behaviors include everything sent to the output ports. In
that case, even with no further interaction, the predictor can clearly emulate the computer
arbitrarily far into the future. Indeed, even if the computer S ∈ C has an internal quantum-
mechanical random number generator, the probability distribution D over possible future
behaviors can still be approximately extremely well.
(b) On the other hand, at least mathematically, one can construct classes of systems C that are
free. Indeed, this is trivial to arrange, by simply restricting the screenable inputs so that S’s
future behavior is determined by some input stream to which P does not have access.
58Or probability measure over infinite sequences, in the case u =∞.
59Variation distance is a standard measure of distance between two probability distributions, and is defined by
‖{px} − {qx}‖ :=
1
2
∑
x
|px − qx|.
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Like many involved definitions in theoretical computer science, cryptography, economics, and
other areas, my definition of freedom is “merely” an attempt to approximate an informal concept
that one had prior to formalization. And indeed, there are many changes one could contemplate
to the definition. To give just a few examples, instead of requiring that E (Bt,∞|It,∞) approximate
D (Bt,∞|It,∞) only for the actual future inputs It,∞, one could demand that it do so for all possible
It,∞. Or one could assume a distribution over the future It,∞, and require success on most of them.
Or one could require success only for most S ∈ C, again assuming a distribution over S’s. Or one
could switch around the quantifiers—e.g., requiring a single predictor P that achieves greater and
greater prediction accuracy ε > 0 the longer it continues. Or one could drop the requirement that
P forecast all of Bt,∞, requiring only that it forecast Bt,u for some large but finite u. It would be
extremely interesting to develop the mathematical theory of these different sorts of prediction—
something I reluctantly leave to future work. Wouldn’t it be priceless if, after millennia of debate,
the resolution of the question “are humans free?” turned out to be “yes if you define ‘free’ with the
ε, δ quantifiers inside, but no if you put the quantifiers outside?”
A central limitation of the definition, as it stands, is that it’s qualitative rather than quantitative,
closer in spirit to computability theory than complexity theory. More concretely, the definition of
“mechanistic” only requires that there exist a finite time t after which the predictor succeeds; it
puts no limit on the amount of time. But this raises a problem: what if the predictor could succeed
in learning to emulate a human subject, but only after observing the subject’s behavior for (say)
10100 years? Does making the subject immortal, in order to give the predictor enough time, belong
to the set of allowed interventions? Likewise, suppose that, after observing the subject’s behavior
for 20 years, the predictor becomes able to predict the subject’s future behavior probabilistically,
but only for the next 20 years, not indefinitely? The definition doesn’t consider this sort of “time-
limited” prediction, even though intuitively, it seems almost as hard to reconcile with free will as
the unlimited kind. On the other hand, the actual numbers matter: a predictor that needed 20
years of data-gathering, in order to learn enough to predict the subject’s behavior for the 5 seconds
immediately afterward, would seem intuitively compatible with freedom. In any case, in this essay
I mostly ignore quantitative timing issues (except for brief discussions in Sections 2.12 and 9), and
imagine for simplicity that we have a predictor that after some finite time learns to predict the
subject’s responses arbitrarily far into the future.
13 Appendix: Prediction and Kolmogorov Complexity
As mentioned in Section 3.1, some readers will take issue with the entire concept of Knightian
uncertainty—that is, with uncertainty that can’t even be properly quantified using probabilities.
Among those readers, some might be content to assert that there exists a “true, objective” prior
probability distribution D over all events in the physical world—and while we might not know
any prescription to calculate D that different agents can agree on, we can be sure that agents
are irrational to whatever extent their own priors deviate from D. However, more sophisticated
readers might try to derive the existence of a roughly-universal prior, using ideas from algorithmic
information theory (see Li and Vita´nyi [54] for an excellent introduction). In this appendix, I’d
like to sketch how the latter argument would go and offer a response to it.
Consider an infinite sequence of bits b1, b2, b3, . . ., which might be generated randomly, or by
some hidden computable pattern, or by some process with elements of both. (For example, maybe
the bits are uniformly random, except that every hundredth bit is the “majority vote” of the
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previous 99 bits.) We can imagine, if we like, that these bits represent a sequence of yes-or-no
decisions made by a human being. For each n ≥ 1, a superintelligent predictor is given b1, . . . , bn−1,
and asked to predict bn. Then the idea of algorithmic statistics is to give a single rule, which can
be proved to predict bn “almost as well” as any other computable rule, in the limit n→∞.
Here’s how it works. Choose any Turing-universal programming language L, which satisfies
the technical condition of being prefix-free: that is, adding characters to the end of a valid program
never yields another valid program. Let P be a program written in L, which runs for an infinite
time and has access to an unlimited supply of random bits, and which generates an infinite sequence
B = (b1, b2, . . .) according to some probability distribution DP . Let |P | be the number of bits in
P . Then for its initial guess as to the behavior of B, our superintelligent predictor will use the
so-called universal prior U , in which each distribution DP appears with probability 2−|P |/C, for
some normalizing constant C =
∑
P 2
−|P | ≤ 1. (The reason for the prefix-free condition was to
ensure that the sum
∑
P 2
−|P | converges.) Then, as the bits b1, b2, . . . start appearing, the predictor
repeatedly updates U using Bayes’ rule, so that its estimate for Pr [bn = 1] is always
PrU [b1 . . . bn−11]
PrU [b1 . . . bn−1]
.
Now suppose that the “true” distribution over B is DQ, for some particular program Q. Then I
claim that, in the limit n→∞, a predictor that starts with U as its prior will do just as well as if
it had started with DQ. The proof is simple: by definition, U places a “constant fraction” of its
probability mass on DQ from the beginning (where the “constant,” 2−|Q|/C, admittedly depends
on |Q|). So for all n and b1 . . . bn,
PrU [b1 . . . bn]
PrDQ [b1 . . . bn]
=
PrU [b1] PrU [b2|b1] · · ·PrU [bn|b1 . . . bn−1]
PrDQ [b1] PrDQ [b2|b1] · · ·PrDQ [bn|b1 . . . bn−1]
≥ 2−|Q|.
Hence ∞∏
n=1
PrU [bn|b1 . . . bn−1]
PrDQ [bn|b1 . . . bn−1]
≥ 2−|Q|
as well. But for all ε > 0, this means that U can assign a probability to the correct value of bn
less than 1− ε times the probability assigned by DQ, only for O (|Q| /ε) values of n or fewer.
Thus, an “algorithmic Bayesian” might argue that there are only two possibilities: either a
physical system is predictable by the universal prior U , or else—to whatever extent it isn’t—in any
meaningful sense the system behaves randomly. There’s no third possibility that we could identify
with Knightian uncertainty or freebits.
One response to this argument—perhaps the response Penrose would prefer—would be that
we can easily defeat the so-called “universal predictor” U , using a sequence of bits b1, b2, . . . that’s
deterministic but noncomputable. One way to construct such a sequence is to “diagonalize against
U ,” defining
bn :=
{
0 if PrU [b1 . . . bn−11] > PrU [b1 . . . bn−10] ,
1 otherwise
for all n ≥ 1. Alternatively, we could let bn be the nth binary digit of Chaitin’s constant Ω [21]
(basically, the probability that a randomly generated computer program halts).60 In either case, U
60For completeness, let me prove that the universal predictor U fails to predict the digits of Ω = 0.b1b2b3 . . .. Recall
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will falsely judge the bn’s to be random even in the limit n→∞. Note that an even more powerful
predictor U ′, equipped with a suitable oracle, could predict either of these sequences perfectly. But
then we could construct new sequences b′1, b
′
2, . . . that were unpredictable even by U ′, and so on.
The response above is closely related to a notion called sophistication from algorithmic infor-
mation theory (see [6, 38, 54]). Given a binary string x, recall that the Kolmogorov complexity
K (x) is the length of the shortest program, in some Turing-universal programming language, whose
output (given a blank input) is x. To illustrate, the Kolmogorov complexity of the first n bits of
pi ≈ 11.00100100 . . .2 is small (log2 n+ O (log log n)), since one only has to provide n (which takes
log2 n bits), together with a program for computing pi to a given accuracy (which takes some small,
fixed number of bits, independent of n). By contrast, if x is an n-bit string chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, then K (x) ≈ n with overwhelming probability, simply by a counting argument. Now, based
on those two examples, it’s tempting to conjecture that “every string is either highly-patterned or
random”: that is, either
(i) K (x) is small, or else
(ii) K (x) is large, but only because of “boring, random, patternless entropy” in x.
Yet the above conjecture, when suitably formalized, turns out to be false. Given a set of strings
S ⊆ {0, 1}n, letK (S) be the length of the shortest program that lists the elements of S. Then given
an n-bit string x and a small parameter c, one can define the c-sophistication of x, or Sophc (x), to
be the minimum of K (S), over all sets S ⊆ {0, 1}n such that x ∈ S and
K (S) + log2 |S| ≤ K (x) + c.
Intuitively, the sophistication of x is telling us, in a near-minimal program for x, how many bits of
the program need to be “interesting code” rather than “algorithmically random data.” Certainly
Sophc (x) is well-defined and at most K (x), since we can always just take S to be the singleton
set {x}. Because of this, highly-patterned strings are unsophisticated. On the other hand,
random strings are also unsophisticated, since for them, we can take S to be the entire set {0, 1}n.
Nevertheless, it’s possible to prove [6, 38] that there exist highly sophisticated strings: indeed,
strings x such that Sophc (x) ≥ n−O (log n). These strings could thus be said to inhabit a third
category between “patterned” and “random.” Not surprisingly, the construction of sophisticated
strings makes essential use of uncomputable processes.
However, for reasons explained in Section 6, I’m exceedingly reluctant to postulate uncom-
putable powers in the laws of physics (such as an ability to generate the digits of Ω). Instead,
I would say that, if there’s scope for freedom, then it lies in the fact that even when a sequence
that Ω is algorithmically random, in the sense that for all n, the shortest program to generate b1 . . . bn has length
n − O (1). Now, suppose by contradiction that PrU [b1 . . . bn] ≥ L/2n, where L ≫ n. Let An be a program that
dovetails over all programs Q, in order to generate better and better lower bounds on PrU [x] for all n-bit strings x
(converging to the correct probabilities in the infinite limit). Then we can specify b1 . . . bn by saying: “when An is
run, b1 . . . bn is the j
th string x ∈ {0, 1}n such that An’s lower bound on PrU [x] exceeds L/2n.” Since there are at
most 2n/L such strings x, this description requires at most n− log
2
L+ log
2
n+O (1) bits. Furthermore, it clearly
gives us a procedure to generate b1 . . . bn. But if L≫ n, then this contradicts the fact that b1 . . . bn has description
length n−O (1). Therefore
Pr
U
[b1 . . . bn] =
n∏
i=1
Pr
U
[bi|b1 . . . bi−1] = O
( n
2n
)
,
and U hardly does better than chance.
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of bits b1, b2, . . . is computable, the universal predictor is only guaranteed to work in the limit
n →∞. Intuitively, once the predictor has figured out the program Q generating the bn’s, it can
then predict future bn’s as well as such prediction is possible. However, the number of serious
mistakes that the predictor makes before converging on the correct Q could in general be as large
as Q’s bit-length. Worse yet, there’s no finite time after which the predictor can know that it’s
converged on the correct Q. Rather, in principle the predictor can always be surprised by a bit bn
that diverges from the predictions of whatever hypothesis Q it favored in the past, whereupon it
needs to find a new hypothesis Q′, and so on.
Some readers might object that, in the real world, it’s reasonable to assume an upper bound
on the number of bits needed to describe a given physical process (for example, a human brain).
In that case, the predictor would indeed have an absolute upper bound on |Q|, and hence on the
number of times it would need to revise its hypothesis substantially.
I agree that such bounds on |Q| almost certainly exist—indeed, they must exist, if we accept
the holographic principle from quantum gravity (see Section 5.4). For me, the issue is simply that
the relevant bounds seem too large to be of any practical interest. Suppose, for example, that we
believed 1014 bits—or roughly one bit per synapse—sufficed to encode everything of interest about
a particular human brain. While that strikes me as an underestimate, it still works out to roughly
40, 000 bits per second, assuming an 80-year lifespan. In other words, it seems that a person of
normal longevity would have more than enough bits to keep the universal predictor U on its toes!
The above estimate leads to amusing thought: if one lived forever, then perhaps one’s “store
of freedom” would eventually get depleted, much like an n-bit computer program can surprise U at
most O (n) times. (Arguably, this depletion happens to some extent over our actual lifetimes, as
we age and become increasingly predictable and set in our ways.) From this perspective, freedom
could be considered merely a “finite-n effect”—but this would be one case where the value of n
matters!
14 Appendix: Knightian Quantum States
In Section 3.2, I introduced the somewhat whimsically-named freestate: a representation of knowl-
edge that combines probabilistic, quantum-mechanical, and Knightian uncertainty, thereby gener-
alizing density matrices, which combine probabilistic and quantum uncertainty. (The “freebits”
referred to throughout the essay are then just 2-level freestates.) While there might be other ways
to formalize the concept of freestates, in this appendix I’ll give a particular formalization that I
prefer.
A good starting point is to combine probabilistic and Knightian uncertainty, leaving aside
quantum mechanics. For simplicity, consider a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. In the probabilistic case, we can
specify our knowledge of b with a single real number, p = Pr [b = 1] ∈ [0, 1]. In the Knightian case,
however, we might have a set of possible probabilities: for example,
p ∈ {0.1} ∪ [0.2, 0.3] ∪ (0, 4.0.5) . (*)
This seems rather complicated! Fortunately, we can make several simplifications. Firstly, since
we don’t care about infinite precision, we might as well take all the probability intervals to be
closed. More importantly, I believe we should assume convexity : that is, if p < q are both possible
probabilities for some event E, then so is every intermediate probability r ∈ [p, q]. My argument
is simply that Knightian uncertainty includes probabilistic uncertainty as a special case: if, for
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example, we have no idea whether the bit b was generated by process P or process Q, then for
all we know, b might also have been generated by choosing between P and Q with some arbitrary
probabilities.
Under the two rules above, the disjunction (*) can be replaced by p ∈ [0.1, 0.5]. More generally,
it’s easy to see that our states will always be nonempty, convex regions of the probability simplex:
that is, nonempty sets S of probability distributions that satisfy αD1 + (1− α)D2 ∈ S for all
D1,D2 ∈ S and all α ∈ [0, 1]. Such a set S can be used to calculate upper and lower bounds on
the probability Pr [E] for any event E. Furthermore, there’s no redundancy in this description: if
S1 6= S2, then it’s easy to see that there exists an event E for which S1 allows a value of Pr [E] not
allowed by S2 or vice versa.
One might worry about the “converse” case: probabilistic uncertainty over different states
of Knightian uncertainty. However, I believe this case can be “expanded out” into Knightian
uncertainty about probabilistic uncertainty, like so:
(A OR B) + (C OR D)
2
=
(
A+ C
2
)
OR
(
A+D
2
)
OR
(
B + C
2
)
OR
(
B +D
2
)
.
By induction, any hierarchy of probabilistic uncertainty about Knightian uncertainty about prob-
abilistic uncertainty about... etc. can likewise be “collapsed,” by such a procedure, into simply a
convex set of probability distributions.
The quantum case, I think, follows exactly the same lines, except that now, instead of a convex
set of probability distributions, we need to talk about a convex set of density matrices. Formally, an
n-dimensional freestate is a nonempty set S of n×n density matrices such that αρ+(1− α) σ ∈ S
for all ρ, σ ∈ S and all α ∈ [0, 1]. Once again, there is no redundancy involved in specifying our
knowledge about a quantum system in this way. The argument is simply the following: for all
nonempty convex sets S1 6= S2, there either exists a state ρ ∈ S1\S2 or a state ρ ∈ S2\S1. Suppose
the former without loss of generality. Then by the convexity of S2, it is easy to find a pure state
|ψ〉 such that 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 /∈ {〈ψ|σ|ψ〉 : σ ∈ S2}.
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